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The aim of this thesis was to analyse and compare tax morale and its determinants in 
South Africa and Zimbabwe, as well as in Zimbabwe in different economic 
environments. The study applied the standard models of tax evasion, game theory, 
prospect theory, agent-based theory and slippery slope framework to explain the 
variability in the determinants of tax morale between South Africa and Zimbabwe 
under different economic and political environments. The study becomes novel in that 
it provides a comparative analysis of the determinants of the tax morale between 
Zimbabwe and South Africa under contrasting economic and political time scales. The 
study also tested a new variable, namely hunger, on how it affects tax morale in 
Zimbabwe and South Africa. 
The study was guided by quantitative research which was used to inform the study. 
Data was collected using questionnaires from the 2010-2014 and 2017-2020 World 
Values Survey (WVS). For Zimbabwe, Wave 6 and Wave 7 had a sample size of 1500 
and 1200 respectively. The Wave 6 survey for South Africa had 3531 participants. 
Data was analysed using STATA software 2013 Version. The study’s dependent 
variable, tax morale and independent variables included marital status, age, income 
level, employment and religion among others, and analysed them using the Ordered 
Logit Model. The Ordered Logit Model was used to empirically model the effects of the 
identified variables on tax morale.  
The study concludes with an understanding of how tax morale and its determinants is 
crucial for governments in their bid to boost voluntary compliance. Also, different 
economic milieus for a particular country affect the level of tax morale significantly. 
Tax morale was established to be high when Zimbabwe was experiencing economic 
growth due to the introduction of multi-currency, herein called the dollarization period, 
and the opposite was true for the post-dollarization era. Surprisingly, the study’s 
results showed that Zimbabweans have a higher tax morale than South Africans, who 
have better standards of living. In addition, the determinants of tax morale also differ 
from one economic situation to another and from one country to another. Corruption, 
which is a menace in both countries under study, has proven to be an important factor 
that influences tax morale. Results of all the models show that demographic factors 
have little effect on tax morale. The study introduced an important variable of hunger 
in its analysis of determinants of tax morale. Though this variable was insignificant for 
vi 
 
South Africa, the study showed that there is a negative relationship between hunger 
and tax morale for Zimbabwe in both economic situations.  
Based on the thesis’s findings, policy makers should consider the eradication of 
corruption and hunger in order to boost tax morale, which in turn improves tax 
compliance. Also, policy makers should include improvement in the perception of 
democracy in the mix of enhancement strategies of tax compliance. 
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INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
1.1 Introduction  
In developing countries, especially African countries, tax revenue contributes more 
than 90 per cent of the total revenue accruing to governments. Ndedzu et al. 
(2013:144) found that tax revenue as a percentage of total revenue for the 
Zimbabwean Government reached a maximum point of 98 per cent; thus in Zimbabwe, 
tax revenue is government revenue (Bonga et al. 2015:25). According to Kołodziej 
(2011:22), taxes are the obligatory monetary contributions that are made to the state’s 
revenue fund and are assessed and imposed by a government agency on the 
activities, enjoyment, expenditure, income, occupation, privilege and property by 
individuals and organisations.  
Kundt (2017:01) highlighted that the mobilisation of domestic resources in developing 
countries, principally through transparent, fair and efficient tax systems, is regarded 
as a central means of achievement for the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), 
especially SDG number 16 which deals with peace, justice and strong institutions. 
Over the decades, tax has continued to be an indispensable facet of public policy, both 
as a way of financing government expenditures and as a means to finance the 
livelihoods of low-income people (van de Boorgaard et al. 2018:260). More so, taxation 
plays vital roles in developing economies, such as reduction in inequalities of income, 
social welfare, and poverty (Maboshe and Woolard, 2018:14; Enami et al. 2019:51). 
Important also, taxation plays a strategic role in building up institutions, markets and 
democracy through making governments accountable to taxpayers. 
Despite the significance of taxes, governments in developing countries are faced with 
the challenge of low tax compliance. Tax morale as it relates to the quality of 
governance is the least understood but most fundamental dimension of tax compliance 
(Sebele-Mpofu, 2020:02). There is thus a need to determine the extent to which the 
different time scales within the Zimbabwean landscape affected the tax morale (pre-
Government of National Unity (GNU), GNU and post-GNU eras). More so, there is 
also a need to make a comparative analysis of tax morale between South Africa and 
Zimbabwe such that governments are enabled to step up their strategies on increasing 
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tax compliance. Empirical studies have revealed that low tax compliance is more 
evident in developing countries mainly because of low tax morale, poor public 
governance quality, ineffective tax systems, perceptions of corruption and the recent 
growth of the 'hard-to-tax' informal sectors (Rosid et al. 2018:338; Musimenta et al. 
2017:25; Badaoui and Magnani, 2013:02). Furthermore, tax non-filing is rampant in 
developing for example, in India, Chattopadhyay and Das-Gupta, (2002) found that an 
average of one in six possible taxpayers file a tax return while in Pakistan, less than 
one per cent of every 180 million file a tax return (Waris, 2013). Tax non-compliance 
takes two forms, namely, tax evasion and tax avoidance whereby tax evasion is illegal 
and tax avoidance is legal. The Global Financial Integrity report (2020:02) found that 
developing countries lost US$8.7 trillion to illicit financial flows from 2008 to 2017. The 
report shows that tax evasion contributed 77.8 per cent of the illicit financial flows. 
Adherence to tax laws is thus important if governments are to close the tax gaps and 
achieve sustainable economic development.  
Horodnic (2018:868) emphasized that tax non-compliance remains one of the principal 
issues for many governments around the world. Various models, such as deterrence 
models, prospect theory and game theory to mention but a few, have been propelled 
to explain tax compliance behaviour among a country's citizens. An important 
phenomenon that has gained ground over the past two decades in trying to understand 
the compliance behaviour of taxpayers is tax morale (Sá et al. 2014:112). The growth 
in the use of behavioural economics in tax compliance demonstrates how 
governments are seeking to use an understanding of tax morale to improve tax 
compliance with tax laws (OECD, 2013).   
The concept of tax morale came as a result of failure by previous research to explain 
why people pay tax even when the tax rates and probability of audit are low, and the 
difference in tax compliance rates among nations (Torgler et al. 2007:02). Luttmer and 
Singhal (2014:02) define tax morale as the non-monetary factors that motivate the 
payment of tax. Research has shown that tax morale is positively correlated with tax 
compliance and tax effort (Ali et al. 2014; Cummings et al. 2009; Fagbemi and Segun, 
2014:07; Daude et al. 2013:32). At an intrinsic level, tax morale is based on the 
assessment of state legitimacy, credibility and political ratification as well as perceived 
fairness and effectiveness of the state and its institutional environment (corruption, tax 
justice and application of the rule of law) (Everest-Phillips, 2010; Dickerson, 2014). 
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Thus, this study will look at tax morale at an intrinsic level as there is a need to 
determine how the political, legal and regulatory environment has affected the taxation 
levels within the South African and Zimbabwean context.  
The connection between tax morale and compliance indicates the effect of the former 
on tax revenues. Torgler et al. (2008:318) found that low tax morale results in 
overstating expenses and under-reporting income, which ultimately means that little 
will be going to the fiscus. Moreso, Sebele-Mpofu (2020)  also indicated that there is 
a causal relationship of some sort, perhaps two connections – the vicious and virtuous 
cycles of governance – namely tax morale and tax compliance. As such, there is a 
need to determine the direction and strength of the relationship which exists within the 
South African and Zimbabwean context between tax morale and tax compliance.  
Zimbabwe is a predominantly interesting country to analyse tax morale and its 
determinants because there have been a number of major changes that have occurred 
to its economic situation and tax system over the past 20 years. The most notable 
examples have been the introduction of the self-assessment system in 2008 and the 
introduction of the Value Added Tax in 2004. Of particular interest also was the 
introduction of dollarisation and the subsequent abandonment of the multi-currency 
four years later. 
South Africa and Zimbabwe provide a good test of studying the determinants of tax 
morale in developing countries. The two countries have experienced extraordinarily 
different economic histories, despite being geographic neighbours. South Africa is the 
major trading partner of Zimbabwe and a major hub for receiving Zimbabweans who 
choose to engage only in cross-border trading or seeking employment. Tevera and 
Zinyama (2002:30) estimated that 8 million Zimbabweans are living illegally in South 
Africa. Politically, South Africa has had five executive presidents since attaining its 
independence in 1994, whereas Zimbabwe had two executive presidents only since 
1980. Moreso, the United Nations Development Programme ranks South Africa on 
number 114 while Zimbabwe is ranked on 150 that Human Development Index. The 
index measures achievement in key dimensions of human development, for example, 
a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable and have a decent standard of living. In 
addition, South Africa is the world's most unequal country, with a Gini coefficient of 
63.0, while Zimbabwe is relatively equal with a Gini coefficient of 44.3. 
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Research has shown that tax morale in African countries is generally lower than it is 
in developed and transition countries. OECD (2019:13) noted that countries with low 
levels of tax revenue as a percentage of GDP have low levels of tax morale, possibly 
because Third World countries have challenges in the provision of public service, 
voluntary tax compliance, and fiscal stability. It is against this background that this 
research intends to examine tax morale and its indicators in South Africa and 
Zimbabwe for the governments to step up their strategies on increasing tax 
compliance.  
1.2 Problem statement 
People generally do not want to pay tax (Torgler, 2004:238). The issue of tax 
compliance has been contentious since biblical times, when Jesus said, “Therefore 
render to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, and to God the things that are God’s” 
(Matthew 22:21 KJV). Thus, tax compliance will remain open for research for as long 
as there are taxes (Lillemets, 2010:233; Torgler, 2007:64). The growing literature 
strand on the factors affecting tax morale is due to the rising body of evidence 
concerning its effect on tax compliance behaviour. Low levels of tax morale and 
consequently low tax compliance levels are a cause for concern for the South African 
and Zimbabwean governments as they pose a threat to the tax base. Ramfol (2019:01) 
identified low tax morale as one of the contributors to a potential tax revolt in South 
Africa. The two countries introduced a plethora of deterrence policies to improve tax 
compliance, but not much has been realised in terms of tax revenue. The enforcement 
efforts aimed at increasing tax compliance done by ZIMRA and SARS include 
intensifying tax audits, placing garnishee orders on tax defaulters, increasing the 
number of prosecution cases, the introduction of a canine unit to reduce smuggling, 
and use of scanners at border posts.  
Studies have shown that deterrence factors such as fines, tax audits, penalties and 
tax rates are not enough to encourage tax compliance; hence the need to put great 
emphasis on the understanding of tax morale in a particular country (Halla, 2010:10). 
More so, Frey (1997) explained that if fines and penalties (which he described as 
extrinsic motivation) are increased, they drive out the eagerness of citizens to pay tax. 
The concept was supported empirically when the Rwanda Revenue Authority 
conducted a taxpayer letter experiment in 2016. The results showed that letters to 
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taxpayers indicating the relationship between taxes and public services were more 
successful than deterrence letters (Mascagni et al. 2017). 
There is a dearth of literature and research on governance and tax morale in the 
African continent and Zimbabwe in particular. Most of the studies discussed were 
carried out in developed countries and mostly in OECD countries (Sebele-Mpofu, 
2020). Research on tax morale in developing countries is scarce (Torgler, 2003:03; 
Tusubira and Nkote, 2013:01) and specifically in Zimbabwe (Sebele-Mpofu, 2020). 
There is, therefore, a need for this study to be carried out to establish the extent to 
which the political and economic conditions in Zimbabwe over time have influenced 
the tax morale. Zimbabwe was excluded in a study by Daude et al. (2013) on what 
drives tax morale focusing on developing countries. Cummings et al. (2009) used an 
Experimental and Survey Evidence approach to investigate the effects of tax morale 
on tax compliance in Botswana and South Africa.  
Far too little attention has been paid to factors that affect tax morale in Zimbabwe. 
Ngwenya (2014) and Maseko (2014) researched the determinants of tax compliance 
of SMEs, which are different to the determinants of tax morale. Nyamwanza (2014) 
concentrated on attitudes and practices of SMEs only toward tax compliance in 
Zimbabwe. Sebele-Mpofu (2020) used the interpretive research philosophy to 
investigate the connection between governance quality and tax morale and 
compliance in Zimbabwe's informal sector. More so, there are limited studies that 
make a comparative analysis of the tax morale between two countries, and that is the 
novelty of this study. To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, no study has 
examined in depth the factors that affect willingness to pay tax, especially using the 
ordered logit model of econometrics, focusing on South Africa and Zimbabwe.  
The research is driven by the popular Shona adage, “Headache is not a problem; what 
caused the headache is the problem”. In the same line, low tax morale and tax 
compliance are not a problem; the challenge is that of why South Africans and 
Zimbabweans are not willing to pay tax. Hence the motive for this research, mainly to 






1.3 Objectives of the study 
The main objective of the study is to identify and analyse the factors that influence tax 
morale in South Africa and Zimbabwe. The objectives are as follows: 
i. To critically assess the dynamics of the tax systems in South Africa and 
Zimbabwe; 
ii. To determine the level of tax morale in South Africa and Zimbabwe; 
iii. To determine the relationship between tax morale and tax compliance; 
iv. To  examine the determinants of tax morale in South Africa and Zimbabwe; and 
v. To determine the tax morale in Zimbabwe in different economic situations. 
1.4 Research questions 
The following research questions are derived from the objectives: 
i. What are the dynamics of the tax systems in South Africa and Zimbabwe? 
ii. What is the tax morale level in South Africa and Zimbabwe? 
iii. What is the relationship between tax morale and tax compliance in South Africa 
and Zimbabwe? 
iv. What are the determinants of tax morale in South Africa and Zimbabwe?  
v. What is the Zimbabwean tax morale under different economic conditions? 
1.5 Significance of the study 
The study will be valuable to taxpayers, revenue authorities and governments of the 
less-developed countries as well as to academia. 
The research is timely because the two governments are struggling to meet their 
objectives because of diminishing tax revenue. Developing countries have forgone 
important capital projects because of low revenue caused by low tax compliance 
levels. The study is sound on the basis that it will serve as a contributing resource to 
reduce the tax gap in neighbouring countries, South Africa and Zimbabwe. An 
understanding of tax morale and improving the willingness of businesses and 
individuals to pay tax will be important as tax administrations seek to increase tax 




Developing countries are characterised by large informal sectors. In developing 
countries, the informal sector is estimated to comprise more than 50 per cent of the 
total economy; hence the government need to tax the informal sector to increase 
revenue collections. In recent years, there has been increasing interest in ways to 
effectively bring informal sector players into the tax net. The research will help 
policymakers to find strategies that the government may use to collect its dues from 
them. Giving tax morale the importance it deserves, developing countries will reduce 
the size of the informal economies, which prove difficult to tax. The study will also help 
the developing countries (especially African countries) to understand the 
characteristics of their taxpayers so that their tax system can be tailor-made. The 
research will even help the taxpayer to know why he/she is taxed. Focus on tax morale 
is thus important in improving the taxpayer–tax authority relationship. 
Understanding the tax morale of taxpayers will also help policymakers to build a 
culture of paying tax amongst the citizens of the country. Knowledge of tax morale will 
enable the governments to categorise their taxpayers using the factors that influence 
their willingness to pay tax. Grouping the taxpayers will also help the governments 
when doing a cost-benefit analysis of taxation. 
Furthermore, the investigation is justified because it will provide recommendations for 
further studies on the factors that influence the decision by taxpayers in developing 
countries to pay or evade taxes. The research is the first to identify and analyse the 
determinants of tax morale in South Africa and Zimbabwe and thus will contribute to 
the sparse literature on tax morale in developing nations. The study will also contribute 
to the literature by identifying important factors that affect tax morale in developing 
countries other than those listed by prior studies. 
1.6 Scope and delimitation of the study 
The main aim of this study is to identify and analyse factors that influence taxpayers’ 
willingness to pay taxes in South Africa and Zimbabwe. Conceptually, the study is 
aimed at identifying and analysing the factors that influence tax morale in South Africa 
and Zimbabwe. Therefore the study will not look at the effects of tax morale in South 
Africa and Zimbabwe. The study is physically delimited to South Africa and Zimbabwe 
only and will be used to compare the two countries. Theoretically, the study will be 
guided by the standard models of tax evasion, game theory, prospect theory, agent-
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based theory, slippery framework and principal-agent theory in identifying and 
analysing the factors that influence tax morale in South Africa and Zimbabwe. The 
research is limited to individual taxpayers 18 years and older interviewed in the World 
Values Survey in selected cities of South Africa and Zimbabwe. The study is also 
limited to the period in which the surveys were conducted, that is 2010-2014 and 2017-
2020. With the above limitations, the study cannot be generalised for the whole 
population. 
1.7 Outline of the study 
Chapter 2 seeks to clarify the tax culture in Zimbabwe with the focus on tax avoidance 
and evasion measures, and the effects of non-compliance. Chapter 3 reviews the tax 
system in South Africa and the trends in revenue collection. Factors affecting tax 
compliance as well as measures taken by SARS to improve tax compliance, will also 
be discussed in this chapter. Chapter 4 explores the relationship between tax morale 
and tax compliance, including a discussion of factors that influence tax morale in 
developing, transition and developed countries. Theories of tax compliance and tax 
morale will also be deliberated as they form the foundation of this study. Chapter 5 
outlines the methods and procedures that will be employed to identify and analyse the 
factors that influence tax morale in both South Africa and Zimbabwe. The model of 
estimation will be discussed as well as the justification of the model. Chapter 6 applies 
the research methodology elaborated in Chapter 5. Estimation, presentation and 
interpretation of the results will be the object of this Chapter. Chapter 7 concludes the 












THE DYNAMICS OF THE TAX SYSTEMS IN ZIMBABWE 
2.1 Introduction 
Tax systems are dynamic, iterative systems which change over time for several 
reasons, and the most common influences on a changing tax system are political and 
economic (Mcauliffe, 2017). This chapter seeks to clarify the tax culture in Zimbabwe 
with a focus on tax avoidance and evasion measures and the effects of non-
compliance. In order to understand the Zimbabwean tax culture, revenue collection, 
tax amnesty and tax debt need clarification. The chapter enables the researcher to 
articulate the tax environment in Zimbabwe, which is imperative in the understanding 
of tax morale. 
2.2 The macroeconomic and tax environment in Zimbabwe 
Generally, Zimbabwe has been regarded as an agro-based country, with more than 
80% of the populace depending on agriculture for their livelihoods. Although the 
agriculture sector has been affected by the controversial land reform, it remains a 
significant contributor to the Zimbabwean economy (Makate et al. 2019:01). Zimbabwe 
has managed to maintain a comparative advantage because of the mineral resources 
it owns, such as iron ore, chrome and coal, as well as its cheap labour. According to 
Mutandwa and Genc (2018:231), Zimbabwe could still turn this into a competitive 
advantage by engaging in continuous improvement of its manufacturing systems, 
using the available raw materials. However, over the past two decades, the 
Zimbabwean economy has been through a pervasive economic collapse. 
Furthermore, certain developed countries such as the United States of America and 
Britain have imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe, which has made it difficult for her to 
access credit lines and donor funding. 
 
Although it is internationally acknowledged that SMEs play a significant role in 
economic development, the sector has been criticised for being a ‘hard to tax’ sector 
(Dlamini, 2017). This is the case in Zimbabwe, where despite these SMEs having 
become the major employer, they are not contributing meaningfully to the fiscus as 
they are generally non-compliant on tax remittances (Nyamwanza et al. 2014:1). A 
slowdown in economic activities depresses the implementation of tax legislation and 
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this is exacerbated by the activities of the informal sector (Maiti and Bhattacharyya, 
2019:1; Loayza, 2016:130).  The challenges in raising tax revenue from the informal 
sector in Zimbabwe have not just been a result of the nature of the SME sector itself, 
but because of the lack of capacity and will by tax authorities to implement and 
administer taxation legislation (Dube and Casale, 2017:63). Zimbabwe, like any other 
developing country, faces the following challenges such as insufficient staff with 
appropriate skills, lack of up-to-date equipment, complex tax laws, corruption, the 
growth of informal traders and paltry budgetary allocations (Matsanyangwe, 2013:49; 
ZIMRA, 2009:23). Zimbabwe has had a number of phases in terms of political 
legitimacy, especially in the form of disputed elections. In 2008, 2013 and 2018 these 
elections were disputed and as such, there is a need for this study to determine how 
these phases of political disputation have affected the level of tax compliance and 
morale within the Zimbabwean context. 
 
2.2.1 Economic stability 
The period 2007-2009 went down as a historic one for both good and bad reasons on 
the economic front, as the country reached the peak of its economic meltdown and 
rampant inflation, and the collapse of the economy severely devalued the Zimbabwean 
currency (Mufudza et al. 2013). In this study, 2009 to 2014 is the period which is taken 
as when the economy of Zimbabwe was stable. The period saw economic growth 
when the ZANU-PF government entered into a Government of National Unity with the 
opposition MDC party that lasted until 2013. The Zimbabwean Government adopted 
the multi-currency system in 2009, in which the USD dollar was the predominant 
currency (Pilossof, 2009). The appropriation of the US dollar as the foremost mode of 
trade balanced the economy astoundingly rapidly. Accordingly, the approaches turned 
out to be more objective, and the economy recorded surprisingly high paces of 
development, but from a low base (Southall, 2017). There was sufficient foreign money 
in circulation to facilitate the transition, allowing the banking system to stabilize 
(Southall, 2018). In addition, Zimbabweans witnessed the return of consumer goods 
to the shops, and a much-welcomed increase in business confidence. These and other 





The economy of Zimbabwe grew at an average of 12% for the period mentioned 
above, making it one of the fastest-growing economies in the world, improving from 
negative growth from 1998 to 2008 (Knoema, 2020). Table 2.1 below, shows the 
increase in Gross Domestic Product for this period termed economically stable. During 
this period inflation averaged 3%, a remarkable decrease from more than 1000% that 
had characterised the preceding period (IMF, 2020). 
 
Table 2. 1: Zimbabwe’s current GDP for the period 2010 to 2019 
 
Year  GDP (Current) 
2010 USD12.0417 Billion 
2011 USD14.1019 Billion 
2012 USD17.1148 Billion 
2013 USD19.091 Billion 
2014 USD19.4955 Billion 
2015 USD19.96 Billion 
2016 USD20.55 Billion 
2017 USD22.04 Billion 
2018 USD24.312 Billion 
2019 USD21.44 Billion 
Source: World Bank (2020) 
 
The bad reason for the period of stability was that the country’s total debt including 
arrears as at 31 October 2009 was US$5.417 billion, representing a debt to GDP ratio 
of 121.7% (Ndedzu et al. 2013). Of this amount, external payment arrears were 
US$3.839 billion, about 71% of the overall debt. Government arrears alone were 
US$2.340 billion whilst parastatal, Reserve Bank and private sector arrears accounted 
for US$895.7 million, US$568.8 million and US$34.4 million respectively. This is not 
in line with the targets for macroeconomic convergence in the SADC which require 
that the overall budget deficit (excluding grants) and public debt should be less than 




The budgetary emergency that influenced the banking sector in the period 2003 to 
2004 saw five banks put under curatorship, two sold and four saved through the 
Troubled Bank Fund. The crisis was to a great extent ascribed to poor corporate 
administration. During this economically stable period, corporate administration picked 
up dynamism as proven by the distributing of Corporate Governance Guidelines by 
the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) in 2004 (Dube and Murahwe, 2015). 
 
According to Horodnic (2018), higher GDP levels, lower levels of systemic corruption, 
good social protection schemes together with increased levels of trust in government 
departments as well as public expenditure heighten tax morale levels and ultimately 
reduce tax non-compliance. The study will thus test the view by Horodnic (2018) to 
determine the validity of the argument in explaining the tax morale with the 
Zimbabwean context during the period extending from 2009 to 2013. Torgler and 
Schneider (2007) highlighted that tax morale is negatively correlated with shadow 
economy activities and positively correlated with direct democracy. This may be 
explained by differences in the fairness of tax administration, perceived equity of fiscal 
exchange, attitudes toward respective governments, and differences in culture, which 
also interact with demographics and trustworthiness (Kemme et al. 2020). Overall, this 
study intends to determine the strength and direction of the relationship between tax 
morale and tax evasion under the economic and political environments which 
Zimbabwe underwent. 
 
2.2.2 Economic instability 
This period was when the Zimbabwean economy suffered stunted growth. The 
economic meltdown has led to massive deindustrialization and a significant decline in 
both manufacturing and agricultural productivity and output, leading to an 
unprecedentedly dramatic increase in unemployment and poverty (Mutandwa and 
Genc, 2018:230; World Bank, 2020). More so, the production of the main foreign 
currency earners in mining such as gold, diamonds and coal fell by more than 27%.  
 
The year 2013 meant the lapsing of the Government of National Unity (GNU), and 
elections were held. Soon after the 2013 elections, foreign investment largely dried 
up, renewed growth slumped and Zimbabweans found themselves facing an acute 
liquidity crisis (Southall, 2018). More so, the Indigenisation Act was enacted which 
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directed that all mines had to be 51 per cent Zimbabwean-possessed, leading to failure 
by the government to lure internal venture or enhance exports, and an increase in 
production costs. The Indigenisation Act has also been credited with creating further 
uncertainty in the economy and negatively impacting the investment climate in the 
country. To put it plainly, the limit of the economy to procure US dollars through exports 
had fallen significantly, and the flexibility of cash circulating within the nation had 
evaporated (Southall, 2017). There were not enough funds to grease the economy, 
notably for the informal sector, upon which poor Zimbabweans are largely dependent. 
Subsequently, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) imposed severe limits upon the 
amount that people could withdraw from their bank accounts, leading to a crisis of 
confidence in the banking system (Dube and Gumbo, 2017). 
 
Southall (2018) posited that bond notes were presented by the Reserve Bank of 
Zimbabwe in late 2016 identical in value to the US dollar to address the intense cash 
shortage distressing the economy. Bond notes were overwhelmingly dismissed by 
Zimbabweans, who expected that they proclaimed a re-visitation of the effects of 
hyper-inflation which had pulverized livelihoods and investment funds in 2006–2008. 
Again, the RBZ reacted by restricting the measure of dollars that people could pull 
back to a stream, driving depositors to queue for quite a long time to lay hands on their 
cash. There had thus been a huge breakdown of trust in the banks, with no one 
needing to keep their cash in them.  
 
As needs are, Zimbabweans turned to offer the bond notes to illegal money changers 
at an enormous discount. This indicated that the public had no trust and confidence in 
the monetary authorities of Zimbabwe due to the vividly recalled recent history of 
hyperinflation, failed banks and worthless local currency (Maziva, 2016). The RBZ's 
efforts to establish confidence in bond notes, currently trading at a marked discount to 
the dollar on the local black market, did little to alter a negative opinion, and there were 
protests.  
 
Credibility was a major concern in the choice of a monetary policy framework to 
replace the multi-currency regime given the culpability of the Reserve Bank of 
Zimbabwe (RBZ) in the recent hyperinflation (Buigut, 2015). In this case, it needs to 
be understood how the changes in the Zimbabwean state legitimacy, credibility, 
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political ratification, corruption, tax justice and application of the rule of law over the 
period from 2009 to the present, affected tax morale.  
 
In addition, the period was affected by Cyclone Idai, resulting in reduced economic 
activities, especially agriculture, which experienced a double-digit decline. The World 
Bank (2021) estimated that the number of extremely poor citizens rose to 7.9 million 
in 2020 due to the COVID-19 (coronavirus) pandemic and its impacts. The Bank 
further indicated that the increase in poverty levels was driven by economic contraction 
and the sharp rise in the prices of food and basic commodities. Furthermore, the 
shrinkage of agricultural production following an El Nino-induced drought worsened 
the circumstances, especially in rural areas. Additionally, Cyclone Idai also worsened 
the situation in three key provinces that typically account for 30% of agricultural 
output.  Additionally, the dry spell prompted a more extensive effect in the electricity 
and water spheres, causing inescapable proportioning and levy changes in 
accordance with overall costs 
  
The surge in inflation was a further challenge that characterized this period. The 
inflation rate has been increasing since October 2018, mainly because of the 
monetisation of sizable financial shortfalls of the past, price distortions, and 
deterioration in the value of bond notes. Annual inflation reached 230% in July 2019 
following the adoption of a new Zimbabwe dollar and a ban on the use of foreign 
currency, thereby sparking fresh concerns that the country was entering a new period 
of hyperinflation (IMF, 2019). The year-on-year inflation rate was 521% in December 
2019. The Zimbabwean Government temporarily stopped publishing official inflation 
figures on 13 July 2007. The same happened again in 2019 towards year-end when 
the Government, through the Ministry of Finance, stopped publishing inflation figures. 
Inflation remains high in 2020 due to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic (IMF, 
2020). 
 
Most of the challenges emanated from policy inconsistencies, economic 
mismanagement, corruption and political instability (Woyo and Woyo, 2019:72). This 
affected taxpayers’ perception of government and how it uses tax revenues, which 
ultimately shaped political willingness to organise for tax and tax compliance purposes 
(Sebele-Mpofu, 2020). The circumstances have been worse for Zimbabwe because, 
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due to the economic meltdown, companies are generally struggling economically, and 
the general tendency in an economic slump is to evade taxation (Dube and Casale, 
2017:63). 
 
2.3 Revenue collection in Zimbabwe  
Taxation revenue collection has remained an essential element of fiscal policy, fuelling 
the operations of governments as the major instrument through which government 
funding is guaranteed (Zhou and Madhikeni, 2013:49). Therefore, the capacity of a 
government to collect and manage revenue properly influences the level of economic 
performance in a country (Kwaramba and Mudzingiri, 2016:2). In most countries, the 
responsibility of revenue collection has been given off to semi-autonomous revenue 
authorities, which have been mandated with direct control over the administration of 
customs, excise and taxes legislation (Bräutigam D.A et al. 2008:1). 
 
2.3.1 History of revenue collection in Zimbabwe 
Revenue collection through taxation is one of the most basic functions of government, 
as it is a central process through which government funding is ensured (Zhou, 
2012:153). Taxation in Zimbabwe started as early as the pre-colonial era with the 
Zunde Ramambo scheme, which was a collective scheme aimed at collecting produce 
revenue to develop self-sustenance (Musarandega et al. 2018:3; Ringson, 2017:53). 
The Zunde Ramambo was, in principle, a tax levied on villagers in the form of 
agricultural produce and minerals which were kept in the chiefs' granary for distribution 
to the poor. Several other taxes were introduced by the colonisers which included hut, 
cattle, head, dip tank and dog tax (Maposa et al. 2010:195).  
 
In recent years, the Constitution of Zimbabwe, through Section 101 as read with 
section 18(a) of the Public Finance Management Act, provides for the establishment 
of the Consolidated Revenue Fund into which all revenues including taxes are paid. 
Revenue comes in the form of taxes, profits from government entities, proceeds from 
the sale of minerals, and dividends from investments in various companies. However, 
due to the prevailing harsh economic environment and mismanagement of the 





2.3.2 Revenue collection agency in Zimbabwe 
Governments engage and empower agents to collect revenue to uphold public 
governance, and these agents are entrusted with enforcing the revenue laws and 
ensure that citizens are held responsible for taxes, laws and regulations (Wynter and 
Oats, 2018:56). In Zimbabwe, taxes are collected by the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority 
(ZIMRA, 2014), which was established in 2001 in terms of the Revenue Authority Act 
(Chapter 23:11). The revenue authority outlines integrity, transparency and fairness 
as its values with an aim to fulfil the mandate stated above (ZIMRA 2015). 
Researchers have tested the values against which the revenue authority is practising. 
Bemani (2014:08) concluded that the administration of tax laws by ZIMRA is viewed 
as autocratic. ZIMRA was established with the main thrust of enhancing ethics in 
revenue collection and bringing in a culture of specialisation. The revenue authority is 
regarded as one of the important players in the economic turnaround of Zimbabwe 
(Manyani et al. 2014:199). 
 
The revenue authority is a fusion of the former department of taxes and the department 
of customs and excise. The two government departments were vulnerable to political 
interference, thereby limiting their efficiency and effectiveness in service delivery. 
Dube (2014:116) penned that ZIMRA is a semi-autonomous entity with an 
independent board of directors even though it still reports to the Ministry of Finance 
and Economic Planning. ZIMRA derives its mandate from Section 4 of the Revenue 
Authority Act, which provides for the collection of revenue, facilitation of trade and 
travel, provision of advice to government on fiscal and economic matters, and 
protection of civil society (Revenue Authority Act). ZIMRA (2015) explained that it 
protects civil society by banning the importation of dangerous products such as 
cannabis and pornographic material to preserve the national culture.  
 
Matunhu and Matunhu (2014:68) noted that the revenue authority should work towards 
the improvement of its taxpayer image to encourage voluntary compliance. Manatsire 
(2012:77) also concluded that service delivery at ZIMRA was good according to its 
staff but poorly rated by its business partners. Taxpayers have criticised ZIMRA for 
not communicating changes in legislation and tax compliance procedures by updating 
its website (Chikuruwo, 2015:59). Advertising, conducting workshops, creating a 
website, indulging in social responsibility are some of the tactics that ZIMRA is 
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executing to appeal to the populace to pay tax (ZIMRA, 2015). ZIMRA should include 
the taxpayers in making decisions that relate to the changes in legislation to encourage 
buy-in (Zivanai et al. 2014:19). Zimbabwe is currently facing an array of economic 
challenges with a liquidity crunch as the main one, and strategies to mitigate these 
problems are being propounded. Effective and efficient reform of systems and capacity 
building is crucial in the revenue authority for the achievement of the desired goals.  
 
A training school was established as well as partnering with the National University of 
Science and Technology in the provision of academic degrees that relate to ZIMRA 
operations intending, to improve capacity building. Implementing a performance 
monitoring tool (Balanced Score Card) at all levels is one of the strategies that ZIMRA 
has adopted to increase accountability for each staff member. 
 
Large companies such as Econet, Delta and parastatals contribute immensely to the 
fiscus in terms of the taxes they pay. ZIMRA established a Large Client Office in April 
2009 to provide one-stop-shop services to the large taxpayers. The office was also 
formed to provide increased interaction, consultancy and professional advice. ZIMRA 
also in 2009, in conjunction with the Zambia Revenue Authority, created a one-stop 
border post at Chirundu to reduce congestion and clearance time at the busy border 
post.  
 
ZIMRA introduced the concept of an advance tax ruling in order to promote 
consistency, clarity and certainty in the interpretation and application of the tax law 
(Revenue Authority Act). Advance rulings also assist clients in confirming the tax 
consequences of proposed transactions and promote voluntary compliance by 
assisting them to comply with tax laws. ZIMRA (2015) defines an advance tax ruling 
as a written statement issued by ZIMRA regarding the interpretation or application of 
the various legislation instruments it administers.  
 
Despite the effort put in place by the revenue authority to improve efficiency, there are 
numerous deficiencies in the tax system and its administration. Section 27 of the 
Revenue Authority Act requires ZIMRA to retain a percentage of the funds collected 
to cover the cost of operations. In practice, however, the tax authority relies on grants 
from the central government (ZIMRA, 2015:35).  Furthermore, lack of decentralisation 
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of certain services, differences in the interpretation of the tax laws by revenue authority 
and the business community, the absence of fully integrated working electronic 
systems, and the time taken to complete tax audits as well as the time taken for VAT 
refunds to be paid out are some of ZIMRA’s shortcomings (Vingirayi et al. 2020).  
 
ZIMRA missed its revenue target in 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016 as shown in Fig 2.1 
below. The revenue authority attributed the shrinking of the tax base to the liquidity 
crunch coupled with low industrial capacity utilisation, company closures and scaling 
down of operations. Positive variances were noted in 2017 and 2018. The revenue 
authority noted that the positive performance was secured on the correction of the 
Intermediated Money Transfer Tax (IMTT), revenue enhancement measures, a firm 
stance against corruption, and automation, which improved compliance by taxpayers 
(ZIMRA, 2017; ZIMRA, 2018).  
 
Figure 2. 1: ZIMRA revenue collection performance for the period 2011 to 2018 
 
Source: ZIMRA (2011, 2012,2013,2014,2015,2016,2017,2018 and 2019) 
2.3.3 Tax revenue to GDP ratio 
The amount of revenue collected by ZIMRA is a function of the nation’s GDP. ZIMRA 
(2015:02) highlighted that there is a strong positive relationship between the GDP and 
revenue collected in any year. Therefore, every year government procedurally projects 
the GDP for the respective year and from that derives a revenue target. Fig 2.2 shows 
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countries as classified by the World Bank (2020).  However, base-broadening remains 
a major objective of ZIMRA. 
Figure 2. 2: Tax revenue to GDP ratio 
 
Source: World Bank (2020) 
 
Zimbabwe performed poorly in terms of corruption and tax performance as compared 
to other SADC countries as shown in Table 2.2 below. More so, Zimbabwe has the 
largest informal economy of 69% while Mauritius has the least size of the shadow 
economy in the regional grouping. For the countries under study, South Africa is better 
than Zimbabwe in all factors such as corruption rank, tax revenue as a percentage of 
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Table 2.2: SADC countries corruption rank, tax revenue and size of the shadow 
economy 
 
Country Rank Tax revenue (% of 
GDP) 2017 
% Size of Shadow 
Economy (2015) 
Angola 146 9.22 52.47 
Botswana 34 22.15 35.8 
Comoros 153 12.60 43.22 
Democratic Republic of Congo 168 7.50 48 
Eswatini 113 17.20 43.7 
Lesotho 85 31.65 30.58 
Madagascar 158 10.03 47.41 
Malawi 123 17.29 43.66 
Mauritius 56 18.55 26.19 
Mozambique 146 22.19 46.87 
Namibia 56 32.08 32.09 
Seychelles 27 32.07 32.4 
South Africa 70 26.23 29.84 
Tanzania 96 11.83 52.4 
Zambia 113 15.18 52.41 
Zimbabwe 158 15.87 69.08 
Source: World Bank (2020) 
 
2.3.4 Tax debt in Zimbabwe 
Brondolo (2009:04) noted that the increase in tax arrears/debt is inter alia one of the 
major challenges faced by both developed and developing countries. Tax debt is the 
delinquent payment of taxes and deferred payments. Tax arrears also include the 
penalties and interest thereon. Tax debts should not be confused with the tax gap 
(explained in Chapter 1) as they are related but distinct. The United States 
Government Accountability Office (2012:03) differentiates between tax debt and the 
tax gap as the former includes taxes and penalty interest while the latter comprises of 
and includes tax only. There are two main types of tax debts, disputed and undisputed. 
Undisputed tax debt is defined as the debt figure agreed upon by the taxpayer and the 
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tax authority while disputed tax debts are those claims which are subject to objection, 
dispute and/or litigation (OECD, 2013). 
 
ZIMRA faces formidable challenges in collecting millions of dollars in delinquent taxes 
which includes the closure of companies with tax debts, lack of resources to follow up 
the debt, and ineffective debt management strategies. Like total tax revenue collected, 
outstanding tax amounts are affected by the economic outlook of a country where they 
tend to increase in an economic slump. In order to get a sense of the scale of the tax 
debt issue, it is prudent to understand the current trend in tax debt in Zimbabwe. 
ZIMRA (2015) noted that the rise of tax arrears was a result of viability problems, 
liquidity and the closure of many companies. 
 
A report by the Auditor General (2014:62) shows that state enterprises' tax debts 
constitute the largest percentage of total arrears. These arrears were a result of 
intensive tax audits as well as mismanagement of the parastatals which led to 
continual accrual of the tax arrears. In order to caution the largest tax debtors, the 
treasury commenced a project of off-setting the tax owed by local authorities against 
amounts owed to the local authorities by government departments. Given the alarming 
increase of tax debt, ZIMRA has also intensified debt management strategies which 
are crucial in ensuring that all taxes and duties legally owed are paid. ZIMRA notes 
that as the debt recovery measures are affected, caution is taken to avoid the closure 
of companies.   
 
ZIMRA has garnished tax debtors' bank accounts and other third parties to collect 
outstanding taxes as empowered by Sections 58 to 60 of the Income Tax Act and 
section 48 of the VAT Act. The tax authority ensures that a tax clearance is required 
before the granting of government contracts, and if the company awarded the contract 
accrues a tax debt, ZIMRA withholds government payments due to the tax debtors. In 
order for companies' directorship to take full responsibility for the tax affairs of the 
company, ZIMRA also imposes tax debts on company directors. The arraignment of 
uncooperative tax debtors for prosecution is another strategy that ZIMRA has adopted 
to collect outstanding taxes. Section 33D of the Revenue Authority Act gives the 
Commissioner General authority to attach any moveable property of the taxpayer in 




The table below shows the movement of tax debt in Zimbabwe for the period 2015 to 
2018. From the table, there is an increase in total tax debt as a percentage of total 
revenue collections. 
Table 2. 3: Movement of tax debt 




Tax debt as a percentage 
of Gross collections 
2015 US$1.97 Billion  US$3.88 billion 48.97% 
2016 US$2.67 Billion US$3.46 billion 77.12% 
2017 US$3.96 Billion US$3.98 billion 99.50% 
2018  US$5.04 Billion  US$5.36 billion 94.03% 
2019 US$4.79 Billion US$23.19 Billion 20.66% 
Source: ZIMRA (2015; 2016; 2017; 2018; 2019) 
2.3.5 Cost of collection 
The cost of collection ratio compares the annual costs of administration incurred by 
ZIMRA with the total revenue collected over the course of a tax year. The cost of 
collection ratio is a frequently used indicator to measure the efficiency of revenue 
administration. Thus, reduction in the ratio, holding other things constant, indicate 
improvements in the efficiency of the revenue authority. ZIMRA (2017) identified cost 
containment as well as cost reduction as one of its strategic goals. More so, the 
revenue authority reported that it had been given additional functions, some in line 
with ease of doing business reforms, which have a bearing on increasing costs. 
Despite this, the total costs have slightly declined or remained largely unchanged as 
shown by the table below: 
Table 2. 4: Cost of collection versus the targeted cost of collection 
  Actual  Target  
2015 3.10% 3.10% 
2016 3.19% 3.00% 
2017 2.61% 2.70% 
2018 2.49% 2.50% 
2019 2.46% 3.00% 
Source: ZIMRA (2015; 2016; 2017; 2018; 2019) 
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2.3.6 Revenue collection legislative framework 
There are various acts of Parliament that ZIMRA oversees which are based on the 
objectives of the Ministry of Finance. These include the Income Tax Act (Chapter 
23:06), the Value Added Tax Act (Chapter 23:12), the Capital Gains Act (Chapter 
23:01), the Finance Act (Chapter 23:04), the Estate Duties Act (Chapter 23:03) and 
the Customs and Excise Act (Chapter 23:02). The acts spell out how the various tax 
heads are collected. Due to the complexity of the tax laws, ZIMRA has devised 
procedures and guidelines to help its officers in executing their duties and 
interpretation of tax laws with fewer hurdles. The tax acts are periodically amended to 
be in line with contemporary trends, government policies as well as the tightening of 
loopholes being taken advantage of by taxpayers to evade/avoid paying tax.  
 
With the complexity of the Zimbabwean tax system, there are incongruities in the 
interpretation of the tax laws. A client who is not satisfied with an assessment or a 
decision made by the Commissioner-General may lodge an objection in terms of 
provisions of the laws administered by ZIMRA within 30 days after the date of the 
assessment or written notification of the decision. Objections are lodged in accordance 
with section 62 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06] as read with the 11th Schedule, 
section 25 of the Capital Gains Tax Act [Chapter 23:01] and section 32 of the Value 
Added Tax Act [Chapter 23:12]. If the client is not satisfied with the Commissioner 
General's decision, he/she may appeal to the High Court or Special Court in terms of 
Section 65 of the Income Tax Act (for Income Tax and Capital Gains Tax matters) 
and/or to the Fiscal Appeals Court in terms of Section 33 of the VAT Act in respect of 
VAT issues. Lodgement of the objection does not suspend the payment of tax due 
unless the Commissioner-General so directs, according to Fiscal Appeal Court, 
Section 14. 
 
2.4 Tax categories in Zimbabwe 
Throughout contemporary economies, taxation has taken many different forms to 
include capital gains tax, interest income tax, dividend tax, and corporate income tax 
(Erosa and González, 2019:114). In most countries, property taxes are also a major 
component of the tax system, and a significant contributor to the total tax revenues, 
especially for local governments (Norregaard, 2013:100). Zimbabwe has a cocktail of 
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both indirect and direct taxes. Revenue is collected in Zimbabwe under various tax 
categories discussed below; 
2.4.1 Value Added Tax (VAT) 
Valued Added Tax (VAT) is defined as a consumption tax charged on the value of 
goods and services sold or consumed within a country. It constitutes an indirect tax 
collected by tax authorities on behalf of the government and is paid by the final 
consumer (Kleanthous and Chatzis, 2019:01). Van Oordt (2015:33) defines VAT as a 
tax of a certain percentage, levied upon the sale of every commodity or service. VAT 
was first collected in France in 1954 and it has been introduced in many countries, 
both developing and developed. Currently, VAT is charged in over 130 countries, 
where it commonly raises 20% or more of all tax revenue.  
 
Compared to other tax heads like personal income tax and withholding tax, VAT has 
managed to stand out as one of the most significant tax policy innovations, generally 
regarded as one of the main sources of governments revenue (Alavuotunki et al. 
2019:490). Widely adopted in sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere, VAT has been the 
centrepiece of tax reform in many developing countries. By any standard, the rise of 
VAT has been the most significant development in tax policy and administration of 
recent decades (Keen and Lockwood, 2009:138). VAT has been commended for 
managing to avoid the cascading of indirect taxes, being harder to evade than other 
forms of taxation and for the fact that it has been compatible with international trade 
(Alavuotunki et al. 2019:490). 
 
Before the introduction of VAT, Zimbabwe was on a single-stage sales tax, which had 
been operational since 1976. The sales tax was applied on all goods sold locally, 
including services, and the rate was 15%, 25% for motor vehicles, and 10% for 
specified commercial vehicles and the supply of electricity (Madzivanyika, 2017:17). 
VAT was introduced in Zimbabwe in 2004 to replace sales tax and is administered 
through the VAT Act (Chapter 23:12) in conjunction with VAT regulations. In terms of 
the VAT Act, VAT is levied on the supply of goods and services as well as on the 
importation and exportation of goods and/or services. Taxable supplies attract VAT at 
specified rates of 0% and 14.5% or any other rate as may be specified by the minister 




With effect from 1 January 2020, the VAT registration threshold was increased from 
ZWL$60 000 to ZWL$ 1 000 000. VAT-registered operators are supposed to complete 
a return (VAT 7) and submit it to ZIMRA. Currently, the due date of VAT 7 and payment 
thereof is the 25th of the following month of which sales were made. However, Section 
12A of the VAT Act [Chapter 23:12] as read with Section 23A of the VAT (General) 
Regulations, in SI 273 of 2003 provides for the postponement of payment of VAT on 
the importation of capital goods upon application to the commissioner.  
 
2.4.2 Employees tax – Pay As You Earn (PAYE)  
Pay As You Earn (PAYE) is paid in terms of Section 8(1) (b) of the Income Tax Act as 
read with the 13th Schedule to the Act. PAYE is a method of paying income tax on 
remuneration that was introduced in 1966 (ZIMRA, 2020). Remuneration includes 
salary, cash in lieu of leave, leave pay, commission, fees, emoluments and pension, 
to mention but a few. The revenue authority later adopted the Final Deduction System 
(FDS) in 2000 to overcome the problems associated with the PAYE system. ZIMRA 
defined FDS as: 
‘A system whereby the employer is directed to withhold Employees Tax (PAYE) from 
the employee`s remuneration in such a way as to ensure that the amount so withheld 
in any year of assessment is as nearly the same as the income tax liability that is 
expected from the employee concerned.’ 
An employer must register with ZIMRA with fourteen (14) days of becoming an 
employer as specified by the Thirteenth Schedule of the Income Tax Act. There is an 
annual return (ITF 16) that contains details on annual earnings, deductions, credits 
and PAYE for each employee which must be submitted 30 days after the end of the 
year. PAYE is calculated by deducting allowable expenses from the gross 
remuneration resulting in taxable income which is then determined by the tax 
chargeable after the application of tax tables. Payment and submission of returns (P2) 
of PAYE to ZIMRA must be done within 10 days after the end of the month during 
which the amount was withheld. PAYE has been one of the top revenue contributors 




Due to the economic melt that has been experienced in Zimbabwe, job losses in the 
form of retrenchments and pay cuts, the tax weighed down heavily on collections of 
PAYE. More importantly, PAYE collections vary from one month to another due to 
various seasons in various sectors of the economy and are at the peak in December 
when most companies pay a bonus. Despite the contribution of PAYE to the 
consolidated revenue fund, leakages in its collection are inherent in Zimbabwe. PAYE 
is evaded in the following ways: non-disclosure of income and taxable benefits, non-
submission of returns, claiming non-deductible expenses and abuse of credits 
enshrined in the Finance Act. The other tax revenue collected by ZIMRA is the AIDS 
levy (paid by the employee and employer, each paying three per cent of the income 
tax payable). 
 
2.4.3 Income Tax  
The income tax also known as corporate tax was introduced in Zimbabwe (then 
Southern Rhodesia) in 1918, but the current legislation was enacted on the 1st of April 
1967. The assessment and collection of this income tax is regulated by the Income 
Tax Act (Chapter 23:06) with the tax rates prescribed in the Finance Act (Chapter 
23:04).  Income in Zimbabwe is currently taxed at source according to Section 8(1) of 
the Income Tax Act (Chapter 23:06). However, there is a proposal made by the 
Government to change from the source-based tax system to a resident-based tax 
system which is yet to be passed as law (Parliament of Zimbabwe, 2013).   
Company tax is levied on the profit generated by both companies and individuals 
engaged in trade and investments. ZIMRA introduced a self-assessment system in 
2007 with the aim of improving collections from the Income Tax well as improving 
efficiency in the tax system. According to the ZIMRA (2015), self-assessment refers 
to the system where specified taxpayers are required to calculate the tax due or 
refundable and furnish a self-assessment return in respect of each tax year not later 
than four months after the end of the respective tax year. Presently, the self-
assessment system applies solely to taxpayers who are registered for VAT. 
Nyahangare (2011:51) studied the self-assessment system in Zimbabwe and found 
that it impacted positively on ZIMRA’s operations and revenue collections.  
Currently, the income tax rate stands at 24.5% of the profit earned, and the tax year 
runs from 1 January to 31 December, though any accounting year may be used 
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instead if so approved by the tax authority. The tax head is paid to ZIMRA in four 
quarterly payments dates known as QPD's on 25 March, 25 June, 25 September and 
20 December, and final payment is settled upon the completion of annual financial 
statements. The annual return is in the form of ITF12c for companies on self-
assessment and ITF 12 for other companies.  
Collections for this tax category are greatly affected by industrial capacity utilisation, 
the general performance of the economy and the cost of production. The economic 
slump in Zimbabwe characterised by exorbitant tariffs, lack of credit lines and erratic 
power supplies reduced the collection of income tax in Zimbabwe. Furthermore, 
income tax is vulnerable to evasion and avoidance in the following ways: inflating 
expenses, not declaring all the sales, claiming non-deductible expenses especially 
those of a capital nature, and inflating losses, which has a bearing on reducing tax 
liability in the succeeding year as well. 
2.4.4 Customs and excise duty 
Trade facilitation is one of the crucial mandates legislated by the Zimbabwean 
government, which is fulfilled by enforcing the Customs and Excise Act (Chapter 
23:02). Customs duty levied on imported goods is used to protect civil society, and 
promote strategic and infant industries. ZIMRA uses an internationally recognised 
harmonised tariff handbook that shows tariff codes and applicable rates to collect the 
customs and excise duties. Generally, rates of customs duty for basic products and 
capital goods are lower than for luxury goods. 
There are three types of customs duties that ZIMRA has adopted. Firstly, specific duty 
is imposed on each unit of a commodity imported. Secondly, ZIMRA applies ad 
valorem customs duty on certain goods such as motor vehicles which are imposed on 
the total value of a commodity imported. The value for duty purposes is based on cost, 
insurance and freight. Lastly, Zimbabwe embraced compound customs duty which is 
a combination of specific and ad valorem customs duties, for example, footwear and 
clothing have tariff codes that attract a combination of specific and ad valorem rates 
of duties.  
ZIMRA is faced with challenges as far as customs duty collection is concerned. 
Importers evade customs duty by under-declaration of values and quantities of the 
goods imported. Due to poor infrastructural development and lack of resources such 
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as all-terrain patrol vehicles, goods are brought to the country through known and 
unknown illegal points of entry. The wrong classification of goods being imported is 
also prevalent in Zimbabwe, in which agents deliberately use the wrong tariff which 
suppresses duty to, pay less duty. The Customs Act also allows for the free importation 
of certain goods under prescribed conditions. However, importers with or without the 
connivance of revenue officers abuse the rebates and remission. An example is the 
acceptance of false declaration on the country of origin for preferential treatment. 
Moreover, goods in transit end up being consumed in Zimbabwe without payment of 
duty. 
 
In order to curb revenue leakages in the collection of customs duties, ZIMRA has 
introduced a department called Post-Clearance Audits where audit cases are opened 
for companies that have imported products. The selection for audit cases is similar to 
that in tax administration which makes use of risk-based approaches. Physical 
inspection of goods imported is also conducted before a bill of entry is assessed to 
verify the quantities and nature of the goods. The government amended Section 234 
of the Customs and Excise Act, banning the driving of motor vehicles, in transit to other 
countries, on Zimbabwean roads to reduce transit fraud.  
 
More so, ZIMRA introduced an electronic cargo tracking system that uses electronic 
seals and transmitters to prevent transit fraud. In line with recommendations from the 
World Customs Organisation and the International Monetary Fund, Zimbabwe is 
shifting the focus from customs duties to excise duties. This development is evidenced 
by a decrease in revenue collections from customs duties and a steady increase of 
contributions by excise duties to the national coffers.  
 
In addition, a separate excise department was created within ZIMRA to concentrate 
on the world trending tax category. Excise duty is an indirect tax that is levied on both 
local and imported specified products.  A subset of excise duty is a special excise duty 
charged on the change of ownership of locally registered second-hand motor vehicles 
and the sale of airtime at a rate of 5%. The tax head is levied primarily to raise revenue 
and discourage consumption of certain commodities as well as to internalise external 
social costs. Excise duty is paid on importation for imports and on the 20th of the 
following month for the locally produced goods (Customs and Excise Act). 
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2.4.5 Presumptive tax 
The Government of Zimbabwe mulled the introduction of the presumptive tax in 2004 
in the 2005 budget statement (2005 Budget statement paragraph 9.41).  ZIMRA (2005) 
defines presumptive tax as a tax based on the notional or estimated business income. 
The tax authority added to the list two types of presumptive taxes which are rebuttable 
and non-rebuttable presumptive taxes. The two types are differentiated in terms of the 
ability of a taxpayer to challenge the tax assessed. The main reasons for the inclusion 
of presumptive tax in the tax system include broadening the revenue base, promoting 
equity in taxation by including informal traders in the tax net and promoting a tax-
paying culture in Zimbabwe (ZIMRA, 2011). The presumptive tax was also meant to 
cater for those who cannot keep proper records as required by the Income Tax Act.  
Sectors of the economy such as restaurants, bottle stores, cottage industries, hair 
salons and commuter operators were targeted to ensure their participation in the 
payment of taxes. As the targeted groups for the presumptive tax are hard-to-tax, 
various statutory instruments were crafted and led to licensing authorities being 
required to withhold presumptive tax whenever a licence is issued to a trader who 
does not have a tax clearance.  However, Utaumire et al. (2013:118) ascertained that 
the implementation of the presumptive tax was not effective in Zimbabwe. Their study 
concluded that presumptive tax had not been fully implemented and administered by 
the tax authority. The presumed gains from presumptive tax are not visible because 
there is corruption in the tax administration, small staff complement, unavailability of 
information relating to the tax head, and lack of educational campaigns and awareness 
(Dube, 2014:51). Zivanai et al. (2014:18) also concluded that taxpayers are not willing 
to pay presumptive tax because they feel it is on the high side and reduces their 
business viability.  
2.4.6 Capital Gains Tax (CGT) 
ZIMRA (2015) defines capital gains tax as a tax levied on the capital gain arising from 
the disposal of a specified asset. It is remitted by seller or depositary (includes 
conveyancer, legal practitioner, estate agent, building society) and agent. Specified 
asset means immovable property (e.g. land and buildings) and any marketable 
security (e.g. debentures, shares, unit trusts, bonds and stock) as specified under the 
CGT Act (Chapter 23:01). The tax category is calculated at a rate of 20% of the capital 
gain determined in accordance with the CGT Act. A CGT clearance certificate is given 
30 
 
after all the necessary documents such as an agreement of sale have been submitted 
to ZIMRA. There are instances where CGT is not payable, for example, transfers of 
specified assets between spouses, transfers in a scheme of reconstruction/merger, or 
the like that is approved by the Commissioner-General of ZIMRA, where a person 
aged 55 years or above sold his or her PPR. 
2.4.7 Withholding tax on tenders 
Withholding tax of 10% is paid when a business operator including the government, 
quasi-government and statutory corporations enters into any contracts with a 
person/company without a valid tax clearance, which results in an obligation to pay 
any amounts totalling or aggregating a specified amount or more. The payment should 
be accompanied by a schedule showing the names of all the persons from whom the 
10% was deducted, and attached to the prescribed form (Rev 5 Form) and submitted 
to ZIMRA. The tax is remitted to ZIMRA on or before the 10th day of the following 
month and the person from whom the amount has been withheld (payee) is furnished 
with a certificate showing full details of the payee including the amount withheld. The 
registered business operator is liable for the amount that he/she has failed to withhold 
and is liable for a penalty equal to the amount that was not withheld. Interest at 10% 
is also payable on the outstanding amount as long it remains unpaid. 
 
2.5 Background to tax culture in Zimbabwe 
Tax systems serve mechanisms to influence market outcomes while incorporating the 
principles of fairness, and the community must perceive fairness and deservingness 
(Sheffrin, 2018:221). The interactive response of taxpayers to tax systems is a 
reflection of their perceptions of the systems, and this could lead to attempts to evade 
and avoid taxes.  
2.5.1 Understanding the evolution of a tax culture 
In general, culture remains a vague concept, despite extensive research having been 
conducted across various disciplines (Wynter and Oats, 2018:56). According to 
Hofstede (1980:25), culture is the collective indoctrination of the mind which 
differentiates members of one human group from another. It is believed to run deeper 
than just a common code or ideological systems which generally lack a sense of 
communion, and operates as a hands-on means for members to get along in the social 
sphere (Swartz, 1997:150). In this context, tax culture, therefore, is related to the 
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principled dimensions of calculated and deliberate actions by societies in relation to 
tax obligations. These ethical behaviours inherent in taxpayers are believed to be a 
product of several socio-demographic factors, such as age, gender, level of education 
and employment status (Young et al. 2016:563). Since a culture represents an integral 
component in any environment, it has a significant impact on taxation and accounting 
practices (Khaled and Khlif, 2016:547). As noted by Nerré (2006:189), each country 
has its own notable national tax culture, and as such all the formal and informal 
institutions within a tax system exhibit certain trends and practical execution that is 
traditionally entrenched within that country.  
 
Empirical research has proved that culture influences tax compliance in each country, 
and as such, it is a significant factor warranting consideration (Bird and Davis-
Nozemack, 2018:1021; Bejakovic and Bezeredi, 2019:45; Abdixhiku et al. 2018:33). 
Similarly, earlier studies by Torgler (2005:525) and Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas 
(2010:441) have established positive and significant correlations between culture, 
national pride and religiosity with the level of tax morale in a country. The study of tax 
culture is fundamental in the understanding tax morale of a country.  
 
Nerré (2001:01) noted that many governments are failing to meet their goals partly 
because of tax-cultural incompatibility. Nerré (2008:155) defines tax culture as “the 
entirety of all relevant formal and informal institutions connected with the national tax 
system and its practical execution which are historically embedded within the country’s 
culture, including the dependencies and ties caused by their ongoing interaction”.  Tax 
culture is characterised by tax behaviour and norms in a particular country. The 
attitude and behaviour of both taxpayers and tax collectors form the fundamental base 
for the tax culture (Malik, 2015).  
  
2.5.2 Tax Culture in Zimbabwe 
Zimbabwe, like all of the developing economies, has implemented several taxes as a 
way of improving its revenue, especially from the informal sector (Dube, 2018:724). 
The interaction of each player in the tax culture-set with another is of paramount 
importance in determining the tax morale of a country as well as improvement in 
revenue collections. Tax culture in the Zimbabwean context is defined by the 
interactions of formal and informal institutions, including tax consultants, clearing 
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agents, government arms in the confinements of the national culture, as shown by Fig 
2.3. 
 
Figure 2. 3: Tax culture in Zimbabwe 
 
Source: Researcher’s formulation 
A crucial interaction in the tax culture of Zimbabwe is that of ZIMRA and the taxpayers. 
This interaction takes the form of educative workshops, on the submission of returns, 
during the audit process, and consultative meetings, to mention but a few. A study by 
Ngwenya et al. (2014:04) showed that the Zimbabwean tax system is complex, which 
leads to taxpayers exhibiting non-paying tax behaviour. The relationship between 
taxpayers and the tax agencies needs to be mutual and respectful to promote a culture 
of paying tax.  Feld and Frey (2002:97) cemented this proposition in a study that 
concluded that the willingness of taxpayers to pay tax is centred on how the tax 
authority treats them.  
 
ZIMRA launched its first Taxpayer Appreciation Day on 30 September 2011 in Harare 
to recognise clients who pay their duties and taxes on time and in full with no 


























intervention from ZIMRA. It has been empirically proven that the willingness of 
individual taxpayers to follow tax regulations is positively related to the signals and 
efforts of political leaders and institutions, coupled with the existence of norms that 
encourage good behaviour (Young et al. 2016:566). In addition, the existence of higher 
tax rates has been found to discourage a positive attitude towards the payment of tax, 
and this has proved to be detrimental to economic growth (Chen et al. 2017:207). On 
the other hand, it has been found that capital gains tax has been found to encourage 
newly established firms to issue more equity to lessen the tax charged on accumulated 
internal capital over the life cycle of the business (Dyrda, 2019:131). 
 
It is against this background that this research intends to examine tax morale and its 
indicators in Zimbabwe for the government to step up its strategies of increasing tax 
compliance. Important also is the relationship between the taxpayers and the tax 
legislation. It is imperative for the government to craft legislation that is understandable 
to the taxpayers. Tax avoidance and tax evasion are the most common problems of 
taxation which can be overcome by ensuring an efficient tax regime and a healthy tax 
culture. A proper tax culture can develop only when taxpayers and tax collectors 
discharge their obligations equally well.  In order to pay tax, taxpayers need to 
understand what is expected of them and agree with tax authorities.  It is therefore 
important to understand the revenue collection process as well as the different 
categories of taxation as explained in the next few sections.  
 
2.5.3 Tax compliance in Zimbabwe 
ZIMRA seems to be applying both persuasion and coercion strategies for tax 
compliance, relying more heavily on semi-military operations which give results in the 
short run, but proving to be difficult to sustain in the prevention of tax evasion. The 
level of tax compliance in Zimbabwe is among the lowest in Africa, as many potential 
taxpayers are outside the tax net (Dlamini, 2017). In its 2017 annual report, ZIMRA 






2.5.4 Factors affecting tax compliance in Zimbabwe 
An analysis of factors that affect tax compliance is important as it assists the 
government in prescribing suitable and lasting solutions to tax evasion and avoidance 
that are inherent in the country. The following are the determinants of tax compliance 
in Zimbabwe; 
2.5.4.1 Corruption 
Besley and Persson (2014) found a strong negative correlation between corruption 
and the tax revenue-to-GDP ratio, which they attributed to corrupt systems of 
government that face resistance to increasing taxes. Bertinelli et al. (2019) studied the 
effects of corruption in Mali and concluded that the payment of bribes reduces tax 
compliance by 10 percentage points. Zimbabwe is ranked amongst the most corrupt 
countries in the world, with the latest ranking being 158 out of 180 countries (See 
Table 2.2). ZIMRA (2017:34) noted that the most dominant areas of corruption in 
ZIMRA are the undervaluation of goods, especially motor vehicles; false removal in 
transit acquittals; facilitation of smuggling; tax evasion and fraud; bribery; and 
collusion. Hove et al. (2012) noted corruption as one of the causes of smuggling, a 
form of tax evasion In Zimbabwe.  In addition, corruption within the ranks of the 
revenue authority is tainting its image thereby reducing tax confidence in both 
taxpayers and potential taxpayers (AFRODAD 2011:24; ZIMRA, 2014:24). 
2.5.4.2 Demographic factors 
Demographic factors also play a crucial role in the determination of citizens’ attitude 
towards taxation. Nyamwanza et al. (2014:04) found that older respondents were 
generally more compliant than young people in Zimbabwe. The level of education 
received by taxpayers is an important factor that contributes to their understanding of 
tax responsibilities, especially regarding registration and filing requirements (Maseko, 
2013:07). 
2.5.4.3 Level of tax rates 
Developing countries generally have high rates of tax in a bid to increase revenue 
mobilization capacity. Most research in Africa has shown that higher tax rates result in 
increasing cases of tax evasion. Van Dunem and Arndt's (2009) reported that in 
Mozambique a 1% increase in tax rates leads to a 1.4% increase in tax evasion. A 
study by Levin and Widell (2014) in Tanzania, Kenya and the UK found similar results. 
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Zivanai et al. (2016:1554) concluded that non-compliance of taxpayers in Zimbabwe 
is driven by high tax rates, perceived low risk of detection, the perception that fellow 
informal traders are not paying taxes, and corruption in the government. Kwaramba 
and Mudzingiri (2016:12) and Nyakuenda (2014:50) found that in Zimbabwe, a 
decrease in tariff rates is associated with a reduction in tax evasion, which is in 
concurrence with other studies undertaken in African countries. 
2.5.4.4 Deterrence factors 
The standard model of tax evasion (which is discussed in full in  chapter four) assumes 
that the penalty will be charged on the evaded amount, which is a different case in 
Zimbabwe. According to the Income Tax Act (Chapter 23:02), Section 45, the penalty 
is charged on tax that would have been unearthed by ZIMRA. The tax evader will thus 
pay additional tax calculated on the evaded amount plus a penalty at 100% of the 
additional tax. Furthermore, the A-S model predicted that high penalties would 
encourage a high level of compliance, but this is counter to the prevailing environment 
in Zimbabwe.  
Penalties are charged at 100% as stipulated by the Income Tax Act, but there is still a 
prolific number of tax evasion cases in Zimbabwe. Nyakuenda (2014:50) found that 
Zimbabweans generally view the penalty associated with tax as small, such that it is 
cheaper to evade tax than to comply with the tax laws. More so, the standard models 
of tax evasion predict that tax evasion will decrease when the tax rates are increased 
This prediction is not true in Zimbabwe, as pointed out by Kwaramba and Mudzingiri 
(2016:10), who studied the effect of tax rates/ tariff on tax evasion on importers and 
found that a decrease on a tariff of a product results in less smuggling of that product. 
Nyakuenda (2014:50) found that Zimbabwean taxpayers evade tax mainly because 
the government imposed high rates. 
2.5.4.5 Tax knowledge 
Palil and Mustapha (2010), Prince and Anayduba (2014), and Witt and Woodbury 
(2013) explained that tax knowledge has a direct relationship with tax compliance. 
Their research further acknowledged that knowledge of offences, rebates, penalties, 
rights and fines correlates positively with the taxpayers' tax compliance behaviour. 
Kassim (2013) also posited that the provision of pertinent information to taxpayers 
would bring about them meeting their tax commitments as and when due. More so, 
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tax knowledge is a critical element in a SAS (self-assessment system) environment as 
it assists in achieving voluntary compliance, specifically in determining the liability due 
(Kasipillai, 2010).  Kirchler (2013) concluded that the tax compliance rate is low in 
Africa due to the lack of adequate tax education.  
For Zimbabwe, Dalu et al. (2013) noted that taxpayers would pay tax only if they were 
aware of the tax laws. The research also argued that the importance of paying tax 
plays an important role in the tax compliance concept. There is thus a need for ZIMRA 
to intensify cascading information on the importance of taxation to the economy to 
increase tax compliance. Mugabe (2015:50) also had results that showed that the 
majority of the respondents alluded to the fact that lack of tax knowledge has a bearing 
on tax evasion in Zimbabwe. 
2.5.4.6 Trust 
Trust in the legal system, tax administration and government is also regarded as a 
critical factor in shaping tax compliance behaviour. Hove and Hove (2016:522) found 
that there are low levels of trust in all arms of the government, that is, the executive, 
parliament and the judiciary system. Consequently, Zimbabweans engage in tax 
evasion and tax avoidance because their attitude towards the governmental system is 
affected by a lack of trust. Importantly also, the fairness of the tax administration in 
carrying out its duties greatly affects tax compliance in Zimbabwe. Hove and Hove 
(2016:523) observed that 100% of the respondents pointed that they are unfavourable 
to the fairness of tax officials. 
2.5.4.7 Record keeping 
As highlighted earlier, SMEs contribute more than 80% to the tax registers of 
developing countries, Zimbabwe included. Alabede et al. (2011) posit that most SMEs 
do not keep proper books of accounting for their trading activities, thereby making it 
impossible for tax authorities to collect or estimate the actual ta revenue from them.  
Maseko and Manyani (2011) confirmed that most of the small entities do not have 
accounting skills and therefore they would have to outsource services, and this, in 
turn, increases the costs of administration leading to most SMEs choosing not to 
formalize their businesses, thereby evading tax. Poor record-keeping translates to 
higher costs of tax compliance for SMEs, in terms of time and financial resources that 
are considered to be scarce, thereby encouraging SMEs to remain informal and 
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thereby not comply with tax legislature (Evans et al. 2011). Nyamwanza et al. (2014) 
also hinted that some SMEs would even keep two sets of books of accounts, that is, 
the actual books and the other set to be produced for ZIMRA, to evade paying tax. 
2.5.4.8 Tax compliance costs 
According to Stern and Barbour (2007), most business persons in developing 
countries remain outside the tax net because the perceived costs of compliance with 
the tax laws outweigh the perceived benefits. A compliance cost is a cost associated 
with regulatory compliance that does not contribute to the core activities of a business. 
A business may be able to claim an exception from regulation if it can establish that 
the compliance cost would be irrational, and in this situation, it will receive a special 
exemption.  
According to Evans et al. (2001), tax compliance costs include monetary costs, time 
costs, psychological costs and opportunity costs to taxpayers. The researchers 
explained the costs as follows: 
 Administrative costs are costs other than compliance costs that are borne by 
the taxpayers. The compliance cost and administrative cost combined are 
defined as the operating cost of taxation.  
 Efficiency costs, also known as social costs, refer to the cost of how a taxpayer 
would conduct oneself, the behaviour which will not be optimal and results from 
the system of tax available. A good example would be a taxpayer changing their 
decisions in investment as a result of complete or partial exemptions from tax 
to certain activities that are given preferential treatment.  
 Opportunity costs refer to the opportunities foregone by a taxpayer for other 
benefits, with the money and time spent on being compliant with tax matters.  
 Monetary costs are the funds and expenses that are incurred by the taxpayers 
in respect of professional services sourced to assist in understanding and being 
able to fully comply with the tax laws. The costs also include the money paid by 
the taxpayers to the tax authorities.  
 Psychological costs include the depression, discomfort of the mind, and 
frustration experienced by taxpayers when they are trying to comply with their 
tax obligations.   
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A number of SMEs in Zimbabwe face challenges such as the inability to keep sufficient 
books of accounting for both management purposes and taxation purposes and the 
inability to hire suitable bookkeepers and tax administrators. Resultantly, tax 
compliance becomes associated with heavy costs that burden operations. 
2.5.5 Strategies taken by ZIMRA to increase tax compliance 
Notwithstanding the challenges facing the economy, ZIMRA introduced a mix of 
processes to boost revenue collection, tax compliance and operational efficiency. In 
the process, convenience to the taxpayers is ensured, broadening the tax base is 
enhanced, winning the fight against the corruption scourge, and managing the tax 
debt. The following are the strategies implemented by ZIMRA to increase tax 
compliance: 
2.5.5.1. Tax amnesty in Zimbabwe 
Wilde and Durbin (2013) indicated that when governments introduce a tax amnesty 
for raising monetary revenue, a positive relationship with compliance levels of the 
citizens exists because of fruitful government gathering income from both the shadow 
domestic economy and capital held abroad. In Zimbabwe, a tax amnesty was first 
promulgated for six months running from October 2014 to March 2015. The main aim 
of the relief was to assist taxpayers in regularizing their business affairs, thereby 
increasing tax compliance levels in the country. Despite the enticing aspects of the tax 
amnesty, the deadline for submitting the tax amnesty forms was extended a number 
of times due to poor response. ZIMRA reported that 7,580 amnesty applications were 
made from companies and individuals, some of which were turned down. The targeted 
delinquent taxpayers did not trust the revenue authority as they thought that they were 
being tricked so that the heavy hand of the authority would descend on them at a 
closer range. 
After the failure of the first amnesty, ZIMRA announced a new tax amnesty programme 
on 15 March 2018 under Finance (No. 1) Act, 2018. The amnesty waived interest and 
penalties on undeclared taxes and other non-compliance relating to taxes that became 
due and payable before 1 December 2017, excluding the principal. The taxes covered 
under the tax amnesty included any tax or duty administered by ZIMRA such as 
Income Tax, Capital Gains Tax, Customs and Excise Duties, Value Added Tax and 
Stamp Duties. The amnesty covered the period 1 January 2018 to 30 June 2018. 
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Also important, ZIMRA proclaimed a tax amnesty whereby penalties and interest on 
VAT calculated in retrospect for those who would voluntarily register for a period up to 
October 31 2015 were waived in full. The amnesty aimed to increase the number of 
new registrants for VAT with the expectation of a lateral increase in revenue collection 
and to enable ZIMRA to track transactions on fiscalised devices. 
2.5.5.2 Voluntary disclosure 
One strategy that has been adopted by ZIMRA to improve tax compliance is the 
introduction of the Voluntary Disclosure Programme. In terms of taxes, the revenue 
authority is granting full remission of penalties in order to encourage taxpayers to come 
forward and volunteer disclosure of omitted income and other tax compliance 
obligations. A Voluntary Disclosure Programme which ran between July 2018 and 
December 2018 was presented,  which supported people who had either intentionally 
or fortuitously dedicated or excluded acts that were against the provisions of the 
Customs and Excise Act to voluntarily disclose such acts as to avoid penalties and 
seizure of the goods. 
2.5.5.3 Investment in information technology and infrastructural development 
 
Introduction of e-filing 
Muita (2011) highlighted that manual processes in both administration of taxation and 
compliance with the tax laws are tiresome, time-consuming and prone to error. Tax 
authorities around the world have thus introduced various online systems that enable, 
for example, online electronic submission of returns, online payments and online 
viewing of returns. Electronic tax filing was first mooted in the United States in 1986, 
enabling the Internal Revenue Services (IRS) to offer tax return e-filing for tax refunds 
only (Muita, 2011).  
ZIMRA launched an e-services solution which was developed in conjunction with 
Microsoft and SAP, an important step towards the creation of a virtual tax office, in 
June 2015. The ZIMRA e-services platform seeks to make it convenient, simple, safe 
and quick for Zimbabwean citizens and businesses to file their tax returns, make online 
payments and keep track of their tax transactions online and from anywhere in the 
world. ZIMRA offices are located in cities and large towns only, thereby disadvantaging 
taxpayers operating from remote areas. Obert et al. (2018:341) noted that the 
40 
 
introduction of e-services by ZIMRA improved the ease of doing business with ZIMRA 
and taxpayers now comply with tax requirements without necessarily going to the 
revenue authority’s offices. 
Introduction of fiscalisation 
In order to facilitate VAT compliance, tax authorities have in recent years relied on 
automation, moving away from the rules-based systems which were easily evaded 
(Wu et al. 2012:8769). Bird (2003) propounds that Fiscalised Electronic Devices 
(FEDs) were first introduced in Italy by the Italian Ministry of Economics in the 1980s 
to keep key financial data such as total VAT, income and taxpayer details for the tax 
authorities. FEDs are small devices or mini-computers used to determine the amount 
of VAT remitted to the government (Niosi, 1994:139). The devices are designed so 
that they record every exchange made by a taxpayer to calculate the exact VAT which 
is supposed to be remitted to the fiscus. Rathus and Nevid (1987) identified four types 
of FEDs, namely Electronic Cash Registers (ECRs), Electronic Tax Registers (ETRs), 
Fiscal Printers (FPs) and Electronic Signature Devices (ESDs). Fiscalisation 
according to the ZIMRA website refers to the installation of fiscal devices to enable 
them to record turnover and other tax information on the read-only fiscal memory at 
the time of sale for use by the tax authorities in Value Added Tax administration.  
It is important to note that in Zimbabwe, fiscalisation has led to a reduction in the loss 
of revenue as the devices are not to be tampered with. Also, the use of fiscalised tax 
registers has assisted in ensuring the simplicity and convenience of the tax system. In 
order to minimise the cost of acquiring Fiscalised Electronic Tax Registers and Fiscal 
Memory Devices, the government enacted a rebate of duty on machines imported by 
approved suppliers with effect from 1 August 2010. Also, 50% of the cost of acquiring 
the machines was added on allowable deductions on claiming input VAT. 
Introduction of scanners 
ZIMRA first introduced scanners in 2003, while mobile baggage scanners were first 
introduced at the Beitbridge Border Post in 2016 and later to other border posts like 
Plumtree and Chirundu. The main purpose of the scanners is to reduce cases of 
smuggling and intrusive leakages, through strengthened identification of smuggled 
goods and dangerous substances. However, Munyanyi (2015:105) noted that the 




Introduction of the Automated Systems for Customs Data World (ASYCUDA 
World)  
ZIMRA introduced the Automated Systems for Customs Data World (ASYCUDA 
World) as a means of improving efficiency in the processing of customs entries and to 
upgrade from ASYCUDA++. The system enables the government to increase national 
budget revenue by spontaneously applying the Customs Tariff (with automatic 
calculation of duties and taxes) and sound payment schemes. More so, the 
introduction of ASYCUDA has led to the production and availability of reliable and 
timely trade and fiscal statistical data to assist the government in its economic planning 
(United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2011:01). Corruption has 
also been reduced as ASYCUDA world curtails the chances of the interface between 
employees and taxpayers (ZIMRA, 2020). Kamajugo (2014) also noted that 
ASYCUDA world enables transactions to be done online, thereby reducing costs to 
the taxpayer such as travelling costs and costs associated with idle time spent queuing 
at border posts. Also, in 2017, ZIMRA further upgraded ASYCUDA World by 
integrating it with the RBZ Exchange Control System. 
Introduction of cargo tracking 
ZIMRA introduced the Electronic Cargo Tracking System (ECTS), a system that tracks 
and monitors transit cargo from the point of entry into Zimbabwe to the point of exit 
using electronic seals that are armed on the cargo, in January 2017. ECTS is an 
effective counter-smuggling and transit fraud curbing system which increases revenue 
to the government. The ECTS system has also brought efficient clearance processes 
at the border posts and decongested the points of entry and exit, thus making 
Zimbabwe a preferred trade and travel corridor in the region (ZIMRA, 2019). The 
system is also a corruption-fighting mechanism through embracing modern 
automation processes, which reduce opportunities for corruption. 
Decentralization of offices 
In an attempt to increase the revenue inflows, ZIMRA opened many offices around the 
country, resulting in increased accessibility to taxpayers. The decentralization of tax 
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collection points saw the establishment of offices such as Marondera, Kariba and 
Chipinge, to mention but a few.  
2.5.5.4 Tax education awareness 
Lack of tax knowledge can be a huge deterrent to efficient tax administration, even 
though ignorance of the law cannot be used as an excuse (AFRODAD, 2011). ZIMRA 
educates taxpayers through holding forums, workshops and seminars, with an aim to 
improve tax compliance (ZIMRA 2016). ZIMRA has also carried out awareness 
campaigns through distributing tax educative pamphlets at border posts, inland offices 
and various other government departments as well as mounting billboards in major 
streets of various towns. Recently, the authority has been broadcasting messages on 
tax issues on a number of radio and television programmes. In addition, ZIMRA 
introduced Taxpayer Appreciation Day to recognise and appreciate tax compliant 
corporates and individuals, thereby cultivating a culture of voluntary tax compliance.  
In this day and age of technological advancement and where an inability to access the 
internet is a thing of the past, ZIMRA has also moved with the times. ZIMRA has 
modernized and has a fully functional and interactive website (www.zimra.co.zw) on 
which clients can access information like statutory instruments, tax rates, calculation 
of duties, post queries and get access to forms for the remittance of taxes. The 
authority also has its presence on social media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook 
and WhatsApp, where taxpayers can interact with the revenue authority. 
2.5.5.5 Reduction of tax rates 
As mentioned earlier, tax rates have an effect on the tax compliance behaviour of 
individuals in Zimbabwe. Thus, to encourage compliance with the tax laws, the 
government reduced the VAT rate from 15% to 14.5% and the income tax rate from 
25% to 24% with effect from 1 January 2020. 
2.5.5.6 Zero tolerance to corruption 
ZIMRA has adopted a zero-tolerance approach to corruption as it tries to improve the 
public image as well as plugging revenue leakages. The following are the strategies 
employed by ZIMRA to eradicate corruption:  
 Educating clients on corruption and its ills through roadshows and workshops 
 Installation of closed-circuit television, 
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 Prosecution of both ZIMRA officials and taxpayers implicated in corruption 
activities 
 Dismissal of ZIMRA officials caught engaging in underhand dealings 
 Staff members are required to periodically declare their assets 
 Conducting lifestyle audits on the Authority’s employees 
 Forfeiting ill-gotten wealth to the state 
 Engaging in awareness campaigns on the negative effects of corruption on the 
society 
 Introduction of a hotline, run by an independent body, to report all corrupt 
activities by both ZIMRA officials and taxpayers 
 
2.5.5.7 Deterrence measures 
Governments institute a number of measures in enforcing tax compliance, such as 
garnishing orders, closure of business premises, confiscation and levying of penalties. 
Tax penalties are referred to as an extra charge on noncompliance with tax laws 
(Denise, 2014). Nhavira (2016) propounded that the decision to evade tax is 
influenced by tax penalties in Zimbabwe. ZIMRA charges penalties and interest as a 
control aimed to reduce or discourage taxpayers from evading tax. The penalties 
range from 20% to 200% of the amount due and 10% interest as prescribed by the 
Income Tax Act, the VAT Act and Capital Gains Tax. Further, Hore (2006) states that 
ZIMRA is empowered by section 45 of the Income Tax Act to estimate any taxpayer’s 
taxable income if one fails to submit a return and also to impose penalties for any 
evasion and avoidance of tax.  
ZIMRA has also introduced tax audits in a bid to enforce tax compliance regulations. 
Tax audits have also been used to identify and ensure that all businesses are brought 
into the tax net. A tax audit can be defined as a thorough examination of a taxpayer’s 
tax affairs to identify and verify the correct treatment of the taxpayer’s business 
transactions for tax purposes (Bergman and Nervarez, 2006). ZIMRA (2017) 
concurred that the main purpose of tax audits is to review inaccuracies in tax 
transactions treatment which may result in upward or downward adjustments of tax 




 Inspection audits, which are an examination of records, documents and devices 
whether internal or external, paper or electronic of asset physical examination. 
 Compliance audit that involves a close review of all tax heads to ensure 
adherence to ZIMRA statutory requirements. 
 A Comprehensive audit, which covers one or more tax heads where there is a 
suspicion of non-compliance. 
 Projects audit, which is a target-based audit in which the auditors target a 
specific industry/ sectors and audit their business activities to identify risk areas 
and select these areas for an in-depth review, thereby minimising tax 
avoidance. 
 Spin-offs, which are related cases resulting from investigations in process of 
related entities doing business with the entity being audited. That is, a review 
of transactions between two or more entities can lead to the other firms being 
investigated. 
ZIMRA has also intensified border patrols to reduce evaders along the border. 
According to the ZIMRA Newsletter (2011), border and highway patrols have been a 
fairly successful strategy, with reports of intercepting smuggled goods being reported. 
Naming and shaming are some of the important tools used by tax authorities to enforce 
tax compliance. ZIMRA mooted the idea of publishing the names of taxpayers 
convicted of tax offences and also telling the public that those offenders undermined 
ZIMRA's revenue collection efforts, thereby compromising service delivery by the 
government and also burdening compliant taxpayers. This idea was also to act as a 
deterrent measure against habitual tax offenders. 
2.5.5.8 Use of tax clearances 
Obtaining a tax clearance certificate is the highest motivation to comply with tax laws 
and regulations for most SME operators in Zimbabwe (Maseko, 2013:07). The 
Revenue Authority Act, Section 34D, stipulates that a tax clearance certificate is a 
document that is issued by ZIMRA to a person liable to pay tax under any of the Acts 
administered by the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority. The certificate is issued upon 
request to a person whose tax affairs are up-to-date or who has made satisfactory tax 
compliance arrangements with ZIMRA.  
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The following are the tax clearance certificates currently being issued by the 
Commissioner-General of ZIMRA: Income Tax Clearance Certificate (ITF 263), 
Capital Gains Tax Clearance Certificate (CGWT 4 A), tax clearance certificate for 
opening a Bank Account and foreign artist clearance. The revenue authority has since 
started issuing computerised tax clearances to curb the upsurge in the number of 
fraudulently issued certificates. Since the tax clearance shows that the business is up-
to-date with tax affairs, the industry places high regard on tax clearance certificates 
and in many cases, the certificate is a prerequisite for one to place a bid for tenders. 
ZIMRA (2019) highlighted that the tax clearances are an important aid in enhancing 
tax compliance because the recipient enjoys the benefits: 
 Withholding Tax is waived on payments for goods and services supplied, 
 No Presumptive Tax will be charged on importations,  
 Tax Clearance Certificate is a pre-requisite when applying for licences issued 
by local authorities. 
 
2.5.5.9 Introducing reward on whistle-blowing 
Whistle-blowers play a pivotal role in facilitating tax compliance enforcement 
(Matamande et al. 2012). ZIMRA implemented all-inclusive whistle-blower laws for tax 
purposes in 2001 as enshrined by Section 34B of the ZIMRA Act (Chapter 23:11). In 
a bid to gather much information on tax evasion and avoidance, ZIMRA introduced an 
incentive system whereby a whistle-blower is paid 10 per cent of the revenue 
recovered (ZIMRA, 2018). Kleven (2012) emphasized that witness protection and the 
use of whistle-blowers is a constructive strategy to give citizens the upper hand in the 
fight against corruption. In order to protect whistle-blowers, ZIMRA guarantees 
confidentiality guided by Section 5 of the Income Tax Act, which deals with the 
preservation of secrecy. 
2.5.5.10 Conducting customer satisfaction survey 
Taxpayer satisfaction is vital in improving tax compliance in any country. ZIMRA 
conducts yearly client satisfaction surveys in a bid to measure the level of taxpayers’ 
fulfilment with the authority’s service provision and solicit for challenges and areas that 
need improvement. ZIMRA (2018) notes that surveys have established issues 
affecting service quality as system challenges, staff attitudes, corruption, operational 
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inefficiency, high rates of duty and taxes. Fig 2.4 below shows how the revenue 
authority performed in terms of client satisfaction; 
Figure 2. 4: Client satisfaction index vs target 
Source: ZIMRA (2014; 2015; 2016; 2017; 2018) 
2.6 Tax Incentives in Zimbabwe 
In the same way as other non-industrial nations, Zimbabwe offers a number of tax and 
customs inducements in the form of tax holidays, reduced tax rates and accelerated 
depreciation. ZIMRA (2015) defines tax incentives as fiscal actions that are used to 
lure local or foreign investment capital to certain economic activities or certain areas 
in a country. Tax incentives in Zimbabwe relate equally to both domestic and foreign 
investors and the major goals of incentives in place are revenue generation, export 
promotion, employment creation and skills transfer, informal sector development and 
industrial development (ZIMRA, 2015). Below is a discussion of some of the tax 
incentives.  
Section 10(2)(q) of the VAT Act entails that tourist facility operators conducting 
business in approved tourism development zones or an operator of a hunting safari 
are required to charge VAT at 0% for services offered to persons who are not residents 
of Zimbabwe. More so, farming inputs and equipment such as animal feed, seed and 
fertiliser are subject to VAT at 0% (Section 10 a.r.w 2nd schedule of the VAT 

















comes in the following ways: prices will be generally lower since there will be no VAT 
on sales and they get VAT refunds which boost their liquidity. VAT can be deferred on 
some capital equipment for exclusive use in mining, manufacturing, agricultural and 
aviation industries whose investment generally relies on imported capital (Section 12A 
of the VAT Act). The whole amount becomes due within 90 days from the date of 
deferment. 
The Customs and Excise Act stipulates some of the tax incentives in the form of 
rebates and suspension of duty. Examples of the rebates include a rebate of duty on 
goods for the mining industry, goods imported in terms of an agreement entered into 
under a special mining lease, goods imported temporarily for an approved project and 
inward processing rebate. Furthermore, SI 74 of 2009 allows granting to an approved 
importer or agent wishing to remove imported goods under a 7-day credit facility upon 
fulfilment of the prescribed conditions.  
Capital expenditure for mining companies on exploration, development and operating 
incurred wholly and exclusively for mining operations is allowed in full as expenses. 
Furthermore, tax losses accrued to a mining entity can be carried forward for an 
indefinite period. Farmers are also allowed special deductions over and above the 
normal deductions. Depreciation is not allowable as an expense for tax purposes and 
is replaced by a special initial allowance (SIA). SIA is allowed at the rate of 25% of the 
cost from year one for four years on articles, implements, machinery and utensils 
purchased for purposes of trade. Zimbabwe has signed several Double Taxation 
Agreements. These are meant to avoid or mitigate double taxation of the same income 
in the two countries to the agreement, that is, where a business entity operates in the 
two territories. 
2.7 Conclusion  
The Zimbabwean economy has been through a meltdown for over two decades and 
most of these challenges have stemmed from policy inconsistencies, economic 
mismanagement, corruption and political instability. The meltdown has led to the loss 
of industrial capacity utilisation as both manufacturing and agricultural productivity fell 
to unprecedented levels. This fall in capacity utilisation, coupled with the withdrawal of 
support from Bretton Woods institutions, the Zimbabwean government has generally 
relied on taxes as a means of financing government expenditure. As such, revenue 
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collection through taxation has become one of the central processes through which 
government funding is ensured. Through a cocktail of both indirect and direct taxes, 
the government has managed to collect revenue for the fiscus, and as a way of 
fostering compliance and promoting critical activities, the government introduced a 
number of tax and customs incentives in the form of tax holidays, reduced tax rates 





















THE DYNAMICS OF THE TAX SYSTEMS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
3.1 Introduction 
Taxes have been levied in South Africa since 1914 (SARB, 2015). A big part of South 
Africa’s national budget is financed by tax revenues, mainly in the form of income tax, 
which comprises over 30% of the total tax revenue (SARS, 2019). Taxation is of 
paramount importance in income redistribution and opportunities as well as making 
South Africa a conducive destination for investment and job creation (SARS, 2013). 
Income inequality in South Africa is extreme, hence there is a need to continuously 
improve the tax system performance. Aaron and Slemrod (1999:01) highlighted that 
the standard index of inequality (Gini coefficient) for South Africa is 0.58, which is 
higher than that of any other country. 
The South African Revenue Service (SARS) observed that the public finances have 
experienced a substantial turnaround, which is attributed to significant revenue 
performance. Over recent decades, the South African central government tax 
revenues as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) have risen steadily and 
particularly since 2000. According to SARS (2018), the central government tax yield 
rose from about 15% of GDP in 1960 to 29% in 2010. According to the SARS (2001), 
tax reforms played a pivotal role in the performance of revenue collection in South 
Africa. The reforms had two comprehensive thrusts, namely: lower rates of tax on 
income and a broadening of the tax base to safeguard the integrity of the tax structure. 
This chapter will review the tax system in South Africa and the trends in revenue 
collection. Factors affecting tax compliance as well as measures taken by SARS to 
improve tax compliance will also be discussed in this chapter. 
3.2 An overview of the tax system in South Africa 
Bird (2008) posits that the institutional and legal systems are crucial in assessing the 
effectiveness of a tax system to get meaningful recommendations that can improve a 
national tax process. Three factors are key in determining the success of a tax system, 
namely political will in tax administration, a clear strategy of achieving results, and 
enough resources to administer the tax process (Bird, 2008).  
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South Africa used to tax income based on the source before 2001. SARS (2015:01) 
described a source-based tax system as a system in which revenue is taxed in the 
country where it originates, that is, any person who derives income in a country should 
contribute to the cost of rendering government services in that country. South Africa 
now has a residence-based tax system where residents, subject to certain exclusions, 
are taxed on their worldwide income irrespective of where it was earned. Non-
residents are taxed only on their income from a South African source, subject to the 
relief provided under Double Taxation Agreements (DTAs). Foreign taxes proved to 
be payable are allowed as a deduction from South African tax payable on foreign 
income. The paragraphs below seek to give an insight into the tax system in South 
Africa, including the tax laws governing tax revenue collections. 
3.2.1 Tax Administration 
In South Africa, tax policy is set by the National Treasury (Department of Finance) and 
collection and tax administration is done by the South African Revenue Service 
(SARS) in terms of the South African Revenue Service Act (No. 34 of 1997). SARS is 
led by the Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner, Chief Operations Officer, Chief 
Finance Officer, Chief Customs and Border Management Officer, Chief Legal and 
Policy Officer and Human Resources Officer. The Commissioner may delegate 
powers or duties to SARS employees, but not the responsibility attaching to those 
powers or duties. The South African Government effected the Tax Administration Act 
28 of 2011 (TAA) which extended the powers of the South African Revenue Service 
(SARS), at the same time indirectly emphasising taxpayers’ rights (African Tax 
Administration Forum, 2012). 
SARS collects more than 90% of the government's revenue, thereby supporting the 
National Development Plan. The South African Government uses the tax collected to 
promote stable and sustainable economic growth (SARS, 2020:01). SARS 
administers a number of tax Acts, in terms of which taxes, duties and levies are 
collected and paid into the National Revenue Fund. The primary legislation that SARS 
governs includes the Income Tax Act, 1962, Customs and Excise Act, 1964, Value-
Added Tax Act, 1991, Tax Administration Act, 2011 and Employment Tax Incentives 
Act, 2013. SARS also collects money on behalf of other departments under their 
legislation, which is then paid into the National Revenue Fund.  
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The revenue heads under which SARS collects include Income Tax, Capital Gains 
Tax, Value-Added Tax (VAT), Customs Duty, Excise Duty, Environmental Levy, Fuel 
and Road Accident Levy, Trade Remedies, International Oil Pollution Compensation 
Fund, Transfer Duty, Estate Duty, Stamp Duty, Securities Transfer Tax, Skills 
Development Levy, Unemployment Insurance Fund, Air Passenger Tax, Donations 
Tax, Pay-As-You-Earn (PAYE), Dividends Tax, Mineral and Petroleum Resource 
Royalty and other taxes including provincial gaming taxes. In order to improve data 
integrity, reduce human intervention, and increase effectiveness and productivity, 
SARS implemented a modern computerized tax collections and administration 
monitoring system in 1997 (SARS, 2010). 
3.2.2 Cost of revenue collection for SARS  
The cost of collection ratio commonly acts as a standard measure of administrative 
costs, or more particularly, a measure of the efficiency with which revenue authorities 
collect tax (Evans, 2003). The ratio compares the annual costs of administration with 
the total revenue collected for a particular fiscal year. The modernisation initiatives 
employed by SARS in the form of the e-filing payment facility assisted in reducing the 
cost of collecting tax revenue from 1.10% in 2010/11 to 0.84% in 2018/19, a ratio within 
the 1% internationally recommended benchmark. Table 3.11 shows the percentage of 
the cost of collection versus the tax revenue collected. Analysis from Table 3.11 shows 
that SARS has contained the cost of collection while increasing the amount of revenue 
it collected. 
Table 3.11: Cost of collection for the period 2010 to 2019 
R million Tax revenue collected Operating cost Cost of collection 
2010/11 674 183 7 426 1.10% 
2012/13 813 826 8 696 1.07% 
2013/14 900 015 8 702 0.97% 
2014/15 986 295 9 523 0.97% 
2015/16 1 069 983 10 245 0.96% 
2016/17 1 144 081 10 696 0.93% 
2017/18 1 216 464 10 795 0.89% 
2018/19 1 287 690 10 764 0.84% 
Source: SARS (2020) 
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3.2.3 Tax structure in South Africa 
The South African tax structure is generally made up of direct and indirect taxes. Direct 
taxes are paid by the factors that produce the incomes. On the other hand, indirect 
taxes are levied on the households or firms that consume the taxed items (Obwona 
and Muwonge, 2002). Direct taxes often include corporation tax, personal income tax, 
for example, Pay-as-you-earn (PAYE), withholding tax, rental income tax, tax on 
interest in banks, and presumptive income tax. Indirect taxes include taxes on 
domestic goods and services such as Value Added Tax (VAT), international trade 
transactions such as import duty, VAT on imported goods and services, and excise 
duties on specific imported de-merit goods such as beer and cigarettes. 
3.2.3.1 Value Added Tax 
The principal source of indirect taxation revenue in South Africa is Value Added Tax, 
commonly known as VAT, which replaced Sales Tax in 1992/93. Revenue is raised 
for the government by requiring certain entities to register and to charge VAT on the 
taxable supplies of goods and services. VAT is charged at each stage of the production 
and distribution process and it is proportional to the price charged for the goods and 
services. Also, VAT is charged on the importation of goods or services. The standard 
rate of VAT in South Africa is 15%, which increased from 14% to 15% from 1 April 
2018. 
A person who is obliged to register for VAT is referred to as a vendor (Vogel, 1988). 
Anyone who carries on a business that generates taxable (standard or zero-rated) 
supplies over ZAR 1 million annually or estimates to make a total value of taxable 
supplies exceeding ZAR 1 million in the 12 months beginning from that month, is 
required to register as a vendor for VAT purposes. A person may also choose to 
voluntarily register if the taxable supplies made in the past period of twelve months 
exceeded R50,000. As of the 1st of March 2012, qualifying micro-businesses that are 
registered for Turnover Tax may also choose to register for VAT provided that all the 
conditions for voluntary registration for VAT are met.  
A vendor is required to submit VAT returns and make payments of the VAT liabilities 
(or claim a VAT refund) in accordance with the tax period allocated to the vendor. The 
VAT returns and payments are normally submitted/made every two months, but those 
companies which earn over ZAR 30 million annual turnover must submit monthly 
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returns. Returns must be submitted on or before the 25th day, or the last business day 
of the month after the end of the tax period. Late payments of VAT attract a penalty 
and interest. 
3.2.3.2 Transfer Duty 
Transfer duty is also an indirect form of tax that is payable by a purchaser when he 
buys real estate property situated in South Africa. Transfer duty is governed by the 
transfer duty Act of 1949. Transfer duty payable is based on a sliding scale between 
0% (for first ZAR 750,000) and 11% (for excess over ZAR 2,250,000). It is important 
to note that if VAT has been imposed, one will not be subject to transfer duties and 
vice versa.  The concept is to avoid double-taxing a taxpayer (SARS, 2017). 
3.2.3.3 Securities Transfer Tax  
Securities Transfer Tax (STT), a fairly new tax, is an indirect tax payable at a rate of 
0.25% on every transfer of securities issued by a close corporation or company 
incorporated, established or formed in South Africa, and by foreign incorporated 
companies listed on a licensed exchange. STT is paid on both listed and unlisted 
shares and is governed by the Securities Transfer Tax Act of 2007. 
3.2.3.4 Customs duties and taxes for importers 
SARS collects three kinds of duties that are levied on the importation of goods or 
services. The first type of duty is customs duty, which can take the following forms:  
 Ad valorem duties:  expressed as a percentage of the free-on-board (FOB) 
value of the imported goods. 
  Specific duties: mostly expressed in Rand per kilogram or per unit. 
(International Trade Administration Commission, 2015:05) 
Secondly, anti-dumping and countervailing duty is another revenue head collected 
under the customs division. Anti-dumping and countervailing duties are levied on 
goods considered to be "dumped" in South Africa and on subsidised imported goods. 
These goods are the subject of investigations into pricing and export incentives in the 
country of origin; the rate imposed will depend on the result of the investigations. 
Lastly, VAT is also collected on goods imported and cleared for home consumption. 
The tenants of the VAT mechanism applies on VAT on the importation of goods and 
services into South Africa. The amount and type of duty imposed on a product are 
determined by the following main criteria: The value of the goods (the customs value), 
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the volume or quantity of the goods, and the tariff classification of the goods (the tariff 
heading). 
Thirdly, the SARS customs division also collects excise duties and levies which are 
imposed mostly on high-volume daily consumable products, for example, petroleum, 
alcohol and tobacco products as well as certain non-essential or luxury items such as 
electronic equipment and cosmetics. The principal function of these duties and levies 
is to ensure a constant stream of revenue for the state, with a secondary function of 
discouraging the consumption of certain products which are harmful to both human 
health and the environment. The revenue generated from excise duties and levies 
amount to approximately 10 per cent of the total revenue received by SARS. In 
addition to duties and levies, SARS also has the Diesel Refund System for qualifying 
entities (SARS, 2020). 
 
3.2.3.5 Corporate income tax 
Corporate income tax is a direct tax imposed on companies resident in the Republic 
of South Africa. Corporate income tax is payable at a rate of 28%. The following are 
the conditions that apply for a company's income to be taxed in South Africa. Firstly, 
the company should be incorporated under South African laws. Secondly, corporate 
income tax also applies to a company that is effectively managed in South Africa. 
Lastly, any corporate which derives its income from within or outside the country is 
liable for corporate income tax.  
3.2.3.6 Pay As You Earn 
Employees’ tax, commonly referred to as PAYE, refers to the tax required to be 
withheld by an employer from an employee’s salary or wage paid or payable.  An 
employer who is registered or required to register with SARS for PAYE and/or Skills 
Development Levy (SDL) purposes is also required to register with SARS for the 
payment of Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF) contributions to SARS. One can 
register different tax types once and for all using the client information system. 
PAYE is due to SARS on a monthly basis and the monthly employer Declaration 
(EMP201) is submitted on the prescribed dates. In addition, PAYE must be paid within 
seven days after the end of the month during which the amount was deducted. The 
Act provides that if the last day for payment falls on a public holiday or weekend, the 
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amount due must be paid on the last business day before the public holiday or 
weekend. 
3.2.3.7 Capital Gains Tax 
Capital gains tax (CGT) was introduced in 2001, whereby income tax is levied on a 
fraction of the gains realised from the disposal of certain assets by corporate and 
individual taxpayers. CGT applies to all assets disposed of on or after 1 October 2001 
(valuation date), regardless of whether the asset was acquired before, on, or after that 
date. A capital gain arises when the proceeds of the disposal of an asset exceed the 
base cost of the asset. CGT is therefore not a separate tax but forms part of income 
tax. All capital gains and capital losses made on the disposal of assets are subject to 
CGT unless excluded by specific provisions. The Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax 
Act, 1962 (the Act) contains most of the CGT provisions which determine a taxable 
capital gain or an assessed capital loss. 
SARS introduced CGT because the absence of it created distortions in the economy, 
by encouraging taxpayers to convert otherwise taxable income into tax-free capital 
gains. Before the enactment of the CGT Act, sophisticated taxpayers engaged in tax 
evasion transactions, thereby reducing the efficiency and equity of the overall tax 
system. CGT is thus a critical element of any income tax system as it protects the 
integrity of the personal and corporate income tax bases and can materially assist in 
improving tax morality (SARS, 2001:04).  
3.2.3.8 Personal income tax 
Personal income tax is the normal tax that is paid on an individual's taxable income. 
Steenekamp (2012) listed the amounts that an individual receives which are taxable 
as income from employment, profits or losses from a business or trade income, or 
profits arising from an individual is a beneficiary of a trust, Director's fees, investment 
income such as interest and foreign dividends, Rental income or losses, Income from 
royalties, Annuities, Pension income, and certain capital gains. 
In South Africa, a person is liable to pay income tax if he/she earns more than: For the 
2021 year of assessment (1 March 2020 - 28 February 2021) R83,100 if he/she is 
younger than 65 years. If one is 65 years of age or older, the tax threshold (i.e. the 
amount above which income tax becomes payable) increases to R128,650. For 
taxpayers aged 75 years and older, this threshold is R143,850. For the 2020 year of 
56 
 
assessment (1 March 2019 - 29 February 2020) R79,000 if one is younger than 65 
years. If a person is 65 years of age or older, the tax threshold (i.e. the amount above 
which income tax becomes payable) increases to R122,300. For taxpayers aged 75 
years and older, this threshold is R136,750 (SARS, 2020). 
3.2.4 Tax mix in South Africa 
As mentioned earlier, the current South African tax mix involves both direct and 
indirect taxes. Table 3.2 shows each tax head and its contribution to the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP). Direct taxes, with special mention of Personal Income Tax, 
contributed significantly to the GDP of South Africa for the period 2013 to 2018. For 
Indirect taxes, VAT is the major contributor, followed by the fuel levy.  The total tax 
revenue as a percentage of GDP is in line with other upper-middle-income and even 
high-income countries as classified by the World Bank (2020). 
Table 3. 2 : Revenue collection per tax head 
Source: SARS (2013; 2014; 2015; 2016; 2017; 2018) 
3.2.5 Tax effort in South Africa 
The tax performance of South Africa can be measured using the tax effort index 
(Glenday, 2008:07). Generally, tax effort is defined as an index of the ratio between 
the share of actual collection to GDP and taxable capacity. Consequently, a high tax 
effort is defined as the case when a tax effort index is above one, inferring that the 
country utilises its tax base well to increase tax income (Stotsky et al. 1997). Le et al. 
(2012) describe tax effort as the actual tax revenues of a country (as measured by the 
R million
PIT CIT DT/STC Other VAT Fuel levy Customs duties Specific excise dutiesOther Total tax revenue
% of total
2013/14 34.50% 19.90% 1.90% 1.50% 26.40% 4.90% 4.90% 3.20% 2.70% 100.00%
2014/15 35.90% 18.90% 2.20% 1.60% 26.50% 4.90% 4.10% 3.30% 2.60% 100.00%
2015/16 36.40% 18.10% 2.20% 1.60% 26.30% 5.20% 4.30% 3.30% 2.60% 100.00%
2016/17 37.20% 18.10% 2.70% 1.50% 25.30% 5.50% 4.00% 3.10% 2.50% 100.00%
2017/18 38.10% 18.10% 2.30% 1.60% 24.50% 5.80% 4.00% 3.10% 2.50% 100.00%
% of GDP
2013/14 8.60% 5.00% 0.50% 0.40% 6.60% 1.20% 1.20% 0.80% 0.70% 24.90%
2014/15 9.20% 4.80% 0.50% 0.40% 6.80% 1.30% 1.10% 0.80% 0.70% 25.50%
2015/16 9.40% 4.70% 0.60% 0.40% 6.80% 1.30% 1.10% 0.80% 0.70% 25.90%
2016/17 9.70% 4.70% 0.70% 0.40% 6.60% 1.40% 1.00% 0.80% 0.70% 25.90%




share of taxes in GDP) to its tax capacity. According to Le et al. (2012:19), South Africa 
is included in a group with high tax collection and high tax effort.  
3.2.6 Tax revenue 
The tax revenue of any country is defined by the tax-to-GDP ratio. There has been a 
steady increase in tax revenue as a percentage of GDP in South Africa as depicted 
by Table 3.3. The increase has been attributed to modernisation initiatives undertaken 
by SARS. 
Table 3. 3 : Revenue collection as a percentage of GDP 




Tax revenue as a % of 
GDP 
2010/11 674 183 2825042.00 23.9% 
2011/12 742 650 3078417.00 24.1% 
2012/13 813 826 3320754.00 24.5% 
2013/14 900 015 3614459.00 24.9% 
2014/15 986 295 3865119.00 25.5% 
2015/16 1 069 983 4124704.00 25.9% 
2016/17 1 144 081 4419437.00 25.9% 
2017/18 1 216 464 4698724.00 25.9% 
2018/19 1 287 690 4921494.00 26.2% 
Source: SARS (2010; 2011; 2012; 2013; 2014; 2015; 2016; 2017; 2018) 
3.2.7 Tax buoyancy 
One of the most important measures of the efficiency of tax systems in public finance 
is tax buoyancy. Tax buoyancy is an indicator used to measure efficiency in revenue 
generation in response to an increase in GDP. In simple terms, tax buoyancy is the 
relationship between tax revenue growth and economic growth. The indicator is 
computed by dividing the percentage change in tax revenue by the percentage change 
in GDP over the period. A buoyancy of one (1) means the pace of revenue growth 
matches that of GDP growth. More so, a tax is said to be buoyant if the tax revenues 
increase more than proportionately in response to a rise in national income or output. 
A tax is buoyant when revenues increase by more than, say, 1 per cent for a 1 per 
cent increase in GDP. 
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Khumbuzile and Hlalefang (2018:13) studied the impact of taxes on economic growth 
in South Africa and concluded that the impact of taxes on economic growth is negative 
and significant in the short and long run. However, Riba (2016:38) had contrasting 
results which showed a positive relationship between taxes and economic growth. In 
recent years, South Africa has experienced a decline in tax buoyancy as shown Table 
3.4.  
Table 3. 4: Tax buoyancy rate 
Period Tax Buoyancy rate Average Tax Buoyancy rate 
2010/11 1.18 1.07 
2011/12 1.13 1.07 
2012/13 1.22 1.07 
2013/14 1.20 1.07 
2014/15 1.37 1.07 
2015/16 1.26 1.07 
2016/17 1.07 1.00 
2017/18 1.07 0.91 
Source: SARS (2010; 2011; 2012; 2013; 2014; 2015; 2016; 2017; 2018) 
3.3 Tax incentives in South Africa 
Klemm and Parys S (2012: 394) define tax incentives as provisions in tax codes that 
give comparatively favourable tax treatment to some sectors, industries or activities. 
Tax incentives are often used as instruments by state governments across the world 
in a bid to lure investors into investing in particular regions, sectors or certain 
enterprises in the economy. Governments often introduce tax reprieves to overcome 
three sets of hurdles to investment: tax-related constraints, non-tax-related economic 
constraints and non-economic constraints (Zee et al. 2002:1499). 
South Africa is one of the countries that have applied different categories of tax 
incentives to direct investment in different sectors, regions, or categories of business 
in which development is expected to occur faster. The South African Government has 
implemented several tax incentives for both small and large businesses to promote 
their growth. These tax incentives range from progressive tax rates to accelerated 
capital allowances for small business corporations, turnover and others including 
those related to CGT, SDL and VAT (Jordaan, 2012: 01). 
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3.3.1 Tax incentives for large corporations 
The following is an explanation of the tax incentives that large corporations enjoy in 
South Africa. 
3.3.1.1 Economic Processing Zones (EPZs) 
EPZs were amongst the first initiatives pioneered in developing countries to promote 
export growth and diversification. The East African Community (2020) defined an 
export processing zone (EPZ) as a customs area in which a company is permitted to 
import capital equipment and raw materials for the manufacture of export goods under 
security, without payment of customs-related duties. However, the goods imported are 
subject to customs control from importation, through the manufacturing process, to the 
time of export or duty payment for home consumption.  
In South Africa, industries under EPZ classification are exempted from VAT on inputs 
of Industrial Development Zone (IDZ) companies sourced from the domestic economy 
and for export processing purposes. They are also exempted from property tax and 
have unrestricted duty free inputs (SADC, 2014). More so, companies under EPZ 
benefit from free trade conditions and streamlined government red tape, allowing for 
one-stop registration and licensing. 
3.3.1.2 The Research and Development incentive  
Research and Development incentives benefit both the taxpayer and the government. 
For the taxpayer, research and development reduces entrepreneurial risk and 
encourages innovation and growth for the country as a whole. A company undertaking 
research and development in the Republic of South Africa qualifies for a 150% tax 
deduction of its operational research and development expenditure (Section 11D of 
the Income Tax Act). The research and development incentive is available to 
businesses of all sizes in all sectors of the economy registered in South Africa. 
Research and development expenditure that satisfies the provisions of the above-
mentioned section will qualify for an automatic 100% tax deduction.  
An additional 50% uplift applies to expenditures on research and development 
activities that have been approved by the Minister of Science and Technology, based 
on the provisions of Section 11D of the Income Tax Act. The incentive is aimed at 
encouraging businesses to undertake and invest in Research and Development in 
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South Africa. However, according to OECD (2019:02), the importance of the incentive 
declined marginally in South Africa for the period up to 2016. 
3.3.1.3 Accelerated depreciation allowance  
The cost of capital is one of the most important determinants of firms’ capital 
investment decisions. Depreciation is not allowable as a deduction when calculating 
taxable income. However, as one of the incentives for taxpayers, wear and tear 
allowance may be deducted on specific capital equipment such as machinery, utensils 
and articles used to produce taxable income if those assets have diminished in value. 
An accelerated depreciation allowance allows firms to deduct depreciation faster than 
the economic depreciation of any particular asset; this constitutes a tax benefit and a 
loss to the treasury.  
Goode (1955:195) acknowledged three conduits through which systems of 
accelerated depreciation allowances may motivate investment. The first is time 
discount gain, hedging against longer-term risk and uncertainty by expecting assets 
to pay for themselves within periods distinctly shorter than their normal economic lives, 
and enhancement in the revenue flows of businesses. More so, the tax incentive is set 
to encourage investment in capital assets. Lastly, from the government’s point of view, 
accelerated depreciation allowances are less costly in terms of revenue foregone than 
are tax holidays (Morisset and Pirnia, 2000:14). 
3.3.1.4 Infrastructure development allowance  
Section 12D of the Income Tax Act allows for a deduction to taxpayers who have 
constructed the following: pipelines used for the transportation of natural oil, lines or 
cables used for the transmission of electricity, telephone lines or cables used for the 
transmission of any signal for telecommunication, and railway lines used for the 
transportation of persons or goods. The deduction is a maximum of 10 per cent of the 
cost per annum for pipelines used to transport natural oil and 5 per cent for 
transmission and railway lines. 
3.3.1.5 Public-Private Partnership allowances  
Public-Private Partnerships are crucial in the development of a country as the concept 
allows public administrators to concentrate on planning, policy and regulation, while 
the private sector concentrates on improving efficiency and quality of service. In order 
to improve state-owned properties, the government of South Africa gives grants to 
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private players and allows tax deductions in relation to the actual improvements made 
by the taxpayer. 
3.3.1.6 Energy-efficiency savings allowance  
The energy-efficiency savings tax incentive, which was instituted in December 2013, 
is provided for in legislation by Section 12L of the Income Tax Act. The incentive, which 
was extended for three more years in the 2019 budget statement, enables small and 
large businesses to save as much as 30% on their energy bills. The tax incentive is 
also aimed at reducing companies’ carbon footprint and assisting in reducing the 
demand for South Africa’s scarce energy resources.  
This incentive offers a tax deduction for taxpayers who implement energy-saving 
measures. For years of assessment commencing on or after 1 March 2015, the 
allowance is calculated at R0.95 per kilowatt-hour of energy efficiency savings. The 
energy efficiency savings must be measured and confirmed Department of Energy or 
the South African National Energy Development Institute (SANEDI). 
3.3.1.7 The Industrial Development Zone  
The South African Government established the Industrial Development Zone 
Programme (IDZ) in 2000, which offers what is called Customs Secured Areas 
(Department of Trade and Industry, 2012:09). The Manufacturing Development Act 
(MDA) establishes the Industrial Development Zone (IDZ). Currently, the government 
is operating the following IDZs: Coega IDZ, Richard’s Bay IDZ, East London IDZ, 
Saldanha IDZ and Dube Trade Port. Companies that are in the IDZ enjoy exemption 
from excise duties, VAT and import duty on assets and inputs used in the production 
of exports. In addition, corporate income tax is reduced to 15%. The IDZs also provide 
dedicated customs officials to help speed up the administration surrounding 
importing/exporting.  
Section 12I of the Income Tax Act allows for the deduction of expenditure incurred on 
industrial policy projects classified as Greenfield projects and Brownfield projects. 
Greenfield projects are new industrial projects utilising wholly new assets for 
manufacturing, while Brownfield projects are projects that are already in existence. 
The main objective of IDZs is to attract foreign direct investment and export of value-




3.3.1.8 Special Economic Zones (SEZ)  
The Special Economic Zones Act, promulgated in 2014, commenced in February 2016 
and provides for the designation, promotion, development, operation and 
management of SEZs. The South African Department of Trade and Industry defines 
SEZs as, ‘geographically designated areas of a country set aside for specifically 
targeted economic activities, which are then supported through special arrangements 
(which may include laws) and support systems that are often different from those that 
apply in the rest of the country. The SEZ programme is an important government 
instrument to propel industrialisation, regional development, export promotion and job 
creation, as well as to enhance South Africa’s attractiveness as a potential destination 
for FDI (Davies, 2014). Currently, qualifying companies operate in the following six 
approved SEZs: Coega, Dube Tradeport, East London, Maluti-A-Phofung, Richards 
Bay and Saldanha Bay. 
The term identifies the three key features of the policy instrument called the Special 
Economic Zone. Special refers to the differential regulatory regime that separates the 
zone from those prevailing in the domestic economy. More so, economic refers to the 
fact that SEZs are about economic growth, employment, export earnings and tax 
revenues. Lastly, zone refers either to the physically or legally bounded “economic 
space” within the national territory in which the SEZ regime applies. 
3.4 Tax incentives for Small and Medium Enterprises 
Small, medium and micro enterprises (SMMEs) are important mechanisms for 
addressing the challenges of job creation, economic growth and equity in South Africa 
(Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), 2005:7). In South Africa, around ninety-one 
per cent (91%) of formal business entities are small and medium-sized entities. SMEs 
are estimated to contribute between fifty-two per cent (52%) and fifty-seven per cent 
(57%) to gross domestic product (GDP) and provide about sixty-one per cent (61%) 
to employment (Abor and Quartey, 2010:210). In order to encourage the growth of 
SMEs, the South African Government has put in place the following tax incentives. 
3.4.1 Accelerated capital allowance 
Section 12E (1) allows a deduction equal to the cost of plant and machinery, either 
brought into use for the first time by the SME for that taxpayer's trade or used by that 
taxpayer directly in the process of manufacture carried on by that taxpayer. The SME 
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must be the owner of the asset. The total amount of the allowance available under 
Section 12E(1) may be limited to less than 100 per cent of the cost of the plant or 
machinery if funding was received from a small business funding entity or in the form 
of a government grant. 
3.4.2 Exemption of capital gains tax on disposal of assets 
Paragraph 57 of the Eighth Schedule of the Income Tax Act exempts capital gain on 
the disposal of the assets of a small business after satisfying one of the following 
conditions:  
 The disposal should be done by a natural person trading as a sole proprietor or 
a partner in a partnership on withdrawal from the partnership, or a shareholder 
of a company or close corporation, of the entire direct interest in a company, 
comprising at least 10% of the equity of the company;  
  The asset, interest in the partnership or interest in the company should have 
been held for a continuous period of five years prior to the disposal: 
  The natural person has attained the age of 55 years or the disposal is a 
consequence of ill health, other infirmities, superannuation or death: 
 All of the capital gains should be realised within 24 months after the date of the 
first disposal; and  
 The total capital gain that is exempted may not exceed R750,000 over the 
lifetime of the natural person. Also, if a natural person operates more than one 
small business, he is obliged to include all qualifying disposals for each such 
small business when determining the capital gain that is to be disregarded. In 
that regard, the assets of a small business are limited to a cumulative total of 
R5 000,000 in terms of the market value of the assets. 
 
3.4.3 Employment tax incentive 
The high rate of unemployment in South Africa, in particular, unemployment in the 
youth, led to the introduction of the employment tax incentive established by the 
Employment Tax Incentive Act (2013). The tax incentive benefits the employer as Pay-
As-You-Earn (PAYE) is significantly reduced by the ETI amount claimed by the 
employer. Subsequently, a reduction in PAYE remittances has the effect of reducing 
the cost of hiring young job seekers who are less skilled and lack experience. SARS 
(2014b:1) explained that the Employment Tax Incentive (ETI) is a cost-sharing 
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mechanism between employers and the government aimed at reducing the liability of 
employers for PAYE. The employment incentive scheme allows employers to claim 
relief for a 24 qualifying month period for all employees who qualify.  
Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the ETI for qualifying employees was increased from 
R1,000 to R1,500 for the first 12 qualifying months and from R500 to R1 000 for the 
second 12 qualifying months. Furthermore, relief was granted in terms of the age 
restriction on ETIs for qualifying employees, in that an ETI of R500 is granted per 
qualifying employee per month, where the employees are between the ages of 30 – 
65 years (SARS 2020). 
A monthly calculation has to be done by the employer to determine how much must 
be claimed for each qualifying employee. The calculation provides for the 
remuneration paid, the period for which the employee is employed in a particular 
month, and the percentage that may be claimed. Furthermore, the employer may also 
add amounts rolled over from previous months.  
3.4.4 Turnover tax 
Turnover tax is a streamlined system aimed at improvement in convenience for micro 
businesses to meet their tax commitments. The turnover tax system substitutes for 
Income Tax, VAT, Provisional Tax, Capital Gains Tax and Dividends Tax for small 
businesses with a qualifying annual turnover of R1 million or less. A micro business 
that is registered for turnover tax can, however, elect to remain in the VAT system 
(from 1 March 2012). Turnover tax is calculated by applying a tax rate to the taxable 
income of a micro business. 
This relief is only available to SBCs that meet the definition of a Small Business 
Corporation as contained in section 12E(4)(a) of the Income Tax Act. If the enterprise 
can be classified as an SBC, then the tax rates for financial years ending on any date 







Table 3. 5 : Turnover tax rates 
Taxable Income (R) Rate of Tax (R) 
1 – 83 100 0% of taxable income 
83 101 – 365 000 7% of taxable income above 83 100 
365 001 – 550 000 19 733 + 21% of taxable income above 365 000 
550 001 and above 58 583 + 28% of the amount above 550 000 
Source: SARS (2020) 
3.4.5 Relief on applying for advance tax rulings 
SARS (2020) expounded that the Advance Tax Ruling (ATR) system strives to 
stimulate simplicity, consistency and certainty about the understanding and application 
of the applicable tax laws. Transparency and certainty on the commissioner's 
interpretation and application of the tax laws relating to proposed transactions can be 
acquired through a binding private ruling (BPR) or a binding class ruling (BCR).  
The service is rendered to taxpayers on a cost-recovery basis but SBCs qualify for a 
reduced application fee of R2, 500 per application, and no fee is charged for the first 
15 hours of work (SARS, 2020). The application fee for all applications is R14, 000 
except for small businesses. SBCs thus make a saving when applying for binding 
rulings. Furthermore, SBCs benefit from the ease of access to the advance tax ruling 
system, thereby increasing tax compliance as clarity and certainty on the interpretation 
of tax is sought.  
3.4.6 Value Added Tax incentives for small business corporations 
Section 15 of the VAT Act requires that vendors must account for VAT on the earlier 
of invoice or payment; that is, the VAT system is invoice-based, unless otherwise 
approved by the Commissioner. This system may pose challenges to often less-liquid 
small businesses, as some of their clients take time to settle their accounts after an 
invoice has been issued. As a relief to SBCs, if their supplies do not exceed R2.5 
million per annum, they may account for VAT on payment (SARS, 2020). More so, 






3.4.7 Venture Capital Tax incentive 
The Venture Capital Tax incentive was implemented in 2009 to promote venture 
capital equity investments in SMEs to provide incentives for equity financing, a venture 
capital regime. Section 12J of the Income Tax Act provides for the venture capital tax 
incentive. The objective of the tax incentive was to create and maintain employment 
and to grow the economy and ultimately the tax base through encouraging investors 
to invest in approved Venture Capital Companies (VCCs). The VCCs are supposed to 
invest in small and medium-sized businesses and junior mining companies. 
Consequently, the incentive assists small and medium-sized businesses in raising 
capital to finance businesses.  
A deduction is allowed from the income of a taxpayer in respect of expenditures 
incurred by that person in respect of shares issued to that person by a venture capital 
company. Tax deductions for individuals are a minimum of R750,000 pa up to R2,25 
million over a lifetime. For listed companies, the deduction is up to 40% of the equity 
in a VCC. 
3.4.8 Relief on Skills Development Levy 
SARS (2020) described the Skills Development Levy as a tariff imposed to embolden 
learning and development in South Africa, and is determined by an employer's salary 
bill. The revenue collected is to be used to develop and improve the skills of 
employees. The levy becomes liable if any employer has or expects the total salaries 
bill to be more than R500,000 over the next 12 months. The relief for SBCs is 
embedded on the threshold one is supposed to surpass in order to be liable to pay the 
Skills Development Levy. 
3.5 Tax compliance in South Africa  
Revenue mobilisation is one of the objectives especially of African governments to 
create fiscal space, provide essential public services, and reduce foreign aid and 
single resource dependence (Drummond et al. 2012). Nevertheless, governments' 
abilities to collect taxes depend on people's willingness to comply with the statutes of 
tax laws. Non-compliance with tax dictates is inherent in developing countries, South 
Africa included. 
Despite the sterling performance of SARS in terms of revenue collection, the tax gap 
still exists. A tax gap is defined as the difference between the expected and actual 
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revenue generated by tax authorities. Tax evasion through businesses understating 
their incomes; overstating deductions, credits or exemptions; or making calculation 
errors on their returns has widened the tax gap in South Africa. Tax amnesty and 
awareness campaigns have been launched by SARS, including informal sector 
participants (thus improving the so-called second economy’s contribution). Dare et al. 
(2019:07) estimated that SARS had the potential of collecting R276.4 billion worth of 
PIT revenue in 2005/06 and 316.6% in 2010/2011 if everyone complied with the 
legislation. However, R216.3 billion was collected in 2005/06 and R290.4 billion was 
collected in 2010/2011, resulting in tax gaps of R60.1 billion and R26.2 billion. There 
is thus a need for this study to determine the factors which have led to the tax gap in 
South Africa, based on the effect of tax morale.  
The findings of Lewis (1982:172) showed that 53.08% of respondents were registered 
as taxpayers with SARS. Nevertheless, only 39.23% had consulted with SARS officials 
in the past. Dare et al. (2019:07) noted that the tax compliance rates were 78.3% and 
91.7% for the 2005/06 and 2010/11 tax years respectively. 
SARS continues to broaden the tax base and expand the taxpayer register. The 
authority’s major goal is to develop a tax and customs system of voluntary compliance, 
and, in rare circumstances, use enforcement tools responsibly and decisively. In an 
effort to increase the levels of voluntary compliance, SARS aims at providing clarity 
and certainty of taxpayers’ obligations (SARS, 2019:02). The table below shows that 
the tax register improved for the period 2015 to 2019 owing to the introduction of bulk 











Table 3. 6 : Tax register for the period 2015 to 2019 
 
Source: SARS (2019:02) 
SARS (2019:64) computed two indices, which are the tax compliance index and the 
attitude to tax compliance index. The Tax Compliance Index is calculated from internal 
data and the results were 67.24% for the 2018/19 tax year, an increase from 65.64% 
reported in 2017/18. The Attitude to Tax Compliance Index calculated from data 
collected in the public opinion survey resulted in a score of 66% for 2018/19, a 
decrease as compared to 72% reported in 2017/18. 
3.5.1 Factors affecting tax compliance in South Africa 
Drummond et al. (2012) argued that raising more home-generated income is a need 
for most Sub‐Saharan African countries. However, the domestic tax bases in most 
African countries are weakened by the prevalence of tax avoidance and tax evasion 
(IMF 2011). Understanding the factors that influence the individual taxpayer's decision 
whether to pay or evade taxes is crucial in dealing with the problem of tax evasion. 
This research will review the literature on factors affecting tax compliance in South 
Africa according to economic deterrence, fiscal exchange, social influences, 
comparative treatment and political accountability.  
3.5.1.2 Economic deterrence factors 
The economic deterrence factors proffered by Becker in 1968 and Allingham and 
Sandmo in 1972, include penalties and audit probabilities. The theoretical tenets of 
economic deterrence have been considered by SARS in the development of effective 
and efficient strategies that seek to improve tax compliance. Section 104 of the Income 
Tax Act deals with offences relating to tax evasion. If a taxpayer is convicted, a fine or 
Number
as at Individuals Companies (CIT) Trusts Employers 
(PAYEVAT 
Vendors Importers Exporters
31 Mar 2015 18,185,538 2,935,385           331,584 429,691 679,274 280,953 254,108
31 Mar 2016 19,075,270 3,278,708           340,000 458,048 706,874 289,922 262,162
31 Mar 2017 19,980,110 3,732,416           345,048 489,445 742,388 301,746 272,951
31 Mar 2018 21,104,375 3,202,007           351,564 520,918 773,783 312,241 282,243
31 Mar 2019 22,170,513 2,020,759           357,859 552,611 802,957 319,949 288,604
Percentage year-on-year growth
31 Mar 2016 4.9% 11.7% 2.5% 6.6% 4.1% 3.2% 3.2%
31 Mar 2017 4.7% 13.8% 1.5% 6.9% 5.0% 4.1% 4.1%
31 Mar 2018 5.6% -14.2% 1.9% 6.4% 4.2% 3.5% 3.4%
31 Mar 2019 5.1% -36.9% 1.8% 6.1% 3.8% 2.5% 2.3%
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imprisonment sentence for a period not exceeding five years is imposed. In addition, 
his/her taxable income may be estimated and three times the amount of tax charged 
thereon.  Cummings et al. (2009) noted that compliance levels increase as the audit 
probability and the penalty rate increase in both South Africa and Botswana. In line 
with this trend, SARS recently raised the severity of punishment by imposing heavy 
penalties for outstanding corporate income tax (CIT) from December 2018. This study 
intends to determine how these economic deterrence factors have affected the tax 
morale behaviour between South Africa and Zimbabwe.  
3.5.1.3 Perception of government expenditure 
Tax compliance is also affected by the perception of the citizens on how the 
government spends the collected taxes. Alm et al. (1992) noted that tax compliance 
increases with the availability of public goods and services. Therefore, the main 
apprehension of taxpayers is what they get directly in return for their tax payments in 
the form of public services. If the government fails to provide basic public goods and 
services or provides them insufficiently, citizens may not be willing to pay taxes and 
tax evasion and avoidance will be the consequence (Pashev, 2005; Everest-Phillips, 
2008; Lieberman, 2002; Bräutigam et al. 2008). Andreoni et al. (1998) explained that 
embezzlement of taxes by government officials, which is common in developing 
countries, also influences taxpayers not to comply with the tax laws. Consequently, 
taxpayers would be prepared to avoid paying the tax if the revenue collected is not 
being utilized for the advantage and government assistance of the general public.  
Moore (2004) expounded that taxation and the provision of public goods and services 
are regarded as a contractual connection between taxpayers and the government. In 
a study done by Oberholzer and Stack (2014), they observed that over half of the 
respondents (58.46%) are of the opinion that the government uses a large proportion 
of taxes for meaningless purposes, which greatly affects tax compliance. More so, a 
study by Ali et al. (2013:20) found that in South Africa, people who are effortlessly 
happy about receiving various services from the government, for example, issuance 
of national identity cards, health and police services are bound to have a tax‐compliant 
attitude. Thus the current study intends to determine how the perception of South 




3.5.1.4 Demographic factors  
McGee (2012) found that demographic factors such as gender, age, education level, 
religion, marital status and income level influence a person’s tax compliance 
behaviour. Torgler (2011) concluded that age and sex are the significant factors that 
affect tax compliance. The researchers Feinstein (1991) and Richardson (2006) 
further explained that that older people and women are more tax compliant than men 
and young ones. According to Feinstein (1991), it is more likely that wedded people 
won't dodge taxes, than unmarried people; married people would be more conscious 
about how they would be seen in society. 
McGee (2012:475) conducted a survey in which he found that widows were the group 
that is most tax compliant, followed by those who were married, separated, living 
together as married, single or never married and lastly, divorced. In a similar study on 
South African attitudes on tax evasion, McGee and Ross (2014) found that divorced 
people are most opposed to tax evasion, followed by married people and widowed 
people. Nevertheless, notwithstanding several studies investigating this demographic 
variable, it seems that there is no conclusive answer to the question of whether men 
or women are more tax compliant (McGee, 2012:415). Therefore it is from the 
inconclusive results of the previous studies that the current study intends to determine 
the extent to which the demographic profile of participants in South Africa and 
Zimbabwe explains tax compliance and morale. The study will contribute to knowledge 
by providing the Zimbabwean extent on how the demographic profile of the 
respondents will explain the tax morale and compliance, as there are inconclusive 
results from previous studies. 
3.5.1.4 Political legitimacy 
Fjeldstad and Heggstad (2012:12) defines legitimacy as conviction or trust in the 
authorities, foundations and social game plan to be fitting, legitimate, just and work for 
the benefit of everyone. According to the political legitimacy theory, tax compliance is 
directly linked to perceptions about the tax authority's trustworthiness (Tayler, 2006; 
Kirchler et al. 2008; Fauvelle-Aymar, 1999). Torgler and Schneider (2007) added that 
higher legitimacy for political institutions leads to higher tax compliance. Political 
legitimacy can also be linked to national pride. Consequently, group identification 
deriving from national pride promotes cooperative behaviour and willingness to pay 
taxes (Torgler and Schneider, 2007). 
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Corruption in tax administration in Africa remains a fundamental barrier to effective 
and fair taxation and to building trust between government and citizens. In addition, 
corruption which is linked to political legitimacy, which is rife in developing countries, 
affects tax compliance. Significant levels of corruption can prompt taxpayers uncertain 
of whether their paid levies are utilized to fund public goods and services, to be more 
likely to sidestep the payment of tax liabilities. Moreover, a taxpayer might consider 
evading taxes if the cost of bribing a tax auditor is lower than the potential benefit from 
tax evasion. Kirchler et al. (2007) highlighted that lack of transparency and 
accountability in the use of public funds negatively affects trust in the tax system as 
well as in the government. Resultantly, there would be increases in the willingness to 
evade taxes.  
Naidoo (2005:13) further argues that those who diligently pay their taxes and comply 
to their best ability with the tax laws want to be treated with respect by the revenue 
authorities. Unfortunately, this is not always the case. Taxpayers often believe that 
they are being treated as criminals and do not appreciate a heavy-handed approach 
from SARS with threats for non-compliance, which is often based on technicalities. 
3.5.1.5 Complexity of the tax system 
The complexity of the tax system is another important factor that affects tax 
compliance in South Africa. Tax legislation in South Africa is so complex that the 
ordinary person has challenges in understanding it. Feddersen (2018) noted that 
complex tax processes can overwhelm taxpayers, making it cumbersome and difficult 
for them to pay their taxes. Importantly, Feddersen (2018) suggested that SARS can 
reduce the complexity of tax compliance processes by using plain language in 
communications and simplifying forms and tax laws where possible. 
McKerchar (2007) simply explained the complex tax system as an excessive burden 
of record-keeping, tax form completion or other compliance requirements placed on 
the taxpayer. Tax complexity can also be caused by increased intricacy in the tax law 
(Richardson and Sawyer, 2001). Hanefah (1996) and McKerchar (2001) also noted 
that tax complexity can take the form of complex tax computation while Cox and Eger 




Evans and Tran-Nam (2013) highlighted three different definitions of tax complexity 
from the perspective of tax accountants, tax lawyers and taxpayers. Tax complexity is 
referred to as the time it takes to prepare income tax returns, including tax planning, 
or the time it takes to give tax advice and consultancies in the view of a tax accountant. 
In as far as tax lawyers are concerned, reading, understanding and interpreting tax 
laws defines tax complexity. To a taxpayer, tax complexity is viewed from the point of 
the time taken and the cost incurred in complying with the provisions of the tax 
legislation. 
Webley et al. (1991:68-77) had results that people evade tax because of the 
unfairness of the tax system. It has been established that a more complex tax system 
leads to noncompliant behaviour among taxpayers. Likewise, a less complex tax 
system would also encourage tax compliance (Cox and Eger, 2006; Richardson, 
2006). A complex tax system also acts as an inducement for taxpayers and tax officials 
to indulge in corrupt activities such as reducing the tax burden or speeding up 
procedures.  Tax officials may also manipulate and extort taxpayers who do not know 
tax legislation. 
3.5.1.6 Tax compliance cost 
Another factor that influences taxpayers to evade tax is the high compliance cost. 
Sandford et al. (1989:10) define tax compliance costs as expenses incurred by 
taxpayers in meeting the requirements laid upon them in complying with a given 
structure and level of tax. Govender (2008) simply explained tax compliance costs as 
all the costs incurred in ensuring proper compliance with relevant tax regulations. The 
researcher listed the costs including the following: 
 Expenses related to record retention, filing and sorting records, invoices and 
receipts; 
 Costs incurred in the preparation and submission of all relevant tax returns; 
 Opportunity cost in respect of time utilized by SMEs in ensuring tax 
compliance; 
 Costs of external advisors that are required for tax compliance and/ or to 
address disputes with the tax authorities; 




Further, the ease of paying tax affects citizens’ willingness to pay tax. The easier it is 
to pay tax, the higher the edge to pay tax. A high ease of doing business ranking 
means that the regulatory environment is more conducive to the starting and operation 
of a local firm. South Africa is rated fifth best in Sub-Saharan Africa in terms of ease 
of paying tax, and fourth in terms of ease of doing business. It is also estimated that it 
takes 210 hours per annum as the time required to comply with three major taxes in 
South Africa (World Bank, 2020:39). The table below shows the ease of doing 
business and paying tax. 
Table 3. 7: Worldwide rank on the ease of doing business and ease of paying 
taxes in selected African countries (ranking within Sub-Saharan Africa in 
brackets) 
Source: World Bank (2020) 
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SME), particularly, suffer from high compliance 
costs. A survey among South African firms on the regulatory costs of doing business 
revealed that taxes, in particular VAT, are perceived as the most problematic set of 
regulations, followed by labour regulation (SBP, 2004). 
There is a direct relationship between tax compliance costs and tax evasion, that is, 
an increase in tax compliance costs results in fewer people complying with the tax 
statutes. Naicker and Rajaram (2018:108) noted that tax compliance cost is one of the 
main factors that affect tax compliance in South Africa, with the most excessive cost 
to ensure tax compliance being the time spent by the owner. 
 
 
Economy Global Rank Rank within group Starting a Business Paying Taxes
Mauritius 13 1 2 1
South Africa 84 4 26 5
Zambia 85 5 20 2
Botswana 87 6 34 6
Namibia 104 9 37 11
Malawi 109 10 30 21
Lesotho 122 15 14 16
Mozambique 138 20 42 18
Zimbabwe 140 21 38 24
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3.6 Strategies employed by South Africa to increase tax compliance 
Prichard et al. (2019) emphasized that the central challenge facing developing and 
transitional government lies in identifying innovative strategies to strengthen revenue 
mobilization, trust and fiscal contracts. 
3.6.1 Simplification of the tax system  
SMMEs contribute the majority percentage of taxpayers in the South African tax 
system. Tax laws are generally too complex to be understood by non-professionals; 
the greater proportion of SMME owners do not have formal qualifications, while the 
disciplines of those who do have formal qualifications might not be in tax law. The 
following are some of the measures taken by SARS to simplify the tax system for 
SMMEs to increase their compliance levels: 
 A simplified registration process by combining the Skills Development Levy, 
Unemployment Insurance Fund and Pay-As-You-Earn registration forms into 
one form was introduced.  
  A simplified turnover-based tax system for micro-businesses was introduced 
from 1 March 2009. The turnover tax is a simplified and optional tax system 
meant to assist SMMEs with an annual qualifying turnover of less than ZAR 1 
million, as it is an easier way for these enterprises to comply with their tax 
obligations. 
 Only one form will be required to register for all taxes, including income tax and 
VAT. 
SARS has activated the function of advance rulings to simplify the tax laws. More so, 
SARS provides interpretation notes aimed at providing guidelines to both internal and 
external stakeholders on the interpretation and application of the provisions of the tax 
legislation. 
3.6.2 Maintain high levels of public trust and credibility  
SARS (2019:63) noted that there has been a serious erosion of trust in SARS as a fair 
tax administrator, due to public admissions at various commissions. However, the 
Acting Commissioner agreed to attend various sector gatherings to explain SARS' 
position and to reassure taxpayer groupings that there is a continuation in the 
campaign to fulfil its mandate geared towards maintaining high levels of public trust. 
The Acting Commissioner made presentations on platforms such as the Johannesburg 
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Chamber of Commerce, the Institute of Internal Auditors South Africa and the South 
African Institute of Business Associations, to mention but a few. 
As mentioned earlier, trust in the tax authorities affects, to a great extent, tax 
compliance. In order to improve cooperation and trust between SARS and large 
business taxpayers, SARS launched the Large Business Forum, which includes the 
top 30 companies in South Africa. The Forum also aims at self-regulation of their tax 
affairs (SARS, 2019:64). SARS is of the view that this will reduce compliance costs 
and result in improved relationships with large businesses.  
SARS (2019:55) also improved the efficiency and effectiveness of taxpayer complaints 
through engagements with the Office of the Tax Ombud (OTO). SARS has conducted 
four strategic and four operational engagement sessions with the OTO. This improved 
the Complaint Monitoring Office’s performance to 63.5% of complaints finalised within 
the turnaround time, and 82% of complaints brought forward from 2017/18 being 
resolved. 
A new service charter, launched on 2 July 2018, describes the rights and obligations 
of taxpayers and service timeframes that SARS commits to in terms of engagements 
with SARS’ contact centres, branches, the e-filing channel and correspondence. The 
reinvented service charter aims at improving the image of the tax authority from the 
perspective of taxpayer-tax authority relationships (SARS, 2019:54). 
3.6.3 Launch of re-established Large Business Centre 
In October 2019, SARS launched the re-established Large Business Centre with the 
main purpose of bringing about voluntary compliance amongst corporate South Africa. 
SARS also noted that the revamped Large Business Centre would bring about 
effective and efficient revenue collection as well as improved SARS' relationship with 
large businesses. The corporates are rated as the third-largest revenue contributor to 
the fiscus; corporate income tax comprised 16.6% of the total revenue in the 
2018/2019 tax year. Moreover, through the reinvigorated Large Business Centre, both 
administration and tax compliance costs are minimised. 
3.6.4 Taxpayer education and service 
Eriksen and Fallan (1996), in Engida and Baisa (2014:437), describe education as the 
individual’s level of understanding about taxation, especially the laws and regulations. 
Peter (2009:20) says that attitudes towards tax compliance can be improved by 
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enhancing taxpayers’ knowledge. By methods for taxpayer education and taxpayer 
services, residents can be educated and taught about the tax framework and be aided 
in their endeavours to conform to the tax system.  
Tax knowledge is an important component in a voluntary compliance tax system 
(Kasippilai, 2000), particularly in determining an accurate tax liability (Palil, 2005; Saad 
et al. 2003). This is empirically established by several other studies (for example, 
Kasipillai and Jabbar, 2003; Kirchler et al. 2006), which documented that possessing 
tax knowledge would lead to higher compliance rates.  
SARS (2019:53) reported that the tax authority interacted with 465 365 taxpayers 
during the 2018/19 tax year through outreach and education activities. Also, SARS 
embarked on education programmes focussing on tertiary institutions, students and 
schoolchildren, with the notion to “catch them young”. Workshops were also conducted 
at various SARS branches through collaboration with external stakeholders, and 
114,392 individuals attended. 
3.6.5 Zero-tolerance approach to fight fraud and corruption 
Mechanisms that allow a reduction in corruption in the tax administration are crucial in 
compacting tax evasion through enhanced trust in the tax system by citizens, as well 
as an increase in revenue mobilisation. In South Africa, SARS established an Anti-
Corruption and Security Unit in 2008 to deal with internal investigations and 
prosecutions on tax and customs corruption. In addition, SARS established a 
corruption hotline that allows individuals wishing to report corruption involving tax 
officials to call a toll free number or file a report on the SARS website. 
Also, to reduce corruption, SARS refers corruption cases for prosecution and internal 
disciplinary committees. During the 2018/19 tax year, 33 cases of corruption were 
referred for investigation. Three SARS employees were convicted on counts of fraud, 
corruption and contravention of the Electronic Communications and Transactions 
regulations. The trio was sentenced to a range of 15 to 25 years imprisonment (SARS, 
2019:66).  Moreover, to discourage corruption amongst taxpayers and tax officials, 
SARS handed over taxpayer induced corruption cases to the National Prosecution 
Authority. A taxpayer received a sentence of a R20,000 fine or four years for offering 




3.6.6 Use of technology 
Recently, African governments have turned towards increasing the use of technology 
in the administration of taxes. Information technology systems play a significant role 
in tax administration modernisation. Enhanced technology also helps in increasing the 
efficiency of the tax administration and demystifying complex tax systems by providing 
online information on taxpayer rights and obligations through call centres or virtual 
helpdesks. Principally, Tambun and Kopong (2017: 49) showed that investment in e-
filing motivated taxpayers to increase their tax compliance levels. 
SARS has embarked on a journey that embraced technological advancement. SARS 
introduced a transformative programme termed Siyakha, meaning We Are Building, 
which was aimed at improving the efficiency and effectiveness in fulfilling its mandate 
(AfDBG, 2010:17). The table below shows some of the advancement in technology 
that has been adopted by SARS in respect to the customs department. 
Table 3. 8 : Advancement in technology measures taken by SARS on customs 
systems 
Source: SARS (2020) 
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According to SARS (2015), historically, in South Africa tax returns were filled in 
manually and mailed to the then Receiver of Revenue (RoR) office through the Post 
Office or hand-delivered to the nearest RoR office. Subsequently, the Siyakha 
program led to the modernisation of SARS, whereby the authority’s operational 
processes were expansively automated to enhance administrative and compliance 
efficiency. The modernisation programme gave birth to an e-filing system in 2008 
(SARS, 2016). Consequently, e-filing reduced tax filing encumbrance for both 
taxpayers and the revenue authority. Also, the rate of tax returns submissions 
increased as shown by Tables 3.9 and 3.10 below, wherein in 2001 return submission 
was purely manual and in 2019 strictly through e-filing. 
Table 3. 9: SARS statistics of tax returns return submission for the period 2019  
Source: SARS (2019:20) 
Table 3. 10 : SARS statistics of outstanding tax returns for the period 2001, 
based on the 2000/2001 annual report 
Source: SARS (2001:26) 
Owing to the increased use of mobile phones, SARS saw it prudent to introduce a 
mobile application by the name of SARS MobiApp, which can be installed from the 
App Store (for Apple devices) or Google Play Store (for Android devices). A taxpayer 
may register for e-filing, file returns, submit supporting documents, make a payment 
PAYE VAT Corporate Income Tax Individual Income Tax
Achievement 58.82% 52.09% 24.67% 60.94%
Target 63.00% 58.50% 46.00% 92.50%
Variance -4.18 -6.41 -21.33 -31.56
Baseline 
(2017/18 
achievement) 59.19% 52.23% 38.26% 94.00%
Type of return 31/3/2002 31/03/2001 Financial Year % change Prior Year % change
Individual 1,821,945.00 1,745,801.00 4.0% 12.4%
Corporate income tax 994,539.00     871,703.00     14.0% 4.3%
PAYE 860,443.00     509,187.00     69.0% 29.7%
VAT 552,022.00     301,807.00     83.0% 99.3%
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to SARS and set up a call back from the SARS contact centre, to mention but a few 
uses of the application. 
 
3.6.7 Tax amnesties 
OECD (2015:14) described a typical amnesty as a reprieve in which delinquent 
taxpayers who voluntarily disclose their unpaid taxes are allowed to enter the tax net 
without paying both the tax owed and the penalties that are associated with non-
compliance. 
The first tax amnesty after independence in South Africa was introduced in 1995. The 
tax amnesty allowed persons who were not registered as taxpayers an opportunity to 
comply with the tax laws with no penalties charged. In 1996, the Final Relief on Tax, 
Interest, Penalty and Additional Tax Act was enacted, which meant to give taxpayers 
additional time to register for tax purposes (SARS, 2016:417). Moreover, an Act called 
the Exchange Control Amnesty and Amendment of Taxation Laws Act of 2003 was 
passed to allow citizens with undisclosed offshore income to regularise their tax affairs. 
Observing the growth and importance of small, micro and medium enterprises, a tax 
amnesty was availed to SMEs to voluntarily declare their undeclared income and 
comply with the provisions of tax legislation (SARS, 2016:417). 
3.6.8 Voluntary Disclosure Programme (VDP) 
A VDP regime is different from the tax amnesty mentioned above, in that taxpayers 
are still liable to settle their undeclared taxes at no or reduced penalties and interest 
that come with tax non-compliance (Baer and Borgne, 2008; OECD, 2015). 
Governments are shifting towards VDPs as they provide an opportunity to raise 
immediate revenue as taxpayers are required to pay the tax owed, in some instances 
including paltry penalty and interest. 
SARS first introduced VDP in 2010 in which people who voluntarily disclosed their 
undeclared income were not charged any penalties of criminal prosecution associated 
with non-compliance. SARS later introduced a permanent Voluntary Disclosure 
Programme (VDP) with effect from 1 October 2012 through the Tax Administration 
Act, 2011 (SARS, 2016:418). The magnitude of the relief is dependent on whether the 
disclosure is undertaken prior to or after the issuance of an audit notice by the tax 
authority. SARS (2019:65) reported that an amount of R3.2 billion was collected for 
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the period 1 April 2018 to 31 March 2019 under the VDP programme, and continues 
to encourage any taxpayer that may have unreported income to apply for the 
programme. 
A Special Voluntary Disclosure Programme (SVDP), which ran for the period 1 
October 2016 to 31 August 2017, was introduced with the aim to give non-compliant 
taxpayers an opportunity to voluntarily declare their unauthorised foreign assets and 
income. Taxpayers who missed the deadline are given a chance to make use of the 
normal VDP process to disclose offshore income. SARS highlighted that the purpose 
of introducing VDP is to enhance voluntary compliance in the interest of good 
management of the tax system and the best use of its resources. SARS (2019) 
disclosed that the introduction of the SVDP witnessed a total of 2,023 tax relief 
applications by the close of the above-mentioned window period. The reprieve has 
yielded a total collection of R4.432 billion and the value of foreign assets disclosed 
through the SVDP amounts to R27,670 billion. Importantly, these are assets that were 
previously hidden offshore and will continue to contribute towards the fiscus into the 
future. Dare et al. (2018:14) studied the effectiveness of VDPs in South Africa and 
they discovered that both once-off and permanent VDPs are only effective in 
increasing compliance for the short term. The researchers also noted that VDPs must 
be accompanied by increased enforcement measures for the government to increase 
tax compliance.  
3.6.9 Deterrence measures 
SARS has recruited competent personnel and increased capacity to audit and 
prosecute non-compliant taxpayers in a bid to deter taxpayers from evading tax. Also, 
a penalty loading model as shown by the table below was mooted to punish habitual 
























of an audit 
Substantial 
understatement  
10% 20% 5% 0% 
Reasonable care not 
taken in completing a 
return 
25% 50% 15% 0% 
No reasonable grounds 
for tax position taken  
50% 75% 25% 0% 
Impermissible avoidance 
arrangement  
75% 100% 35% 0% 
Gross negligence  100% 125% 50% 5% 
Intentional tax evasion  150% 200% 75% 10% 
 Source: SARS (2019). 
SARS has also intensified prosecution of non-compliant individuals as witnessed by 
the conviction of a tax offender who was sentenced to 20 years effective imprisonment 
on counts of fraud, money laundering and corruption of a public officer. The convicted 
person prejudiced the fiscus by an amount of R32,942,133 through submitting 
significant fraudulent refund claims on behalf of several VAT vendors and was assisted 
by a SARS employee who released the refunds. More so, to create awareness and to 
send a message to compliant taxpayers that there is a fair application of the law, SARS 
publishes successful prosecutions since 2018.  
SARS (2019:48) intensified compliance audits to increase tax compliance, through an 
increase in the visibility of SARS among taxpayers. Important also, SARS improved 
the use of third party data to improve the risk of detection and increase in audit success 
rate. Due to the nature of compliance audits, SARS uses automated risk engines to 
identify and evaluate specific risks associated with tax compliance. SARS stated that 
1.9 million compliance audits were finalised in the 2018/19 tax year, with a total 
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financial impact of approximately R30 billion, including the reduction of refunds. Also, 
the tax authority recorded a success rate of 35%, which is in line with international 
trends. 
3.7 Comparison of tax systems of South Africa and Zimbabwe 
Both South Africa and Zimbabwe have autonomous revenue authorities which collect 
tax on behalf of the government. South Africa's tax regime is set by the National 
Treasury and is managed by SARS. ZIMRA derives its mandate from the Revenue 
Authority Act, passed by the Parliament of Zimbabwe in 2002. 
3.7.1 Tax rates 
South Africa and Zimbabwe have different rates for Income tax, PAYE and VAT and 
the same tariffs for CGT as shown by the table below. 
Table 3. 12: Tax rates 
Country South Africa Zimbabwe 
Value Added Tax 15% 14.5% 
Capital gains tax Max 20% Max 20% 
Income tax 28% 24% 
PAYE Max 45% Max 40% 
Source: ZIMRA (2020) and SARS (2020) 
3.7.2 Introduction of taxes 
Income tax in South Africa was first introduced in 1914 with the introduction of the 
Income Tax Act No 28, an Act with its origins in the New South Wales Act of 1895. 
The income tax also known as corporate tax was introduced in Zimbabwe (then 
Southern Rhodesia) in 1918 but the current legislation was enacted on 1 April 1967. 
3.7.3 Source-based vs Resident-based 
Residence taxation of income is based on the principle that people and firms should 
contribute towards the public services provided for them by the country where they 
live, on all their income, wherever it comes from. Source taxation is justified by the 
view that the country which provides the opportunity to generate income or profits 
should have the right to tax it. Economists tend to favour residence jurisdiction, both 
because they consider the source of income to be hard to pin down (income often has 
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more than one source) and because they think residence jurisdiction promotes 
economic efficiency since the decision where to invest should be unaffected by the tax 
rate. South Africa uses the resident based tax system while Zimbabwe uses the 
source-based tax system. 
3.7.4 Taxation of the informal sector 
South African has turnover tax, which is meant for small business, while small 
business is taxed like any other tax registered company. Taxes based on turnover 
require an informal enterprise to keep some basic books and records of transactions. 
A uniform tax rate as a (percentage of turnover) may then be applied to all enterprises 
under such a regime. Ghana levies a three per cent flat rate turnover tax as a 
replacement for VAT (Joshi et al. 2013). The Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA) has 
implemented a system of progressively taxing turnover but with reduced rates for 
those enterprises with adequate records of transactions (TRA, 2011).  
Overall, 70 per cent of South African micro-businesses are concentrated in the retail 
sector (Ligthelm, 2006). In South Africa, retail businesses are found mainly in rural 
and urban areas, throughout formal and informal settlements, and in all provinces. The 
same estimates of the informal sector's share of total South African employment are 
said to be in the range of 17-19 per cent (National Labour & Economic Development 
Institute, 2004). South Africa's informal employment as a proportion of non-agricultural 
employment was at 72 per cent, with 47 per cent of informal enterprise workers in the 
trade sector according to Devey and Valodia (2006).through the informal sector, SA is 
able to grow its turnover revenue through taxation since many of its income tax comes 
from the informal sector. 
As alluded to in chapter two, Zimbabwe has adopted a presumptive tax, which is meant 
to bring informal traders into the tax net. Ahmad and Stern, (1991: 276) defines the 
tax head as; "the term presumptive taxation covers a number of procedures under 
which the 'desired' base for taxation (direct or indirect) is not itself measured but is 
inferred from some simple indicators which are more easily measured than the base 
itself". Moreso, Bird and Wallace, (2003) noted that the main objectives of presumptive 
taxes are to simplify the tax administration process, to collect some revenue from 
these firms and to educate them on tax issues with the ultimate aim of incorporating 
them into the regular tax system  
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Presumptive tax rates in Zimbabwe are based on pointers of income capacity or 
business performance of a particular informal sector segment, for example, turnover 
estimates of minibus taxis. Different tax rates can then be applied based on estimated 
profits within the sub-sector, for example, based on the seating capacity of the minibus 
taxi. This method could potentially address many of the equity concerns of 
presumptive taxation as rates are based on ratios developed for a particular informal 
sector segment. However, this method of setting tax rates requires research on 
turnover and profit margins for all the informal sector segments that are targeted for 
taxation. Dube and Casale (2017) noted that for informal enterprises that can maintain 
basic records on turnover, the turnover-based tax, which is used by South Africa, is 
the best option. 
3.8 Conclusion 
The chapter analysed the tax system in South Africa. Generally, the South African 
Government is making efforts to increase tax compliance, which will ultimately 
increase revenue. There is a need for a comparative analysis between South Africa 
and Zimbabwe to derive feasible policy recommendations for policymakers and 
revenue administrations as pointed out in later chapters. As compared to Zimbabwe, 
South Africa enjoys more in terms of resource allocation to tax administration, huge 
revenue collection base and is more technologically advanced in terms of revenue 
collection. Moreso, both countries use similar strategies to increase compliance such 
as launching tax amnesty, zero tolerance to corruption and promoting voluntary 
disclosure programs. In the next chapter, the factors affecting the tax culture and 










DETERMINANTS OF TAX MORALE AND COMPLIANCE: 
THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL EXPOSITIONS 
 
4.1  Introduction 
The world today is experiencing abrupt technological changes which are blurring the 
line between the physical and the digital world, opening up new opportunities for 
market reforms and trade liberalization.  However, this transition has brought about 
opportunities for illegal activities such as tax evasion, creative accounting and 
opportunistic managerial behaviour (Bruno, 2019:193). Of these activities, tax evasion 
is indisputably the main problem because it reduces tax revenue and undermines the 
principle of equity and social cohesion (Nemore and Morone, 2019:11). Since tax is a 
means for financing government expenditures, tax compliance and tax evasion remain 
a major concern for governments worldwide (Brink and Porcano, 2017:87; Tabandeh 
et al. 2013:101).  
 
Identifying the major drivers of tax compliance is a principal objective for economic 
policy in all countries experiencing significant growth in parallel economies (Nemore 
and Morone, 2019:11). Researchers have summarised that the exploration of tax 
evasion and tax compliance is still in its infancy. An important concept that researchers 
of tax issues have recently been interested in is tax morale. Tax morale has received 
increased attention in light of the recent tax reforms that many countries in Sub-
Saharan African countries are attempting to make to improve their fiscal capacity 
(Jahnke and Weisser, 2018:01).  
 
Fjeldstad et al. (1998:02) stated that it is important to concentrate on "why do 
taxpayers comply" rather than on "why do taxpayers evade", of which the former is the 
basis of the tax morale phenomenon. There is a great difference between tax morale 
and tax compliance though they are often treated as the same, especially in German-
speaking countries (Kirchgässner, 2010:02). Authors, for example, Verboon and van 
Dijke (2007:03) and Torgler (2004:239), defined tax compliance and tax morale as the 
willingness to pay tax. Cummings et al. (2009:457) conducted experiments in 
Botswana and South Africa and concluded that tax morale influences tax compliance, 
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confirming that they are two different concepts. Taschetti (2013:06) and Torgler and 
Schneider (2007:06) simply explained that tax compliance is behavioural while tax 
morale is based on attitudes. Tax morale research is important as it helps in 
understanding the behaviour and attitudes of taxpayers towards tax compliance. There 
are several factors that influence tax morale, and the existing empirical evidence cites 
dissimilar channels and substantial cross-country differences in these factors (Brink 
and Porcano, 2017:87; Belmonte et al. 2017:204). There is limited theoretical and 
empirical research that has been done on tax morale, especially in developing 
countries (Torgler and Schneider, 2005:01). Frey and Feld (2002:88) added that "most 
studies treat 'tax morale' as a black box without discussing or even considering how it 
might arise or how it might be maintained. It is usually perceived as being part of the 
meta-preferences of taxpayers and used as the residuum in the analysis capturing 
unknown influences on tax evasion. The more interesting question then is which 
factors shape the emergence and maintenance of tax morale.” 
 
To explore tax morale, this chapter will first discuss the definitions of tax morale put 
across by researchers. Theories of tax compliance and tax morale will also be 
discussed as they form the foundation of this study. It is important also to look at the 
factors that influence tax morale in developing, transitional and developed countries. 
Research has shown that every theory or concept, tax morale not spared, has 
strengths and weaknesses; the importance of tax morale and limitations of this 
concept is thus also discussed in this chapter. 
 
4.2  Definition of tax morale 
Tax morale has been defined as the general inclination and motivation to comply with 
tax laws and regulations (Calvet and Alm, 2013:66). It is the inherent motivation to pay 
tax obligations that represents a taxpayer's readiness and moral belief in paying taxes 
and contributing fairly to the society (Luttmer and Singhal, 2014:149). Tax morale was 
first defined by Schmo¨lders (1960:97) as the attitude of taxpayers towards the 
decision of whether to comply with tax requirements or to evade tax. He explained 
further that it is based on the population's tax mentality. Mohlmann (2013:02) 
described tax morale as a psychological explanation for voluntary tax compliance, 
while Bethencourt et al. (2013:04) explained it as "an internalised social norm for tax 
compliance which expands the cost incurred by evaders to include not only the fines 
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payable upon detection but also certain non-pecuniary considerations". Ortega and 
Pablo (2013:02) generalize tax morale as a concept that includes the moral rule of 
taxpayers which encourages them to comply with tax laws. Prinz (2002:02) concluded 
that tax morale is a kind of best response of the taxpayer to the insecurity they feel 
with respect to the complexity of the tax laws.  
The term "tax morale" summarises a number of factors and motivations such as social 
norms, personal values and other cognitive processes that significantly influence an 
individual's intentional compliance with tax laws (Brink and Porcano, 2017:91). 
Moreover, Torgler (2003:04) regarded tax morale as the intrinsic motivation to pay 
taxes. The belief of contributing to the state through the payment of taxes is another 
definition of tax morale (Cummings et al. 2009:448). Tax morale can also be defined 
as the willingness to pay taxes by the individual (Torgler, 2004:239). Importantly, also, 
Schnellenbach (2002:118) described tax morale as a phenomenon that taxpayers 
evade less tax than predicted by the standard models of tax evasion. He added that 
tax evasion depends on how satisfied taxpayers are with public policies and the quality 
of their relationship with tax authorities. 
 
Ultimately, tax evasion occurs when, for some reason, taxpayers do not comply with 
tax laws or do not pay the expected tax as determined using the existing tax rules and 
regulations (Brink and Porcano, 2017:89). More so, social norms characterise tax 
morale as they make the decision to evade tax unattractive. The authors also describe 
the concept as a return rendered to the government for its provision of public goods 
and services. Tax morale can be summed up as a moral obligation of paying taxes 
and an idea of contributing to the country by paying taxes (Bilgin, 2014:61). This study 
will adopt the definition a definition of tax morale which implies that it is an intrinsic 
motivational factor that explains the willingness or ability of a citizen to pay tax. 
  
4.3 Theoretical evolution of tax morale 
Perceptions and attitudes of taxpayers towards tax evasion are not always motivated 
by rationality (Yee et al. 2017:414; Brink and Porcano, 2017:89). The following 
subheadings explain how tax morale evolved through the proliferation of authors 





4.3.1 Standard models of tax evasion 
The review of the standard model is important as it pioneered research on tax 
compliance and, subsequently, the study of tax morale. The standard model was first 
proffered by Allingham and Sandmo in 1972 based on the economic theory of crime 
as well as on the expected utility maximisation calculus. The model presents the 
decision to evade tax as an expected utility-maximization gamble (Myles and Naylor, 
1996: 50).  
 
The main parameters of the model are personal income, the rates of tax and penalty, 
and the probability of a tax audit. According to Allingham and Sandmo (1972:324) 
under the tax declaration decision lies the uncertainty and the choice between 
declaring actual income and declaring less.  Allingham and Sandmo (1972) narrated 
that taxpayers pay tax, based on weighing the benefits of evading tax and the cost 
associated with tax evasion. The benefit of evading tax comes in the form of lower tax 
liability while the cost of tax evasion includes being charged high penalties on the 
unreported income. More so, the model predicts that taxpayers will always declare 
their income correctly if the probability of detection is high. The standard model adopts 
that taxpayers are mindful of the costs and benefits of their tax behaviour and that 
these individuals are usually unaware or at least distracted from the incentives 
available (Alm, 2019:358). 
 
The standard model, also known as the classical tax evasion model, proposed that 
deterrent policies are important in increasing tax compliance because tax evasion is 
negatively correlated with the audit probability and degree of punishment (Allingham 
and Sandmo, 1972:324). However, the level of understanding and availability of 
information might influence how the taxpayers behave (Olowookere and Fasina, 
2013:147). A simple illustration of the Allingham and Sandmo (A-S) model can be done 
by assuming that a taxpayer receives a fixed amount of income, I, and must decide on 
how much of the income to declare on tax returns and how much to underreport. The 
rate of tax in the declared income is t while no tax is paid on undeclared income.  
Tax authorities do carry out tax audits now and then. There is a probability p that the 
taxpayer might be audited and if he/she is audited, the tax will be charged a penalty 
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at a rate of b on the undeclared income. Thus, the taxpayer’s income Y, if charged a 
penalty, is denoted by 𝑌 = 𝐼 − 𝑡𝑅 − 𝑏[𝑡(𝐼𝑅)] and income Z is 𝑍 = 𝐼 − 𝑡𝑅 if 
underreporting is not unearthed by the audit. The taxpayer is the assumed taxpayer 
to choose declared income to maximize expected utility, or 𝐸𝑈(𝐼) = 𝑝𝑈(𝑌) + (1 −
𝑝)𝑈(𝑍), where E is the expectation operator and utility U (I) is a function only of 
income. Gahramanov (2009:38) concluded that despite the wide criticism of the 
standard models, they are rational and still useful in explaining compliance behaviour. 
Also, Mas’ud et al. (2015:408) highlighted that the classical models of tax evasion are 
still important in tax compliance research as some of their predictions are true in some 
countries. 
The standard models predicted a high level of tax evasion, yet the opposite is being 
exhibited by countries especially the developed ones (Alm et al. 2005:05). The A-S 
model is weaker compared to other models as it assumes that the probability of an 
audit is constant. In reality, tax audits are not purely random since the probability of 
being audited is likely to depend on the volume of revenue declared. Frey (2002:03) 
observed that the standard model of tax evasion based on the subjective expected 
utility maximization does not perform particularly well in econometric analysis. In 
support of the model, Lastly and more important is that the standard models neglect 
tax morale, which is an important factor in determining tax compliance behaviour. The 
game theory is regarded as an alternative to the A-S model and the game theory is 
going to be reviewed in the next sub-section. 
4.3.2 Game theory and tax compliance 
Tax evasion is an important notion, and its reality is fundamental to most public 
economics issues (Alm, 2019:354). Due to the growing criticism of standard taxation 
models, scores of researchers explored alternatives, which include game theory, to 
explain tax compliance behaviour. In tax games, equilibrium of the tax compliance 
game implies that the strategy choices must be mutually optimal, i.e. the audit strategy 
must maximise the revenue collected, and the declaration must maximise utility given 
the audit strategy.  
 
The first paper to analyse tax evasion using a game-theoretical setup was done by 
Joseph Greenberg in 1982. The model shows that tax authorities should not adopt a 
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constant rate of auditing taxpayers as it generates less revenue than if it adopts a 
differential set of tax inspections. CorchónIn (1992:09) modelled strategic interaction 
between taxpayers and the government, focusing on a case where a taxpayer has to 
decide either to join or not to join the informal economy. The model predicted that a 
high penalty for evaders is socially desirable and that tax evasion is due to imperfect, 
rather than incomplete, information. 
 
Erard and Feinstein (1994:17) incorporated honest taxpayers into a game-theoretical 
set-up which has a tax agency and tax evaders. Their model showed that tax 
compliance is affected by the fairness of the tax system and taxpayers' reactions to 
government activities, policies and personnel. Bosco and Mittone (1997) used the 
game theory to examine the effect of announcing tax audit results on tax evasion, and 
a positive relationship was found between tax audit publicity and tax evasion. Frey and 
Holler (1998) used a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium to explain that deterrence 
factors are not as important as tax morale in analysing tax compliance behaviour. 
Calvet and Alm (2013:21) ran tax compliance games to add that tax compliance is 
influenced by non-economic factors such as sympathy and empathy. However, 
Satpathi et al. (2013:1230) also used the game theory to determine the influence of 
tax morale on tax compliance and they found that there was no change in the rate of 
tax compliance when tax morale was introduced. 
Also, Alm and McKee (2003:310) used the game theory to show that tax compliance 
is increased when the tax authorities engage in more random audits. However, Kamijo 
(2014:13) showed that under genuine penalty rate conditions, the lowest-reporter-
audited (LIRA) rule is better than a random selection rule. Moreover, Sánchez-Villalba 
(2010:05) made use of game theoretical setup to predict that tax evasion is reduced 
when the tax authorities use a contingent audit rule than a cut-off rule. He explained 
that a cut-off rule is a method for tax authorities' audit declarations that are below a 
certain fixed cut-off income level, while the contingent rule consists of the tax authority 
auditing every firm with a probability that is a non-decreasing function of every other 
taxpayer's declarations.  
In contrast with the standard models of tax evasion, Anson et al. (2006:20) developed 
a game-theoretical set to analyse the effect of tax rates on customs duty fraud, and 
they found that there is less tax evasion on imported products with high tax rates. 
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Breuer (2012:36) also used game theory to investigate the effect of whistleblowing of 
tax evaders on tax compliance, and they discovered that whistleblowing is useful in 
compacting tax evasion. Blaufus et al. (2014:20) designed a tax game to determine 
the effect of tax privacy on tax compliance and found that public disclosure of tax 
evaders increases tax evasion. 
Additionally, Neumärker and Pech (2010:14) used game theory to show that 
governments do receive more revenue if they grant penalty relief. In the same vein, 
Mendoza and Wielhouwer (2015:15) modelled a game with two players, that is. a 
taxpayer and a tax authority, and predicted that increasing deterrence undermines 
trust.  Voluntary disclosure is an important concept in the study of tax compliance. 
Langenmayr et al. (2015:31) studied the effects of voluntary disclosure using game 
theory and confirmed that voluntary disclosure mechanisms increase tax evasion. 
Torgler (2003:284) noted that the strength of the game theory is that it makes explicit 
strategic aspects of social interactions. Furthermore, the logic of game theory helps to 
simplify the complexity of tax compliance. However, Hyun (2005:02) noted that the 
game-theoretical approach could not completely explain the behaviour of tax 
compliance, hence the need to explore other realistic models to explain the behaviour. 
Torgler (2003:284) added that tax compliance is a more complex topic that cannot be 
explained only by analysing a game with two taxpayers. 
4.3.3 Prospect theory and tax compliance 
Alm et al. (1992) noted that the prospect theory can be used to explain 'why people 
pay taxes' despite evidence of low levels of probability to be audited and low levels of 
penalties on additional tax. The prospect theory, initiated by Kahneman and Tversky 
in 1979, centred mainly on criticizing the expected utility theory as a descriptive model 
of decision making under risk. With the use of prospect theory in explaining tax 
compliance behaviour, the utility function used in standard models of tax evasion is 
replaced by a value function. The theory, which explains how people evaluate risk, 
holds that people are risk-averse in regard to gains but risk-seeking regarding loss. 
Simply, the prospect theory predicts that tax compliance proliferates if paying tax is 
seen as a gain.  
The expected utility theory predicts that high tax rates increase tax compliance. 
However, empirical studies have shown that there is a positive relationship between 
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tax rates and tax evasion. This paradox is known as the tax evasion puzzle or Yatzak 
puzzle. Dhami and al-Nowai (2005), in their model, predicted that prospect theory does 
explain the tax evasion puzzle as they found that tax evasion increases with the tax 
rate. Trotin (2012:02) used the same notion of reference point coined by Dhami and 
al-Nowai to show that an increase in the tax rate is followed by a decrease in the 
evaded amount of tax. Piolatto and Rablen (2013:14) supported the argument that 
prospect theory reverses the Yitzhaki puzzle in some situations.  
In countries such as the United States, taxpayers are obliged to pay taxes through a 
system in which they use either a common method of withholding or estimated tax 
payment. Developing countries such as Zimbabwe use quarterly payment dates and 
the PAYE system for taxpayers to remit tax (ZIMRA, 2015). These systems involve 
taxpayers estimating their taxable income at the beginning of the year and paying tax 
using applicable rates in quarters. At the end of the year, the taxpayers are supposed 
to file a return that shows the actual income accrued to them, and tax is calculated 
thereon. A comparison of tax paid through the QPDs will be made versus tax 
calculated on the annual return. Resultantly, if the taxpayers have paid more QPDs 
than the actual tax, then they will be in a refund position and conversely, if the QPDs 
are less than the actual tax then the taxpayers pay the balance. In the prospect theory 
context, taxpayers perceive the latter scenario as a loss, thus they are more willing to 
take risky strategies when declaring income (Kahneman and Tversky, 1981 and 
Bloomquist, 2003:15). 
A plethora of researchers have investigated tax compliance in the context of the 
prospect theory and concluded that tax evasion is more pronounced in taxpayers 
whose withheld tax is less than the actual tax assessed at the of the year (see Robben 
et al. 1990:342; White et al. 1993:74; Engström et al. 2011:27). Moreover, Schmidt 
(2001:168) used different subjects in his experiments to support the tenets of the 
prospect theory. His findings were that taxpayers in a payable position at the end of 
the year are most likely to take heed of aggressive advice from tax consultancy than 
those in a refundable position. In addition, other researchers (Lien and Smith, 
2010:337, Elffers and Hessig, 1997:304) used the prospect theory to show that 
taxpayers pay excessive QPDs to get refunds come year-end.  
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Surprisingly, Schisler (1994:135) had results that did not support the prospect theory 
when it comes to tax consultants' behaviour in relation to the position of their clients at 
the end of the year. More so, Kirchler and Maciejovsky (2002) found that the self-
employed are not affected by their tax position at the end of the year, that is, whether 
they are in a refundable or payable position. Alm and Torgler, 2012:26) added that 
prospect theory is not enough to explain all tax compliance paradoxes. The prospect 
theory is overall viewed as insufficient to explain human behaviour because of the lack 
of standard reference point taxpayers set (Kirchler et al. 2008:17). 
4.3.4 Agent-based theory and tax compliance 
Superfluity models have been formulated in trying to explain taxpayers' behaviour 
concerning tax evasion, tax avoidance and tax compliance. Researchers as will be 
shown in this section have adopted an agent-based theory in trying to come with an 
explanation of tax compliance behaviour. The first model was developed by Mittone 
and Patelli (2000), who introduced an agent-based model to tax compliance by 
modelling taxpayers into three categories, namely honest taxpayers, imitative 
taxpayers and free-riders. They found that even if there are few enforcement 
programmes there is a possibility that most of the taxpayers will evade tax.  
Davis et al. (2003:61) modelled an agent-based set-up in which the population is 
divided into two segments, namely compliant and non-compliant groups, and noted 
that tax evasion will increase if enforcement is lax in the compliant segment, and the 
compliance rate will increase if enforcement is upped in the non-compliant group. In 
addition, Korobow et al. (2007) set up a model where taxpayers compare expected 
payoffs from non-compliance, partial compliance and full compliance. These 
researchers found that a high rate of compliance can be sustained by a low level of 
enforcement. 
Pickhardt and Seibo (2011:02) explored the difference between the analysis of tax 
evasion in standard models and agent-based models. They explained that in an agent-
based model the agent’s behaviour is influenced by the behaviour of a certain group 
with the model; the agents may not possess a utility function and tax evasion dynamics 
may be triggered either by parameter changes or by stochastic processes or a 
combination of both. 
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Hokamp (2013:188) investigated income tax evasion using an agent-based theory and 
found that tax evasion increases with marginal per capita returns. He also found that 
back-auditing helps in alleviating tax evasion challenges. These researchers 
concurred with Alm and McKee (2003:310) who narrated that tax authorities will 
increase their revenue inflows if they embark on random audits, especially if the 
taxpayers believe that the audits are targeting certain individuals. However, random 
audits were found to be a weaker enforcement strategy compared to cycle-based 
audits by Smojver (2016:291), who used the agent-based model of tax compliance. 
In support of the 'deterrence models' of tax evasion, Zaklan et al. (2009:12) concluded 
that in as much as the tax compliance behaviour of an individual may be group 
influenced, higher levels of enforcement play a pivotal role in increasing the rate of tax 
compliance. Taxpayer's tax compliance behaviour may be influenced by the attitude 
and behaviour of fellow taxpayers who live in the same neighbourhood. Arslan and 
Ican (2013:342) showed that tax compliance increases with the rate of audit and that 
the neighbourhood has a negative influence on the behaviour of a taxpayer. Andrei et 
al. (2014:119) theorised an agent-based model with the agents being adaptive, 
bounded rationally, and embedded in social networks. Their findings were that social 
networks do influence tax compliance behaviour; for example, taxpayers are like to be 
more compliant in social networks with a high degree of centrality. 
Moreover, Calimani and Pellizzari (2014) also used the agent-based theory to note 
that tax morale is an important factor that determines tax compliance. Pellizzari and 
Rizzio (2012:15) used the attitude of the agents to tax compliance as a proxy of tax 
morale in an agent-based model and noted that tax morale has a positive relationship 
with tax compliance.  In support of these findings, Gulyás et al. (2015:04) used an 
agent-based model with employees, employers and the government as the agents. 
They found that the governments should devise tools that improve tax morale which 
in turn curb tax evasion. They also found that an adaptive strategy of auditing yields 
high revenue flows for the governments. 
Though game theory and agent-based models have similar features, they are different 
in that game theory is structured, analytical and demanding in constructing and solving 
the models while the agent-based model allows great flexibility in devising models and 
setting their parameters (Smojver, 2016:282). Agent-based models have an 
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advantage over standard models of tax compliance as they provide more flexibility for 
analyzing complex systems and collective taxpaying behaviour arising from individual 
taxpayers’ interactions (Andrei et al. 2014). 
4.3.5 Slippery slope framework 
An important tax compliance theory that based its foundation on why there is 'high tax 
compliance' rather than why tax evasion is prevalent is the slippery slope framework. 
The framework, first developed by Kirchler in 2007, assumes that integration of 
economic and psychological determinants of tax behaviour leads to tax compliance. 
Economic factors include audit probability and fines are adopted from the standard 
theory of tax evasion, while the psychological factors include social norms and justice 
perceptions. Importantly also, the slippery slope framework observes that the tax 
environment can be either an antagonistic or a synergistic climate. A country that is 
characterised by an antagonistic climate involves a tax authority that does not believe 
in taxpayers' willingness to pay, and this leads to taxpayers believing that they are 
mistreated by the tax authority. In contrast, a synergistic climate is characterised by a 
cordial relationship in which taxpayers see the tax authorities' services as community-
oriented. 
Scholarly evidence has affirmed the significance and capacity of the slippery slope 
framework in explaining tax compliance (Muehlbacher and Kirchler, 2010:607 Kogler 
et al. 2015:126). The slippery slope framework also postulates that tax compliance is 
dependent on the power of the authorities and trust in the authorities to effect either 
enforced compliance or voluntary compliance (Kirchler et al. 2008; Kastlunger et al. 
2013). Kirchler et al. (2008), in their experiment, then define trust as 'the general 
opinion that the tax authorities are benevolent and work for the common good, 
whereas the power of authorities refers to the perception of authorities' capacity to 
detect and punish evasion. Fig 4.1 simplifies the slippery slope framework, where the 
important tenets that include trust, power, voluntary compliance and enforced 
compliance are illustrated.  
Trust in the authorities yields voluntary compliance and coercive power results in 
enforced compliance. Kastlunger et al. (2013:43) differentiated coercive power and 
legitimate power where the former centred on the ability to punishment and levy heavy 
fines while the latter involves the effectiveness of authorities in reducing tax crimes. In 
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order to substantiate the dynamic relationship between power and trust, the slippery 
slope framework was protracted by categorising both, the power of tax authorities into 
coercive and legitimate power, and trust into reason-based and implicit trust (Gangl et 
al. 2015:16). 
Figure 4. 1 :  Slippery slope framework of tax compliance 
 
 
Source: The Slippery Slope Framework (Kirchler et al. 2008:212). 
Lisi (2013:06) also developed a theoretical model which based its assumptions on the 
slippery theory and macroeconomic model of the labour market. The model predicted 
that the right blend of deterrence tools and trust increases tax compliance which will, 
in turn, reduce the unemployment rate. Prinz et al. (2013) modelled the slippery slope 
framework assuming that tax authorities have instruments of coercive power and 
persuasive power and that there are two groups of taxpayers, namely compliance-
minded and evasion-minded taxpayers.  
The model theorised that tax compliance depends on the number of people who are 
evasion-minded, i.e. the larger the number of evasion-minded taxpayers, the lower will 
be the probability of full tax compliance. Kogler et al. (2012) found evidence to support 
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the assumptions of the slippery slope framework and show that both trust and power 
are important determinants of tax compliance in different economic conditions and tax 
climates. The researchers encouraged the government to gain their citizens’ trust by 
enhancing fair procedures and service-oriented behaviour. 
Benk and Budak (2012:15) found that results of the statistical analysis revealed that 
data from Turkish taxpayers partly support the assumptions of the slippery slope 
framework. They further discovered that the perceived power of authorities is a 
significant predictor of enforced tax compliance, while trust in the authorities has no 
significant influence. Moreover, Lozza et al. (2013:51) used self-employed participants 
in an experiment and confirmed that the existence of trust and power leads to tax 
compliance. An important observation made by Lozza and others is the link between 
trust and evaluations of public expenditures.  
Wilks and Pacheco (2014:03) tested the slippery slope framework in Portugal and the 
results allow the researcher to conclude that trust in authorities and their capacity to 
deter and punish tax evaders are interrelated and that both are essential in securing 
tax compliance. Gobena and Van Dijke (2015:31) empirically tested the slippery slope 
framework in Ethiopia and showed that procedural justice was associated with 
voluntary tax compliance only when legitimate power of the tax authority was low and 
when coercive power of the authority was high. Gobena and Van Dijke (2015:31) also 
showed that only coercive power predicts enforced tax compliance. 
 
4.3.6 Principal-agent and tax compliance. 
Tax evasion also occurs in corporate entities and is more complex than individual 
compliance behaviour. The principal-agent theory emerged in the 1970s and has its 
basis in economic research. The theory's basic model assumes two parties, the agent 
and the principal, and it is the problems in this relationship that make the need for audit 
and internal control (Reinganum and Wilde, 1985:17). The relationship can be 
described as the principal who delegates tasks to the agent to perform. The model 
states that the principal can control the agent through incentives and monitoring. It 
stipulates that the principal offers appropriate compensation to the agent as a way of 
inducing the desired outcome (Martini et al. 2016:27).  
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The principal-agent theory has been used to analyse the tax compliance behaviour of 
both companies and individuals. The theory was first used in the analysis of 
compliance behaviour by Reinganum and Wilde in 1985, who wanted to determine the 
optimal audit policy of the tax agency. The study shows that audit cut-off rules are 
imperceptibly better than random audit rules, and it also found that the former was the 
least-cost policy that encourages the correct declaration of income. In addition, 
Reinganum and Wilde (1985) found that the principal-agent theory in tax compliance 
produces higher levels of tax compliance than does the portfolio theory. Chen and Chu 
(2005:159) used the principal-agent model to predict that tax evasion decreased with 
the size of the firm. They explained that this is because there is much interaction 
between the manager and the owner of the firm. The model also predicted that tax 
evasion for firms tends to increase if there is a low rate of penalties and audit rates. 
Moreover, tax authorities can use a third party verification policy when carrying out 
their audit work. This policy works where an individual is being audited on his/her 
employment income and where there is a firm transaction with another firm. Kleven et 
al. (2009:21) found that third party reporting does reduce the occurrence of tax evasion 
and that it is more successful in large firms. 
Rablen (2013:13) proposed a principal-agent setting where the tax authority (principal) 
commits to an audit strategy, then taxpayers (agents) maximize expected utility. The 
model differed from the standard model as it predicts that tax compliance decreases 
as the audit rate increases. More so, Meyer-Brauns (2013) modelled a principal-agent 
setting with a principal hiring an agent to reduce the tax payable. There is also a tax 
authority that chooses an enforcement policy to maximise the social welfare criterion.   
The principal-agent model has its weakness. For example, Renvall and Spångberg 
(2014:37) assume risk-neutral taxpayers, which is a very strict assumption. Another 
weakness of the principal-agent model is that the tax authorities are assumed to be 
able to commit to their strategy and detect all tax evaders, which implies that all audited 
taxpayers are found to be tax compliant. Andreoni et al. (1998:831) simply criticised 
the principal-agent model as a poor description of real-world tax systems. Di Donato 
(2016:13) found in his study of compacting tax evasion and corruption in a principal-
agent set-up that tax morale is an important factor that should be considered when 
trying to induce tax compliance. Hence the next section looks at the influence of tax 
morale on tax compliance. 
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4.3.7 Tax morale models and tax compliance 
One of the key puzzles in the tax compliance literature is to understand why so many 
people pay their taxes despite a low probability of being detected. Researchers (see 
Alm et al. 1992 and Torgler, 2003) have concluded that tax morale is the reason why 
there is a high tax compliance rate in developed countries. In spite of the importance 
of tax morale, Feld and Frey (2002) argued that little research had been done on how 
it evolved and how best it can be cultivated. Given the weakness of the above-
discussed models of tax compliance and their assertion that tax morale is the 
important factor that explains tax compliance behaviour, the main aim of this study is 
to explore the tenets of tax morale and its determinants in South Africa and Zimbabwe.  
Richardson and Sawyer (2001) reported that individuals who have low tax ethics and 
low tax morale have a greater propensity to cheat on their tax declarations. Torgler 
(2003) added that nations with lower levels of tax morale have higher rates of evasion 
and avoidance.  In addition, Torgler et al. (2008) regressed a model with over-
deduction as the dependent variable and they found that the lower the tax morale, the 
more individuals overstate deductions or expenses, which reduces taxable income. 
They also analysed under-reporting (tax evasion) which showed that the lower the tax 
morale the higher the rate of tax evasion. It can be concluded that tax morale is an 
important factor that affects the level of tax compliance. Fakile (2011:118) discovered 
that in Nigeria there is a significant positive effect of tax morale on tax compliance. 
The perceived legitimacy of government policy influences both the magnitude of tax 
evasion and tax morale. Schnellenbach (2002) introduced a simple model of 
psychological costs that depend on the perceived legitimacy of public policies and 
predicted that a policy that is considered legitimate, which raises tax rates, will 
increase both costs associated with tax evasion and tax morale.  
Interaction between the tax authorities and taxpayers is of paramount importance in 
the study of tax compliance behaviour, as shown in some of the models discussed 
above, for example, the game theory and principal-agent models of tax compliance. 
Frey and Feld (2002:23) used the crowding theory to analyse whether the interaction 
between the tax authority and the taxpayers affects tax morale. The models predict 
that tax morale is affected by the behaviour of the tax authority, where higher tax 
morale among taxpayers is experienced when tax officials show respect to them. 
Critiquing the standard models of tax evasion, their models also prove that deterrence 
100 
 
factors do actually 'crowd out' tax morale, hence low tax compliance. High levels of 
enforcement are likely to make taxpayers perceive the system as unjust and as such 
lead to violation of the law and legislation and cultivate an attitude of dishonesty, 
immorality and a general tendency to evade tax (Yee et al. 2017:414). Moreover, 
Dell'Anno (2009) extended the model of Gordon (1989) to examine the relationship 
between tax compliance and tax morale. Tax morale is separated into the effect of 
guilt and the effect of shame. The guilty conscience arises from the taxpayer 
anticipating guilt when under-reporting and escaping detection. The social stigma is 
caused by the taxpayer anticipating public shame when under-reporting. It is assumed 
that these attitudes are influenced by the taxpayer's perception of the extent of tax 
evasion in society and the behaviour of the tax authority. 
Traxler (2010:101) expanded the standard model of tax compliance by incorporating 
tax morale. The model emphasized the importance of group influence on the individual 
taxpayer in regard to tax compliance behaviour. He explained that tax morale is a 
major contributor to high levels of tax compliance despite the weak tax enforcement 
exhibited in many nations. Thus for governments to increase tax compliance, tax 
morale should be extended to the moral leaders of that particular group. Also, the 
model predicted that austere deterrent policies increase the propensity to evade tax. 
Doerrenberg et al. (2012:04) established an optimal income tax model which includes 
tax morale, where it is assumed that tax morale varies amongst groups, and where 
the government can tax the groups differently. They predicted that groups with higher 
tax morale will be taxed more heavily, simply because taxing them is less onerous and 
their reported income reacts less elastically to tax rate changes than the reported 
income of groups with lower tax morale. The model is important for policymakers as it 
aids in cost-benefit analysis for taxation.  
Similar to the study of Doerrenberg et al. (2012) is that of Simonovits (2011), whose 
model assumed that an individual taxpayer supplies labour and the tax declarations 
depend on tax morale. He also divided tax morale into categories, namely exogenous 
and endogenous, where the former is a given parameter of the utility function, and the 
latter depends on the exogenous tax morale as well as on the observed behaviour of 
the individual's neighbourhood. The model concluded that higher morale suggests a 
higher socially optimal tax rate. In addition, Doerrenberg and Peichl (2010) discussed 
the opposite causality and found that greater tax progressivity implies higher tax 
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morale. Lisi (2013:02) also developed a model that shows that tax morale affects the 
various policies that a government puts in place to stamp out tax evasion. The model 
separates taxpayers into honest and tax dodgers, wherein for honest taxpayers there 
should be minimum deterrence policies while for tax dodgers there should be an 
increase in both the number of deterrence policies and monitoring.  
Furthermore, Bethencourt and Kunze (2013:17) proposed a theoretical model that 
incorporated tax morale into a dynamic overlapping generation's model of capital 
income tax evasion. In this model, tax morale is taken as a social norm for tax 
compliance and predicted a positive relationship between per capita GDP and tax 
morale as the number of evaders in society declines. Thus, the empirical facts support 
the finding that high-income countries exhibit high-quality institutions, high levels of 
tax morale and so, low levels of evasion.  The prediction was proven to be true by 
Deyneli (2014:61), who used the Tobit regression model to find that the higher the 
GDP the higher the tax morale in that particular country.  The problems of low tax 
compliance prevalent in most developing countries can be reduced if the tax morale 
is considered for policy-making since it has a direct relationship with tax compliance 
(Anyongyeire 2011:39; Halla, 2010:05; Marti et al. 2010:119; Torgler et al. 2007:17). 
The study of tax morale is thus of paramount importance in the less-developed 
countries such as South Africa and Zimbabwe where governments rely on tax revenue 
to finance their expenditure. 
4.4 Determinants of tax morale in developed countries 
The determinants of tax morale were first studied by Schmo¨lders (1960), who 
analysed tax morale among self-employed workers in Europe. He concluded that self-
employed taxpayers had lower levels of tax morale than taxpayers who worked for 
other people or organizations. Strümpel (1969) also analysed tax morale among 
European taxpayers. He found that tax morale in Germany was comparatively low, 
whereas in England it was comparatively high, because the German government used 
coercive tax enforcement techniques while the British system treated taxpayers with 
more respect and less control. 
Research has shown that demographic factors such as age, religion, gender, 
employment status and educational attainment determine tax morale studies. 
However, Ristovskaa et al. (2013:177) revealed that demographic factors are less 
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significant than non-demographic factors in determining Macedonians’ willingness to 
pay tax.  Age has been identified by researchers as an important demographic factor 
that determines tax morale. Torgler (2007:12) and Bilgin (2014:67) found that age is 
positively correlated with tax morale. Torgler and Valev (2010:15) used the justifiability 
of cheating taxes as the proxy for tax morale and found that in Western Europe women 
do not vindicate cheating of taxes. Alm et al. (2005:17) found that gender does not 
significantly affect tax morale in Russia. More so, Deyneli (2014:61) found that 
countries with high manhood have a corresponding higher level of tax morale. In 
Spain, religious people have higher tax morale than those who do not attend religious 
gatherings (Bilgin, 2014:67). However, Kanniainen and Pääkkönen (2007:20) found 
that there is no difference in terms of Catholic and Protestant beliefs on tax morale in 
Europe. Similarly, Torgler (2006:22) had results that show that in Spain, church 
attendance has no significant influence on tax morale. 
Additionally, Russo (2013:113) found a positive relationship between tax morale and 
the self-employed in Italy. In Europe and the United States of America, compared to 
full-time employees, the share of self-employers reporting the highest tax morale is 
6.5 percentage points lower. The results correspond to the standard argument that 
self-employed taxpayers exhibit lower tax compliance, based on the higher cost of 
being honest, a result that supports the findings of Schmolders (1960) more than 50 
years ago (Alm and Torgler, 2006: 241). However, Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas 
(2008:22) found contrasting results which show that self-employment has a negative 
relationship with tax morale. Çevik (2014:110) estimated a logistics regression model 
from the World Value Survey data and found that individual reciprocal tendency is an 
important determinant of tax morale.  
Additionally, Jahnke (2014:10) found that in Vietnam vertical reciprocity has a higher 
impact on tax morale than horizontal reciprocity.  Torgler (2004) found that trust in the 
legal system, government, parliament and revenue authorities affects the tax morale 
of a country. However, Sá et al. (2014:114) used a linear regression model and found 
an inverse relationship between institutional trust and tax morale. Corruption is another 
important determinant of tax morale in a particular country. There is an inverse 
relationship between corruption and between tax morale (Torgler, 2004:17). Moreover, 
Barone and Mocetti (2011:725) found that public spending inefficiency negatively 
affects tax morale in Italy.  
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Additionally, Lubian and Zarri (2011:20) noted that the happiness of a taxpayer plays 
an important role in determining his/her tax morale. The study found that taxpayers 
who are happy have higher tax morale than the others. An individual taxpayer is 
influenced strongly by his perception of the behaviour of other taxpayers (Frey and 
Torgler, 2006:24; Hammar et al. 2009: 245). Research has shown that tax morale is 
affected by the question of whether an individual is proud to be a citizen of a particular 
country or not. Torgler (2003:295) and Sá et al. (2014:114) found that in Canada and 
Portugal, pride has a significant effect on tax morale. These results were also 
established by Yew et al. (2014:71) in Russia. The Opportunity to evade tax also 
affects tax morale. Blaufus et al. (2014:4) found that the more chances are there to 
evade tax, the lower the tax morale.  
Verboon and van Dijke (2007:24) found significant positive correlations between 
personal tax morale and the perceived probability of detection. In Italy, Filippin et al. 
(2013:324) used ordinary least squares (OLS) and found out that tax morale has a 
direct relationship with tax enforcement. Alm et al. (1992) found in an experimental 
setting that tax morale is more significant if taxpayers believe that there is a direct 
relationship between the taxes paid and the utility gained from a public good. Baldry 
(1986) has shown in an experiment that some people never evade taxes, seemingly 
paying no regard to expected utility considerations whatsoever. 
Torgler and Werner (2004) established an empirical correlation between local fiscal 
autonomy and tax morale in Germany. The authors define fiscal autonomy as the ratio 
between a municipality's tax revenues and the GDP of its federal state. Again, high 
fiscal autonomy makes it more likely that the residents of a municipality get back a 
good deal of what they have paid in taxes. This may in turn increase tax morale. Güth 
et al. (2005) investigated the effect of centralization and decentralization of tax 
collection as well as the decisions on how to use the collected tax revenue. The 
researchers concurred with Torger and Werner (2004) that tax morale is higher in a 
region where there is decentralization than in a region with centrality.  
Risk attitude is also an important factor that has been identified in developed countries 
to have an influence on tax morale. Kouamé (2015:25) studied the effect of risk attitude 
on tax morale and concluded that risk aversion has a positive relationship with tax 
morale. Lastly, group influence also matters in determining the level of tax morale in 
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developed countries. People’s tax morale increases if they believe that others are also 
willing to pay taxes. Also, voluntary tax compliance is dependent on the taxpaying 
behaviour of other group members (Frey and Torgler, 2007; Wenzel, 2005). 
4.5 Determinants of tax morale in transition countries 
Demographic factors are also crucial in transition countries in determining tax morale. 
In Latin America, Gerstenbl¨uth et al. (2012:129) found that age is a significant factor 
of tax morale and more importantly they found that tax morale increases with age. 
They also noted that gender, marital status and being unemployed do not influence 
tax morale. However, Torgler (2004:253) observed that in India the oldest group of 
taxpayers exhibited the lowest tax morale. Religion has also been identified as a factor 
that affects tax morale by a plethora of researchers. In the context of Latin American 
countries, Gerstenbl¨uth et al. (2012:129) found that attendance of religious services 
makes no differences in attitudes towards tax morale. Moreover, Setyonugroho and 
Sardjono (2013:85) used linear regression to test their hypotheses and found that in 
Indonesia tax knowledge does not affect willingness to pay tax.     
Andriani (2012:09) used the bivariate Probit model to estimate determinants of tax 
morale in Palestine and found that there is a great relationship between tax morale 
and public spirit and a negative correlation between tax morale and associational 
activity. In Venezuela, reciprocity towards governments proved to be a significant 
influence on citizens' willingness to pay tax (Ortega and Pablo, 2013:11). Surprisingly, 
Aguirre and Rocha (2010:17) found that corruption is insignificant in explaining tax 
morale in Latin American countries. More so, studies have identified the role played 
by occupational status as important in understanding tax morale. Gerstenbl¨uth et al. 
(2012:130) found that self-employed people have a high probability of having less tax 
morale in Latin America and the Caribbean. However, Piatti et al. (2014:16) found that 
the self-employed reported higher tax morale than other groups in Asia-Pacific 
countries and others. 
4.6 Determinants of tax morale in developing countries 
More so, Ali et al. (2013) used the logit model and Afrobarometer survey data to 
examine factors that determine citizens’ tax compliance attitude in Kenya, Tanzania, 
Uganda and South Africa. The study found that the provision of public services, tax 
knowledge and awareness, and perceptions about the fairness of the government are 
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the major determinants of tax morale in these countries. However, these researchers 
noted that factors that affect tax compliant behaviour do differ from one country to 
another. 
Fakile (2011:118) had empirical findings that showed social norms, attitudes towards 
government, tax evasion and tax avoidance have a significant effect on tax morale, 
while there is no significant effect of attitudes towards the legal system and traditional 
institutions on tax morale. In concurrence with Fakile, Kouamé (2015:22) found results 
that social norms are important in explaining tax morale in developing countries than 
in developed countries.  
Trust is also an important factor that determines tax morale in developing countries. 
Kouamé (2019:11) noted that trust can be categorized into vertical trust and horizontal 
trust. Laksmana and Narsa (2016:16), defines vertical trust as the trust of the taxpayer 
to the tax authorities, while horizontal trust is the trust of the taxpayer to other 
taxpayers. He also concluded that quality and trust in public institutions do not have 
any bearing on tax morale in developing countries than in developed countries. In 
contrast with research findings in the developed countries, Bodea and LeBas 
(2013:22) used the ordered logit model to find that age does not affect tax morale in 
urban Nigeria. In the same vein, Ibrahim et al. (2015:409) studied tax morale in Ghana 
and found that tax morale decreases with age. Ibrahim (2015:409) also concluded that 
in Ghana the level of education, marital status, patriotism, sector of employment, and 
satisfaction with democracy do not influence morale. 
In addition, Tusubira and Nkote (2013:6) studied the determinants of tax morale in 
Uganda and found that reciprocity is a significant determinant of tax morale as well as 
social norms. The researchers noted that tax morale does influence tax compliance 
positively. Corruption is rife in developing countries, especially in Africa, where 
according to the Transparency International (2021) organization, Sub-Saharan Africa 
is the lowermost performing region in terms of corruption index and there is little 
improvement from previous years. Jahnke (2015:08) concentrated on the effects of 
corruption on tax morale in developing countries and found that corruption has a 
negative effect on tax morale. However, Abdul–Razak and Adafula (2013:54) found 




4.7 Literature review on tax morale in South Africa 
Cummings et al. (2009:24) conducted research on tax morale in South Africa and 
Botswana. They found that tax morale is higher in Botswana than in South Africa. Also, 
they concurred with research in developed countries that the quality of political 
institutions has a significant influence on tax morale and tax compliance in those 
countries. Additionally, Oberholzer (2008:66) studied the attitudes of South Africans 
towards the payment of tax. His study explained that tax morale in South Africa is low 
because taxpayers feel there is high corruption in the government and the taxpayers’ 
money is not put to good use. 
 4.8 Importance of tax morale in developing countries 
Ramfol (2019) highlighted that the benefits of promoting tax morale hold immense 
potential for tax revenue generation as taxpayers' level of tax morale is a strong 
stimulus to comply with or resist tax laws. She added that countries demonstrating 
higher ratios of tax to Gross Domestic Product have higher tax morale. Bodea and 
LeBas (2013:02) noted that tax morale is important as it enhances voluntary tax 
compliance, which is desirable in developing countries. They added that tax authorities 
in the less-developed countries are still behind in terms of contemporary tax collection 
methods. Subsequently, the increase of tax enforcement and penalties for evasion 
leads to dwindling tax revenues. Luttmer and Singhal (2014:152) added that tax 
morale is important as it is the residual component that explains tax compliance 
behaviour in a heavily enforced environment. The researchers quoted research by 
Dwenger et al. (2014) who studied compliance with the local Protestant church tax in 
Bavaria to show that despite lack of enforcement an important role for tax-morale-
driven compliance is noted. 
Tax morale is also valuable to an economy because it reduces the cost of financing 
the public sector (Doerrenberg, 2012:01). Doerrenberg (2012:01) further explained 
that a high level of tax morale will imply that the tax base is large, and hence tax rates 
can be reduced. Important also, is that when tax morale is high, tax distortions of 
economic activity are smaller and tax enforcement and administration costs are lower 
than in cases where tax morale is low. Alm (2012) highlighted that tax evasion reduces 
both public revenue and the availability of public services and also discriminates 
against honest taxpayers.  
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As noted above, tax morale has a negative relationship with tax evasion. Thus, through 
improved tax morale, tax non-compliance will fall. Subsequently, there will be an 
increase in service provision and encouragement of paying tax to would-be tax 
dodgers. Personal circumstances and opposition to particular government policies, in 
contrast, are destabilizing influences, causing tax morale to fluctuate. Braithwaite and 
Ahmed (2005:537) posited that tax morale is not only an important factor for tax 
compliance but is also a useful measurement of judging how the tax system is 
performing. They added that the tax morale level could fluctuate, but it can withstand 
any unpopular policy as long as adjustments are made to restore morale to the level 
necessary for a well-functioning democracy. 
The importance of tax morale is multi-faced as it can also be used to predict the 
election results of a particular country. García et al. (2015:84) posed a model where 
parties compete over the level of income redistribution in the first stage, and voters 
decide about their level of tax compliance in the second stage They found that that as 
voters become more confident about society's tax morale, there is an increase in the 
probability that the party more in favour of income redistribution will win, and also in 
the level of tax compliance. Both public-spending efficiency and tax morale affect tax 
evasion, and these coupled with ethical and social norms influence a taxpayer's beliefs 
and behaviours in relation to tax. Inefficient public spending is believed to lower the 
psychological and social cost of tax evasion measured in terms of the guilt and bad 
morality felt by the taxpayer (Brink and Porcano, 2017:89). 
4.9 Limitations of tax morale 
Important as it is, the concept of tax morale is not free from criticism. Bethencourt and 
Kunze (2013:17) had empirical evidence that tax morale may not only explain why 
some taxpayers never evade tax but even outweighs the benefits of being tax 
compliant. Also, Posner (2000) indicated that the differences in tax compliance rates 
among nations might mean that tax morale is a non-event. Leonardo (2011:13) also 
criticized tax morale as it fails to explain the relationship between taxpayers’ attitudes 
and taxpayers’ behaviour. 
4.10 Conclusion 
The chapter concentrated on the concept of tax morale and tax compliance. 
Theoretical and empirical research was done with an emphasis on how tax morale 
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evolved. Tax morale has been mentioned in a prior model as an important factor that 
influences tax compliance. It has been noted that tax morale does influence tax 
compliance positively, which makes it an important phenomenon to be thoroughly 
looked at, especially in developing countries where there is a low level of tax 
compliance. Important to note also is the heterogeneity of tax morale illustrated across 
countries and over time highlighted by Alm and Torgler (2006). From the description 
of determinants of tax morale in developing, transition and developed countries, it is 
worthwhile to highlight that the determinants vary from one country to another and the 
outcomes depend on the model used by the respective researcher.  Also, little 
research has been done on tax morale and its determinants in developing countries, 
South Africa and Zimbabwe included. The next chapter will look at the research 





















The study seeks to investigate the determinants of tax morale in South Africa and 
Zimbabwe. This chapter outlines the methods and procedures employed to identify 
and analyse the factors that influence tax morale. The model of estimation is discussed 
as well as the justification of the model. Diagnostic tests carried out in the study are 
discussed before the description of data collection procedures. 
5.2  Model selection and variables selection 
The selection of variables for the present investigation was determined primarily by 
the level of support they had received in the literature. The nature of the dependent 
variable helps to determine the model to be adopted by the study. The study 
dependant variable, tax morale, is qualitative and has more than two categories, hence 
calling for an ordered logistic model. Ordered logistic regression is employed when 
dependent variables involve three or more categories (Ari, 2016). In this model, the 
effects of the independent variables are allowed to differ for each outcome (Koprulu, 
2011). Therefore, the ordered logit model having the response variable with three 
categories is chosen to be the most appropriate regression model to explain the 
relationship between the response variable and explanatory variables. 
As highlighted above, the dependent variable (tax morale) is an ordered categorical 
variable, thus an ordered logit model is hereby applied in this study. The model was 
first coined by Peter McCullagh (1980) as an extension of a logit model. Furthermore, 
the logit model arises if a specified function is the cumulative density function of the 
logistic distribution. Grilli and Rampichini (2015:01) posited that the ordered logit 
model is a member of the wider class of cumulative ordinal models, where the logit 
function is replaced by a general link function, logit, probit and complementary log-odd 
being the most common ones.  
More so, the dependent variable for an ordered logit model takes a number of finite 
and discrete values that contain ordinal information. One of the important features of 
the model is that it is based on the cumulative probabilities of the response variable. 
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Particularly, the logit of each cumulative probability is assumed to be a linear function 
of the covariates with regression coefficients constant across response categories.  
The advancement of the ordered logit model has one strong assumption of the 
constant log odds ratio. McCullagh (1980) explained that the assumption of the 
constant log odds ratio is called the proportional odds assumption, which is the reason 
why ordered logit/probit models are also known as proportional odds models. 
5.3 Justification of the model 
Torgler (2004:240) acknowledged that analysing tax morale as a dependent variable 
is new in tax compliance research. The research has an option of using a Linear 
Probability Model (LPM) or ordered logit model or ordered probit. However, according 
to Gujarati (2004:593), the LPM model has the following disadvantages:  
 Non-normality of ui,  
 heteroscedasticity of ui, 
  possibility of ˆYi lying outside the 0–1 range, and  
 the generally lower R2 values. 
The author further noted that LPM is less attractive as it assumes that Pi= E(Y = 1 | X) 
increases linearly with X, that is, the marginal effect of X remains constant throughout. 
Gujarati (2004:625) highlighted that logit and probit models give almost similar results 
though a logit model assumes error terms to follow a logistic distribution whereas the 
probit model assumes normality in the distribution of error terms. 
Most of the research on tax morale uses ordered probit models. The estimated 
regression coefficients from an ordered logit model are about 1.81 times the values 
from an ordered probit model. However, logit models are simpler than probit models. 
The equation of the logistic Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) for logit models is 
simple, while the normal CDF for probit models involves an unevaluated integral 
(Gujarati, 2004:614). The difference is trivial for dichotomous data, but for polytomous 
data, where multivariate logistic is required or normal distribution, the disadvantage of 
the probit model is more severe. In this research, tax morale data is polytomous in 
nature, thus it is more desirable to use a logit model.  
111 
 
Furthermore, a logit model is more desirable than a probit model because it is easy to 
interpret. The inverse linearizing transformation for the logit model is directly 
interpretable as log-odds, while the inverse transformation for probit models does not 
have a direct interpretation. Based on the strengths of the logit ordered model over 
other methods of analysis, the study used an ordered logit model for the analysis of 
tax morale determinants in South Africa and Zimbabwe. Whereas the survey question 
used will have ranked answers. 
5.3.1  Assumptions of logistic regression 
The foundation of an ordered logit model is logistic regression. Logistic regression is 
different from linear regression in that it does not make several of the key assumptions 
that linear and general linear models hold so close. Furthermore, logistic regression 
does not require a linear relationship between the dependent and independent 
variables. Moreover, the error terms (residuals) for logistic regression do not need to 
be normally distributed and homoscedasticity is not required. The dependent variable 
in logistic regression is not measured on an interval or ratio scale. The following are 
the assumptions of logistic regression, some of which also apply to linear regression:  
5.3.2 Assumption of observation independence  
Logistic regression entails the observations to be independent of each other. That is 
to say, and the observations should not come from repeated dimensions or 
coordinated data. 
5.3.3 Assumption of linearity of independent variables and log-odds 
Linearity of independent variables and log odds is one of the fundamentals of logistic 
regression. More so, logistic regression entails that the independent variables are 
linearly related to the log odds.  
5.3.4 Assumption of the absence of multicollinearity 
The independent variables for a logistic regression should not be too highly correlated 





5.3.5 Assumption of a large sample size  
Logistic regression classically calls for a large sample size. A general rule is that a 
minimum of 10 cases with the least frequent outcome for each independent variable 
in the model is needed.  
5.3.6 Assumption of appropriate outcome structure  
An appropriate structure of the outcome variable is one of the main assumptions of 
logistic regression. In other words, binary logistic regression requires the dependent 
variable to be binary and ordinal logistic regression requires the dependent variable to 
be ordinal.  
5.4  Derivation of the ordered logit model 
Let 𝑌𝑖 be considered to be an ordinal response variable with C categories for the i-th 
subject, combined with a vector of covariates 𝑋𝑖. Thus, a regression model will create 
a relationship between the covariates and the set of probabilities of the categories 
𝑝𝑐𝑖 = Pr(𝑌𝑖 = 𝑦𝑐|𝑿𝑖), 𝑐 = 1, … , 𝐶. Grilli and Rampichini (2015:01) noted that regression 
models for ordinal responses refer to appropriate one-to-one transformations, for 
example, the cumulative probabilities 𝑞𝑐𝑖 = Pr(𝑌𝑖 ≤ 𝑦𝑐|𝑿𝑖), 𝑐 = 1, … , 𝐶. Furthermore, 
the authors emphasized that the model specifies only C1 cumulative probabilities.  
Therefore, an ordered logit model for an ordinal response Yi with C categories is 
defined by a set of C1 equations where the cumulative probabilities 𝑔𝑐𝑖 = Pr (𝑌𝑖 ≤
𝑦𝑐|𝑿𝑖) are related to a linear predictor 𝜷
′𝑿𝑖 = 𝛽𝟎 + 𝛽𝟏𝑋𝟏𝒊 + 𝛽2𝑋2𝑖 +… through the logit 
function:  
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝑔𝑐𝑖) = log ( 𝑔𝑐𝑖 /(1 − 𝑔𝑐𝑖)𝛼𝑐 − 𝜷′𝑿𝒊 , 𝑐 = 1,2, … , 𝐶 − 1.  (1) 
 
The parameters 𝛼𝐶, called thresholds or cut-points, are in increasing order (𝛼1 < 𝛼2 <
⋯ < 𝛼𝑐−1). More so, the effects of the covariates are constant across response 
categories, a characteristic feature called the parallel regression assumption. The 
assumption is confirmed as plotting 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝑔𝑐𝑖) against covariate results in C1 parallel 
lines. Grilli and Rampichini (2015:01) highlighted that the ordered logit model is also 
known as the proportional odds model because the parallel regression assumption 
113 
 
implies the proportionality of the odds of not exceeding the c-th category 𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑐𝑖 =
𝑔𝑐𝑖/(1 − 𝑔𝑐𝑖):  
The cumulative probability for category c, derived from equation (1), is  
𝑔𝑐𝑖 = exp(𝛼𝑐 − 𝛽
′𝑋𝑖) /(1 + exp(𝛼𝑐 − 𝛽
′𝑋𝑖) = 1/(1 + exp(−𝛼𝑐 + 𝛽
′𝑋𝑖) (2)  
A cumulative model for an ordinal response, such as the ordered logit model (1), is 
equivalent to a system composed of a set of thresholds 𝛼𝑐
∗ and a linear regression 
model for an underlying continuous response:  
𝑌𝑖
∗ = (𝛽∗)′𝑋𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖
∗         (3)  
where 𝑒𝑖
∗ is an error with mean zero and standard deviation𝜎𝑒∗. The relationship 
Pr(𝑌𝑖 ≤ 𝑦𝑐) = Pr (𝑌𝑖
∗ ≤ 𝛼𝑐
∗) implies that the linear model (3) is equivalent to the 
cumulative model 𝑙(𝑔𝑐𝑖) = 𝛼𝑐 − 𝛽′𝑋𝑖, where the link function 𝑙(. ) is the inverse of the 
distribution function of the error 𝑒𝑖
∗. The relationship between a parameter of the 
cumulative model 𝜃 and the corresponding parameter of the underlying model 𝜃∗ is 
𝜃 = 𝜃∗𝜎𝑙/𝜎𝑒∗, where 𝜎𝑙 is the standard deviation of the distribution associated to the 
link function, for example, 𝜎𝑙 = 𝜋/√3 ≅ 1.81 for logit. The depiction through an 
underlying linear model also makes it clear that the estimated slopes from a cumulative 
model are approximately invariant to the merging of the categories.  
5.4.1 Marginal effects 
Making decisions about using variables' values in estimation is very important because 
the marginal effect depends on the values of all explanatory variables. Since total 
probability always equals 1, the total marginal effect for each variable is zero. But it 
should be noted that the marginal effect is not direct on binary variables, and it can be 
obtained by calculating the difference between the two possible probabilities. The 
marginal effects of each variable on the different alternatives sum up to zero. Marginal 
effects interpretation: each unit increase in the independent variable 
increases/decreases the probability of selecting alternative j by the marginal effect 
expressed as a percent. 
Calculating the marginal effects is therefore a method to find the quantitative effect 
that the independent variable has on tax morale. The marginal effect indicates the 
change in the share of taxpayers (or the probability of) belonging to a specific tax 
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morale level (i.e. 0, 1, 2, 3) when the independent variable increases by exactly one 
unit. The study will present only the marginal effects for the highest value from the 
ordered logit estimation. 
The calculation of the marginal effect of one unit change in 𝑋𝑘 predictor on the 












= [𝜆(𝜇𝑗−𝑖 − 𝛽
′𝑋𝑖) − 𝜆(𝜇𝑗 − 𝛽
′𝑋𝑖)]𝛽𝑘 
In which 𝜇𝑗 = +∞ , 𝜇0 = −∞, 𝜆𝑗(𝑋𝑖) =
𝜕𝑖𝑗(𝑋𝑖)
𝜕𝑋𝑘
⁄   
5.5 The estimation of parameters 
The parameters will be estimated using the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) 
method, which maximises the probability of categorisation. The procedure of 
estimating MLE does not require an assumption of normality or homoscedasticity of 
errors. A maximum likelihood estimation is a statistical tool used for several analysis 
methods, to estimate the model parameters given a set of observations (Harrell 2015). 
It can be applied assuming that the explanatory model variables are independent of 
the unobserved components of the utility (Train 2009) 
Maximum likelihood estimators (MLEs) are most attractive because of their large 
sample or asymptotic properties (Greene 2002: 472). 






′𝑋𝑖) − 𝛾(𝜇𝑗−1 − 𝛽
′𝑋𝑖)]
𝑍𝑖𝑗 
Where ′𝑍𝑖𝑗′ is a binary variable, it is equal 1 when the observed group for person ‘i’ is 
‘j’, and if they are not equal, it equals 0. The Newton-Raphons algorithm is used in the 
maximising process (Greene 2002:472).  
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5.6 Empirical model  
The empirical model is specified as follows:   
𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑒 = 𝐹(𝐴𝑔𝑒, 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟, 𝑒𝑑𝑢, 𝑚𝑠, 𝑒𝑠, 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑖, 𝑖𝑛𝑐, ℎ𝑢, 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟, 𝑡𝑝, ℎ𝑎𝑝𝑝, 𝑆𝐷, 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑑, 𝑎𝑤)  
or equivalently 
𝑃(𝑇𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑒 = 1 𝑋⁄ )
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽2𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽3𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽4𝑒𝑑𝑢 + 𝛽5𝑚𝑠 + 𝛽6𝑖𝑛𝑐 + 𝛽7𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽8𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟
+ 𝛽9ℎ𝑎𝑝𝑝 + 𝛽10ℎ𝑢 + 𝛽11𝑒𝑠 + 𝛽12𝑆𝐷 + 𝛽13𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑑 + 𝛽14𝑎𝑤 + 𝛽15𝑇𝑃 + 𝜇_𝑖 
 
Where  𝑃(𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑒 = 1 𝑋⁄ ) is the probability that an individual is willing to pay tax 
given the vector of observable demographic, economic and institutional 
characteristics: 
𝛽0 is a constant 
𝑎𝑔𝑒  is age of the respondent; 
𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 is sex of the respondent; 
𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐 is education of the respondent; 
𝑚𝑠 is marital status; 
𝑒𝑠 is employment status of the respondent;  
𝑖𝑛𝑐  is income of respondent;  
𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑖 is religion of respondent; 
ℎ𝑢 is level of hunger of the respondent; 
𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟 is corruption perception; 
𝑇𝑃 is trust in parliament 
𝑆𝐷 is the level of satisfaction with democracy   
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑑 is the level of the respondent’s pride  
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𝑎𝑤 is the level of awareness 
𝐻𝑎𝑝𝑝 is the level of happiness 
𝜇𝑖  is an error term. 
5.6 Diagnostic Tests 
To ensure reliable results for policy, the study will perform statistical tests on the data 
collected.  
5.6.1 Multicollinearity test 
Multicollinearity ensues when two or more independent variables in the model are 
approximately determined by a linear combination of other independent variables in 
the model. To check linear dependence between explanatory variables, a correlation 
test will be carried out. A correlation matrix will be computed. If explanatory variables 
are correlated, then there is a problem of multicollinearity and this may result in biased 
results.  To solve this problem, one of the variables should be dropped. 
5.6.2 Specification test 
The Ramsey Regression Equation Specification Error Test (RESET) for 
misspecification will be carried out. The test detects omitted variables and the incorrect 
functional form of the model. The mechanics of the test are that, if non-linear 
combinations of the explanatory variables have any power in explaining the dependent 
variable, then the problem of misspecification exists. If the model can be significantly 
improved by artificially including powers of the predictions of the model, then the 
original model must have been inadequate.  
5.6.3 Log-likelihood ratio test  
The log-likelihood ratio test (LRT) is a statistical test of the goodness of fit between 
two models. It is used in the Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square test of whether all predictors' 
regression coefficients in the model are simultaneously zero. 
5.6.4 LR chi2(3)  
This is the Likelihood Ratio (LR) Chi-Square test which assumes that at least one of 
the predictors' regression coefficients is not equal to zero in the model. The number in 
the parenthesis indicates the degrees of freedom of the Chi-Square distribution used 
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to test the LR Chi-Square statistic and is defined by the number of predictors in the 
model. 
Likelihood ratio tests (LRTs) have been used to compare two nested models. The form 
of the test is suggested by its name, 




the ratio of two likelihood functions; the simpler model (s) has fewer parameters than 
the general (g) model. Asymmetrically, the test statistic is distributed as a Chi-Squared 
random variable, with degrees of freedom equal to the difference in the number of 
parameters between the two models. 
Likelihood ratio tests compare two models provided that the simpler model is a special 
case of the more complex model (i.e., “nested”). LRTs can be presented as a 
difference in the log-likelihoods (recall that log 𝐴 𝐵⁄ = log 𝐴 − log 𝐵) and this is often 
handy as they can be expressed in terms of deviance. Then, 
𝐿𝑅𝑇 = −2(log𝑒( ℒ𝑠) − log𝑒( ℒ𝑔)) 
= −2(log𝑒( ℒ𝑠) − 2 log𝑒( ℒ𝑔) 
= 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠 − 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑔. 
Therefore, the likelihood ratio test can be calculated as a difference in the 
nonconformity for the two models. This is convenient as deviance is an estimation of 
interest for different aspects. 
5.6.5 Prob> Chi square 
This is the probability of getting a LR test statistic as extreme as, or more so than that 
observed under the null hypothesis. The null hypothesis is that all of the regression 
coefficients in the model are equal to zero. 
5.6.6 Pseudo R-squared 
This is McFadden's pseudo-R-squared. This value lies between 0 and 1. The Pseudo 
R-square is used to measure the goodness of fit of the model. The Goodness of fit of 
the fitted models is assessed by using the Pseudo-R2 criterion. The selection of 
variables is based when the 95% confidence level or variables with a p-value of less 
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than 0.05 are considered significant in the model selection procedure. 
McFadden's R2 is another version, based on the log-likelihood kernels for the 
intercept-only model and the full estimated model. 
5.6.7 Z and P>|z| 
These are the test statistics and p-value, respectively, for the null hypothesis that an 
individual predictor's regression coefficient is zero given that the rest of the predictors 
are in the model. 
5.7  Validity 
The validity indicates the extent to which a measuring device is able to measure what 
will be measured. A research instrument is said to be valid if it is able to measure what 
you need and can properly reveal the data of variables to be studied. Validity will be 
analysed with both convergent validity and discriminant validity.  
5.8 Discussion of variables 
The idealistic inclusion of the variables specified in the model is anchored on strong 
theoretical and empirical justification.  
5.8.1 The dependent variable – tax morale 
Tax morale in this study, as in similar previous studies, is a dependent variable. It is a 
measure of the intrinsic motivation of an individual to pay tax. The author used the 
2010-2012 and 2017-2020 World Values Survey (WVS) data to measure individual 
impetus to pay tax. The WVS dataset commonly used a 10-point Likert Scale approach 
to generate data on tax morale from the respondents. This approach of having a series 
of responses is credited based on promoting more accurate truthful responses 
compared to the approach of pinpointing one's level of underreporting that encourages 
the respondent to lie (McAuliffe, 2017). Tax morale in this study is measured by 
assessing whether, given a chance, one always justifies cheating on taxes, or, given 
a chance, never justifies cheating on taxes.  
For the purposes of this study, tax morale is captured by compressing the 10-point 
Likert Scale into a 4-point scale. The 4-point scale developed in this study took the 
value 3 for never justifiable, denoting high tax morale, and 0 for always justifiable, 




5.8.2 The independent variables 
The following is the discussion of the independent variables of the study’s ordered 
logit model: 
5.8.2.1 Marital status 
This variable intends to establish if there is a relationship between marital status and 
tax morale. Tittle (1980) claims that marital status influences legal or illegal behaviour 
depending on the extent to which individuals are constrained by their social networks. 
Further literature suggests that married people have more social stakes in the society 
in which they live and are more committed than singles to their social and political 
community. As a result, couples are likely to have higher tax morale than singles. 
Separated and divorced people, as put forward by Torgler et al. (2007:31), are more 
pessimistic in life and are more likely to have low tax morale.   
This study classified marital status into six categories coded as follows 1 stands for 
married people; 2 for living together as married; 3 for divorced people; 4 for separated 
people; 5 for windows; and 6 for singles. Due to differences in economic situations in 
South Africa and Zimbabwe, singles are expected to exhibit higher tax morale in 
Zimbabwe than other categories. It is the view of this study that it is difficult if not 
impossible for a rational person to consider paying tax before meeting family 
responsibilities. Given the economic condition in Zimbabwe, this study supposes that 
people with heavy family responsibilities, couples included, are likely to have low tax 
morale. In South Africa, however, married people are expected to have high tax 
morale.  
5.8.2.2 Religion 
This variable accounts for the differences in values, ethics and beliefs on tax morale. 
Religion and socio-cultural beliefs play a major role in tax payment or tax evasion by 
discouraging or encouraging compliance with tax laws. It is assumed in this study that 
religious individuals will have higher tax morale compared to non-religious people. The 
variable measures the effect and importance of God, biblical teachings, Christian 
values, ethics and beliefs in upholding national obligations. This variable is captured 
as a categorical variable coded as follows: 1 if the respondent is a religious person; 2 
if not a religious person; and 3 if an atheist. Similarly to other previous studies (Torgler 
2003, 2005, 2006; Alm and Torgler, 2006; Torgler and Schneider, 2007, Torgler and 
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Martinez-Vazquez, 2009), this study expects that people who report being religious 
have higher tax morale than non-religious and atheist people.  
5.8.2.3 Gender 
The variable seeks to establish the relationship between gender and tax morale. There 
is overwhelming evidence that women have higher tax morale than men. According to 
Ross and McGee (2012), women are more opposed to tax evasion. Spicer and Becker 
(1980), Tittle (1980) and the social-psychological literature validating Ross and McGee 
argued that women are more compliant with tax than men. Frank (1996) further 
substantiated the claim submitting that women pay more attention to ethical 
considerations, even when choosing an employer. Daude et al. 2013; Kogler et al. 
2007; Leonardo and Martinez-Vazquez, 2016; Torgler, 2003, 2004, 2006) also 
acknowledged that women have higher tax morale than men. This study, too, expects 
that women have higher tax morale than men. The study used a dummy variable to 
capture gender as follows, 1 if the respondent is a male and 2 otherwise.  
5.8.2.4 Income level 
Literature suggests that tax morale also depends on one's level of income. It is 
assumed that upper-income class people are more tax compliant. Because of their 
economic status, they always want, by any means, to avoid shaming and blackmailing 
their branded names. Further, wealthier individuals could have access to tax planning 
and therefore are able to minimize their tax burden. As a result, they are argued to 
have high tax morale compared to their lower-income counterparts. However, new 
literature advocates that the influence of income class on tax morale depends on 
preferences and the progression of income tax schedules. Thus, tax morale may 
increase or decrease with the income class.  
This study, like other previous studies, classified income level into 3 categories as 
follows: 1 representing the lower-income class, 2 indicating the middle-income class 
and 3 for the upper-income class. The study expects a positive or negative effect of 
income level on tax morale.  
5.8.2.5 Employment   
There is a consensus that the occupation of an individual affects the level of tax 
morale. It is assumed that formally employed people with known permanent incomes 
have access to tax planning and therefore are able to minimize their tax burden, unlike 
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the self-employed people. Torgler and Murphy (2004:313) argued that self-employed 
taxpayers have more opportunities to evade taxes than formally employed individuals 
whose employers deduct tax on their behalf. Lewis (1982) added that taxes are more 
visible for self-employed people due to the high compliance costs. While compulsory 
deduction of tax on behalf of employees does not reflect the willingness to pay of the 
employee, this study argues that employed people are better motivated to pay the tax 
due to lower compliance costs.  
Employment in this study is classified into 4 categories, namely: full-time employment, 
part-time, informally employed and unemployed. The four classes were coded as 
follows: 1 stands for full-time employed people, 2 for part-time, 3 for informally 
employed people and 4 for unemployed people. While there are diverging views on 
the effect of employment on tax morale, this study, in line with the findings of 
Schmölders (1960) in Europe and Torgler and Shaltegger (2006:409), expects full-
time employed people to have high tax morale across all the models.  
5.8.2.6 Age 
There exists conflicting literature on the effects of age on tax morale. While other 
studies endorsed a positive relationship between age and tax morale (Torgler, 
2007:12; Bilgin, 2014:67), others concluded that younger people are more ethical, 
perhaps showing more idealistic beliefs in ethical responsibilities (McAuliffe, 2017). 
Age in this study is captured as a categorical variable classified into 3 groups, namely: 
the dependent age group (1-25 years), the active or working age (26-59) and the old 
age, usually retirees (60+ years). The author assumes that university students, for 
instance, complete their first degree at an average age of 25, they then are employed 
between 26 and 59 years and retire at 60. As a result, age is captured as follows: 16-
25 years is coded 1, 26-59 years is coded as 2 and 60+ years as 3.  
This study submits that as individuals grow older in stable economies with vibrant 
pension schemes and other social security systems as in South Africa, they become 
more tax compliant and develop greater respect for authority/legislation/political 
responsibility. However, in unstable economies as in Zimbabwe, where pension 
schemes and social security systems are poor and ineffective, old age may not exhibit 
high tax morale. The study, thus, expects old age and middle age to have higher tax 
morale for South Africa and Zimbabwe respectively.  
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5.8.2.7 Educational level 
Educational level, according to Oberholzer and Stack (2009), as quoted in Pretorius 
(2015), is a very powerful factor that influences attitudes towards tax compliance.  
According to McGee (2012), educational level is positively and negatively related to 
tax morale and tax evasion respectively. McGee reasoned that educated people, 
unlike their uneducated counterparts, are likely to respect and uphold national rules, 
laws and regulations. This study concurs with the research findings of McGee (2012) 
and Pretorius (2015), that a higher level of education reduces taxpayer’s chances to 
evade tax. Tax literacy is crucial in making tax decisions, especially tax planning. 
Educated people are likely to have knowledge of the benefits and use of tax by the 
authorities. Given that the taxes are not abused by responsible authorities, highly 
educated people are likely to pay tax.  
This study classified and captured educational levels as follows: respondents without 
primary education level or with below primary education level were coded 1; those with 
basic primary level but without secondary level were coded 2; respondents with 
secondary level but below university level were coded 3 and respondents at university 
level and above were coded 4. The study expects that highly educated respondents 
exhibit higher morale to tax payment.  
5.8.2.8 Corruption 
There exists a growing literature on the effect of corruption on tax morale. Torgler 
(2006) argues that countries with high levels of corruption lack the social norm of 
paying taxes to the government. Thus, according to Torgler, higher levels of corruption 
increase the chances of tax evasion. Besley and Persson (2013) also confirmed that 
corruption is an obstacle to the emergence of tax compliance norms in developing 
countries. Irrespective of classes of corruption, several studies, Makumbe (2011) and 
Transparency International-Zimbabwe (2012) included, concur that corrupt people are 
unlikely to pay tax.  
This study argues that in an inefficient state where corruption is rampant, the citizens 
will have little trust in authority, which would be reciprocated by a low incentive to 
cooperate and pay tax. However, this study, unlike previous studies, interrogated 
corruption, not from the receiver's perspective, that is the tax authority, but from the 
taxpayer's viewpoint. Although corruption can be facilitated by the tax authorities, often 
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it is initiated by the taxpayer. It is the view of this study that corrupt people are unlikely 
to pay tax. Whilst tax authorities sometimes facilitate corruption, taxpayers initiate it 
and evade tax.  
Thus, in this study, corruption is coded as follows: 1 if the respondent is not corrupt 
(do not justify payment of bribe), 2 if the respondent somehow justifies corruption and 
3 if the respondent is corrupt and always justifies the payment of bribes. The study 
expects that corrupt people have low morale to pay tax.   
5.8.2.9 Hunger  
Generally, people have an inherent behaviour to fend for themselves or their families 
before they think of someone else. Further, whenever people are employed they ought 
to satisfy personal desires before thinking of meeting national obligations such as tax 
payment. It is the view of this study that a hungry person would seek to meet personal 
needs before thinking of paying tax. Thus, tax payment is a secondary commitment 
only met after satisfying higher order or primary obligations.  This study proposes that 
people who have never gone without enough food to eat have high morale to pay tax. 
The study expects that a rational person, given insufficient resources, would evade 
tax.  Consequently, people who often go without enough food to eat are likely to evade 
tax.  
Hunger (which is relatively new to available studies), in this study, is measured using 
the frequency of getting enough food to eat. The variable is therefore classified as 
follows: 1 stand for respondents who often go without enough food to eat (extremely 
hungry); 2 for respondents who sometimes go without enough food to eat; 3 for 
respondents who rarely go without enough food to eat; and 4 for respondents who 
have never gone without enough food to eat. The study supposes that extremely 
hungry people have low tax morale.   
5.8.2.10 Democracy  
Feld and Frey (2006) emphasized the role of politics and perceptions of democracy 
on tax morale. The duo submitted that tax morale is enhanced if political processes 
are perceived as fair and legitimate. Evidence also supports that citizens of countries 
that are democratically governed have greater morale to pay tax. Torgler and 
Shaltegger (2006:413) confirmed that a higher pro-democratic attitude leads to higher 
tax morale in Latin America and transition countries as well. The duo reasoned that 
124 
 
the inclusion and broad participation of the public (public participation) in tax and 
expenditure policies in democratic countries affect the individual's willingness to pay 
tax.   
Often, taxpayers construe being asked about their policy preferences as a signal that 
government considers them as partners in governance, and will in turn reciprocate 
that treatment by being willing to comply with their tax obligations. Consistent with 
previous studies, this study expects tax morale to increase with the level of democracy. 
The variable was classified and captured as follows: 1 stand for not at all democratic; 
2 for mid-low democracy; 3 for mid-democracy; 4 for mid-high democracy; and 5 for 
complete democracy.  
5.8.2.11 Pride  
The role of pride in tax matters has been widely discussed in the literature. Interesting 
among the different schools of thought is that eventually, they concur that national 
pride boosts the individual's morale to pay tax. According to Torgler (2004:243); 
Torgler and Shaltegger (2006:412), pride stimulates cooperative behaviour. Torgler 
(2003) and Tyler (2000) put forward that pride warrants love and support for the 
country. Previous studies, Leonardo and Martinez Vazquez (2016) and Torgler (2004) 
included, confirmed the positive relationship between national pride and tax morale.  
This study shares the same view with Leonardo and Martinez Vazquez and Torgler. 
The study argues that people who are proud of their nationalities are often patriotic 
and are likely to pay tax. Pride in this study is captured as follows: 1 for respondents 
who are very proud of their nationalities; 2 for quite proud; 3 for not very proud; 4 for 
not at all proud; and 5 for respondents who are not nationals of a country.  
5.8.2.12 Awareness 
The role of tax information on tax planning, compliance and evasion cannot be 
overlooked. For citizens to comply with tax, adequate and timely information on tax 
ranges, schedules and non-compliance costs, among others, is critical. Tax 
information, apart from its prospects of encouraging tax compliance, can also motivate 
tax evasion. Often, should people decide to evade tax, they utilize the information that 




This study measures tax awareness using the frequency of listening to the radio and 
captures it as follows: 1 for respondents who listen and get radio information daily; 2 
for those who get radio information weekly; 3 monthly; 4 less than monthly; and 5 
never get radio information. The study hypothesizes that people who frequently get 
tax awareness information, be it tax changes, tax policies and government tax 
expenditures in and around their country, are likely to have more or less incentives to 
pay tax. This study, therefore, expects a positive or negative effect of tax awareness 
on tax morale.   
5.8.2.13 Happiness 
There is a consensus that human contentment has an effect on tax morale. For 
whatsoever reason, angry people are dispirited to cooperate. Given chances, 
frustrated people will evade tax. This study proposes a positive relationship between 
the level of happiness and tax morale. The study argues that happy people are often 
in high spirits (cooperative) and are unlikely to evade tax. Happiness, in this study, is 
classified as follows: 1 stands for respondents who are very happy; 2 for respondents 
who are rather happy; 3 for respondents who are not very happy; and 4 for 
respondents who are not happy at all.  
5.8.2.14 Trust in Parliament 
The role of public trust in government institutions, especially the three arms of the 
government, namely the legislature, the judiciary and the executive, have been 
emphasized in McAuliff (2017) as one of the crucial determinants of tax morale.  
Frequently, citizens feel cheated if taxes are not spent efficiently (Cummings et al. 
2009). Accordingly, citizen attitudes and trust towards the government in general and 
specific institutions matter. Citizens are reluctant to contribute to a tax that they believe 
is being spent poorly. As such, literature suggests that trust in public institutions, 
mostly the legislature, contributes positively to tax compliance. 
  
For the avoidance of doubt, distrust in Parliament gives the suspicion to the public 
regarding the legitimacy of the tax laws and regulations they make. Trust in Parliament 
in this study is captured as follows: 1 if respondents have a great deal of trust in the 
Parliament; 2 if respondents have quite a lot of trust in the Parliament; 3 if respondents 
do not have very much trust in Parliament; and 4 if respondents do not at all have trust 
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in Parliament. Similar to other previous studies, this study predicts trust in Parliament 
to contribute positively to tax morale.  
 
5.9 Data sources  
The main source of data for the study is Wave 6 (2010-2014) and Wave 7 (2017-2020) 
of the World Values Survey (WVS). Wave 6 was for both South Africa and Zimbabwe 
while Wave 7 was for Zimbabwe only. The WVS investigates socio-cultural and 
political change and collects comparative data on values and belief systems. It is 
based on representative national samples of at least 1000 individuals. The World 
Values Survey (WVS) is conducted worldwide and covers quite a large number of 
countries. For Zimbabwe, Wave 6 and Wave 7 had a sample size of 1500 and 1200 
respectively. The Wave 6 survey for South Africa had 3531 participants. The survey 
interviewed participants who were above 18 years regardless of gender. The 
participants were also drawn from all the provinces in South Africa and Zimbabwe as 
well as from both rural and urban areas.  
Bilgin and Bilgin (2016:169) highlighted that all research studies on tax morale and its 
determinants used international databases such as the International Social Survey 
Programme (ISSP), World Values Survey (WVS), European Values Survey (EVS) and 
African Opinion Survey (Afrobarometer). The following are the advantages and 
disadvantages of using WVS: 
5.9.1  Advantages of using WVS 
 As taxation issues are sensitive, the surveys are advantageous in that they are 
structured in such a way that the respondent does not suspect that he/she is 
being asked about tax evasion. 
 This creates a hypothetical situation in which taxpayers have an ’easy 
opportunity’ to evade and it does not ask participants about their actual tax-
compliance behaviour. There is also evidence indicating that the replies to the 
corresponding question in the WVS are indeed linked with actual levels of tax 
evasion (Halla, 2012). 




 The surveys cover all the provinces, thus the results will give a fair assessment 
of tax morale in South Africa and Zimbabwe. 
 The data allows analysis of tax morale and its determinants in different periods.   
 A further advantage of using WVS data sets is that they cover a wide variety of 
questions on different topics, which helps reduce framing effects that may be 
present in surveys based only on tax compliance questions.  
 Lastly, WVS had the edge over other surveys' data because it captured the 
issue of hunger, which is an important factor of tax morale that was introduced 
in this study. 
5.9.2 Disadvantages of using WVS 
 People interviewed in the surveys might overstate their willingness to pay taxes, 
as no sanctions are involved.  
 Former tax evaders may compensate for their tax dodging by reporting high tax 
morale. 
5.10 Reliability 
Reliability estimates of the survey questions with respect to measuring tax morale and 
determining will be conducted. Reliability refers to the exactness of a measurement 
procedure. The data from WVS is reliable since it has been used by many researchers 
in the field of tax morale including tax morale gurus like Benno Torgler, Lars 
P. Feld and Bruno S. Frey to mention a few. Reliability is going to be measured in 
terms of Cronbach's alpha (α). The scale items will be regarded as reliable as 
Cronbach's alpha (α) values are greater than 0.70. 
5.11 Conclusion  
The chapter presented the research methodology which will be used in the study. The 
chapter also provided a discussion of the sources of variables to be used in the study 
based on the literature earlier reviewed. Thus the preambles from literature paved the 
way for the development of hypotheses that will be tested in the study. More so, the 
chapter also provided the sources of data which will be used in determining the factors 
affecting tax morale and or tax evasion. In addition, the chapter provided a discussion 
of the models which will be used in the analysis of data and the shortcomings inherent 
in each of the models. In the chapter, there was also coverage of the validity and 




ESTIMATION, PRESENTATION AND INTERPRETATION OF 
RESULTS 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter applies the research methodology elaborated in Chapter 5. Estimation, 
presentation and interpretation of the results is the object of this chapter. Descriptive 
analysis meant to enhance understanding of the data characteristics will be presented 
first. The chapter concludes by estimating, presenting and interpreting the results of 
the ordered logit model. 
6.2 Descriptive analysis 
This section presents the descriptive statistics for Zimbabwe (during the dollarization 
and post-dollarization periods) and South Africa. The table summarizes the lower (q-

















Table 6. 1: Descriptive Statistics for Zimbabwe and South Africa 
                              Zimbabwe During Dollarization Period Zimbabwe Post-Dollarization Period                     South Africa 
Variable 25 quartiles Median 75 Quartiles 25 quartiles Median 75 Quartiles 25 quartiles Median 75 Quartiles 
Tax Morale 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Marital Status 1.00 1.00 6.00 1.00 1.00 5.00 1.00 3.00 6.00 
Democracy 2.00 3.00 4.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 
Religion 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Pride 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 
Employment 2.00 4.00 4.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 1.00 4.00 4.00 
Income 2.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 
Gender 1.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 
Age 24.00 30.00 41.00 25.00 35.00 50.00 27.00 35.00 48.00 
Corruption 1.00 1.00 3.00 8.00 10.00 10.00 1.00 2.00 6.00 
Happiness 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 
Awareness 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.00 2.00 4.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 
Education 1.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 
Trust in Gvt 2.00 3.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 












6.2.1 Zimbabwe: Dollarization (2010-2014) vs post-dollarization period (2017-
2020) 
The descriptive statistics indicate close similarities in respondents' marital status, 
religion, gender, education and hunger. However, respondents indicate diverging 
views regarding their perception of democracy, employment, income, corruption, 
happiness, awareness and trust of government. Also, the age of the sample 
respondents varied during the two periods with the median age vary from 5 years to 
30 years in the post dollarization.   
6.2.2 Zimbabwe and South Africa 
Zimbabwe and South African respondents portray identical characteristics on religion, 
pride and income. On other remaining variables, the respondents from the two 
countries depict huge variations in their perception and views regarding their 
respective countries. This study suggests that these differences in respondence 
characterise, perception and views on their countries, may result in differences in the 
level of tax morale between the countries.   
6.3 Multicollinearity Test Results 
Correlation analysis has been conducted in 3 parts using 3 datasets. First, it was 
conducted using Zimbabwean data during the dollarization period that is, using 2013 
survey data. Second, it was conducted using the post-dollarization 2020 survey data 
for Zimbabwe again, and lastly, it was carried out using the 2013 South African survey 
data. The correlation matrices are done to find out whether there is a high correlation 
between the independent variables to pose the problem of multicollinearity.  
6.3.1 Zimbabwe: Dollarization period 
The correlation between tax morale and its covariates during the dollarization period 
indicates that marital status, democracy, religion, pride, income, gender, age, hunger 
and trust in government are positively correlated with tax morale, while employment, 
corruption, happiness, awareness and education have a negative association with tax 
morale. There are no indications of high correlation among covariates, suggesting the 




























MARITAL 1.0000               
DEMOCR 0.0179    1.0000              
RELIGION 0.0133 -0.0417  1.0000             
PRIDE 0.0396 -0.1386  0.0317   1.0000            
EMPLOY 0.1127   -0.0303  0.0207   0.0123 1.0000           
INCOME -0.109 -0.0313  0.0373   0.0317   0.0798    1.0000          
GENDER  0.0076    0.0338 -0.0919 -0.027 0.2314    0.0468 1.0000         
AGE -0.254    0.0476  0.0582 0.0465 0.0284  0.1095   0.0232 1.0000        
CORRUPT 0.0597 -0.0717 -0.0164 0.0340 -0.0522 -0.0608  -0.061 -0.077  1.0000       
HAPPINE -0.047 -0.1579  0.0180   0.1448  0.0202    0.1956  -0.015 0.1896    0.0029 1.0000      
AWAREN  0.086 -0.0761  0.0117   0.0799  0.1085    0.0445   0.1159 -0.004 -0.0419   0.0736  1.0000     
EDUCAT 0.0770 -0.0249 -0.0213 -0.013 -0.2125 -0.2191  -0.175 -0.417  0.0767 -0.1163 -0.1147 1.0000    
TR GOV 0.0310 -0.3386  0.0154 0.1455   -0.0114  0.0099  -0.073 -0.101 -0.0163  0.1032  0.1595   0.0546   1.0000   




































1.0000               
DEMOCRAC
Y 
0.0125  1.0000              
RELIGION 0.0322  0.0219  1.0000             
PRIDE 0.0768 -0.1761  0.0565 1.0000            
EMPLOYME
NT 
0.1304  0.0274 -0.0312  -0.022  1.0000           
INCOME  -0.032   0.0248   -0.0429  -0.023  0.0161  1.0000          
GENDER   -0.035  0.0092 -0.0965 0.0437  0.2194 -0.0264 1.0000         
AGE  -0.254  0.0080 -0.0148  -0.080  0.0556  0.0913 -0.014 1.0000        
CORRUPTI
ON 
0.0116 -0.2952 -0.0041 0.1434 -0.0440 -0.0437 -0.056 0.0021  1.0000       
HAPPINESS  -0.112 -0.2477 -0.0499 0.1647  0.0155  0.0641 -0.008 0.1711  0.1829  1.0000      
AWARENES
S 
0.0948 -0.0083  0.0706 0.0065 -0.0190    0.0087 0.1427   0.0472 -0.0484    0.0164    1.0000     
EDUCATIO
N 
0.0482 -0.0952  0.0306 0.0947 -0.1711 -0.1622 -0.177 -0.213  0.1303  0.0000 -0.1036 1.0000    
TRUST GOV 0.0609 -0.3119  0.0519 0.2464 -0.1211 -0.1218 -0.089 -0.120  0.2410  0.2438  0.0310 0.2870 1.0000   





























 1.0000               
DEMOCR
ACY 
 0.0304  1.0000              
RELIGION  0.1159   -0.0650  1.0000             
PRIDE -0.0082 -0.1709  0.0203 1.0000            
EMPLOY
MENT 
 0.2040    0.0246  0.0483 0.0442  1.0000           
INCOME  0.1526 -0.0026    0.0467  -0.017  0.1690    1.0000          
GENDER  -0.0544    0.0332 -0.1624 0.0373  0.1648  0.0132 1.0000         
AGE -0.4443 -0.0467 -0.1221  -0.007 -0.0377 -0.0873 0.0560 1.0000        
CORRUP
TION 
 0.0359  0.1168   -0.0258  -0.053 -0.0337 -0.0957  -0.015 -0.069  1.0000       
HAPPINE
SS 
 0.0515 -0.0667  0.0444   0.1307  0.1928  0.2617   0.0232 -0.044 -0.1008  1.0000      
AWAREN
ESS 
 0.0899 -0.0228    0.1098   0.0998  0.0726  0.0710 0.0184 -0.074  0.0083 -0.0387  1.0000     
EDUCATI
ON 
-0.1132  0.0311 -0.0471 0.0035 -0.2969 -0.3382  -0.030 -0.071  0.0366 -0.1779   -0.0900  1.0000    
TRUST 
GOV 
-0.0352 -0.3464  0.0068 0.0648 -0.0095 -0.0059 0.0139   0.0242   -0.1912  0.0511   0.0872 -0.0568 1.0000   





Tables 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4 all show that correlation coefficients between the variables are less than 0.8 implying the absence of 








6.4 Ordered Logit Regression results 
Table 6.5 presents the results of the ordered logit model analysis for three periods. The first column from the left shows the variables 
in the empirical model, the second shows regression results for Zimbabwe in the post-dollarization period, the third shows results for 
Zimbabwe during the dollarization period and the fourth column shows results for South Africa. The odds ratios, which are the 
exponentiated coefficients of the ordered logit shall be used to explain the effect of the independent variables on the dependent 
variable, tax morale.   
Table 6. 5 : Ordered Logit Regression results 
Variables Zimbabwe: Post-dollarization Zimbabwe: Dollarization  South Africa 
 Code Coefficients 
(t-value) 
Odds Ratio Coefficients 
(t-value) 






















 .2380607   
(0.49) 
 
Divorced (Base) 3 ----------  -------  -------  



















  (0.50) 
 
Democracy Not at all democratic 
(Base) 
1 --------  -------  --------  




1.4920 -.3517803   
(-1.17) 
 




 -.3687031   
(-1.47) 
 




1.4957 -.4444814   
 
  (-1.81)*  
0.6412 
Completely democratic 5 -.4123182   0.6621 .238582    -.5372669 0.5843 
135 
 
(-1.70)* (0.90) (-1.78)* 
Religion A religious person (Base) 1 -------  --------  -------  




 .0792352   
(0.46) 
 




 -.8141056   
(-1.01) 
 
Pride Very Proud (Base) 1 ---------  --------  --------  




1.3659 .0221562   
  (0.14) 
 





(-0.54)   
 




 .8442434   
(1.59) 
 




 1.612976   








 -.1385578   
(-0.42) 
 









3 --------  -------  --------  
Unemployed 4 .0498386   
(0.28) 
 -.2014747   
(-1.22) 
   .051405   
  (0.15) 
 
Income Level Lower Class 1   -.2748208    
(-1.24) 
 -.0207662   
(-0.12) 
 -.0321773   
(-0.14) 
 
Middle Class (Base) 2 --------  --------  -------  




 .10676  
 (0.62) 
 
Gender Male  1 ----------  --------    




 -.1236725   
  (-0.87) 
 







26-59 (Base) 2 --------  -------  --------  




 -.5580614   
(-1.93)* 
0.5723 




8.9868   3.530923   




Somehow Justifiable 2 -------  -------  -------  




0.3081 -2.595797   
(-4.31)*** 
0.0746 
Happiness Very Happy 1 .0646672 
(0.30) 
 .3763216   
(2.83)*** 
1.4569 .2453901   
(1.57) 
 
Rather Happy (Base) 2 ----------  -------  --------  
Not Very Happy 3 -.1826793 
(-1.01) 
 -.0809876   
(-0.45) 
   .303385   
(1.47) 
 




2.1624 .0881281  
  (0.22) 
 





  (0.36) 
 
Weekly (Base) 2 ---------  -------  --------  




   .2017922   
(0.62) 
 




0.6660 .1264609   
  (0.35) 
 












   (0.71) 
 




 .0679388   
(0.28) 
 




1.4858   .2540358   
(1.15) 
 
University level and 
above (Base) 
4 ---------   -------  -------  




0.6392 -.6798816  
  (-1.53) 
 




   -.21434 
(-0.97) 
 
Rarely (Base) 3 ---------  ------  --------  




 -.0102093   
(-0.05) 
 
Trust A great deal 1 -.0841116 
(-0.36) 
 .1805055   
(0.90) 
 -.1280422   
(-0.51) 
 
Quite a lot (Base) 2 ---------  -------  --------  
Not very much 3 .3487155   1.4172 .0600668    .0635737  
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(1.76)* (0.43)     (0.37) 




 -.437466   
(-2.16) 
0.6457 
Number of observations 1215  1215    1215  
LR chi2(41)   56.39  305.46  856.29  
Prob > chi2   0.0553  0.0000   0.0000  
Pseudo R2 0.0335  0.1081    0.3160  






6.5 Specification Test: Linktest, a simplified version of the Ramsey Regression Equation Specification Error Test (RESET) 
Table 6. 6: Linktest – South Africa 
  taxmorale Coef. Std. Err. z     P>|z|    
  _hat 1.098868   .3559542 3.09     0.002 
_hatsq -.013203 .0466016   -0.28     0.777   
As the prediction squared has no explanatory power, the regression model shows no evidence of misspecification. 
 
Table 6. 7: Linktest – Zimbabwe - dollarization 
  taxmorale Coef. Std. Err. z     P>|z|    
  _hat 1.080475   .1129599   9.57     0.000    
_hatsq -.0262682 .0324203    -0.81   0.418   
As the prediction squared has no explanatory power, the regression model shows no evidence of misspecification. 
 
Table 6. 8: Linktest – post-dollarization 
  tax 
morale 
Coef. Std. Err.    z     P>|z|    
  _hat 1.165055    .2125178      
5.48   
   0.000    
_hatsq -.1420445   .1433924     -
0.99 
    0.322   




6.6 Interpretation and Discussion of Results  
Discussion of results in this study is done in two parts. The first part compares the 
regression results between two economic periods, the dollarization period, characterised 
by currency reforms leading to economic stability and recovery, and the post-dollarization 
period characterised by change of leadership, currency reforms again, reforming back to 
the mono-currency system, and economic, currency and political instability as well as 
economic decline. The second part involves a comparison of regression results between 
South Africa and Zimbabwe under dollarization using the 2013 survey data.  
6.6.1 Dollarization and post-dollarization regression results 
Empirical analysis of the determinants of tax morale during and after dollarization shows 
that marital status explains tax morale for the dollarization period only. Firstly, the 
separated have 138% higher odds of being in the higher category of tax morale than the 
divorced at the 10% level of significance. Also, the single is 2.02 times more likely to have 
higher tax morale than the divorced at the 5% level. Therefore, being single or separated 
is associated with having higher tax morale than the divorced in dollarized Zimbabwe, all 
other variables held constant.    
Perceptions of democracy have been found to influence tax morale in both periods. 
Nonetheless, the results for democracy in the post-dollarization period are quite 
surprising. They contradict the theoretical prediction. Whilst theory predicts that people 
who believe the country to be democratically governed are expected to have high tax 
morale, the results show the opposite. People who believe the country to be completely 
democratic were 44% less likely to be in the high tax morale category than those in the 
not democratic at all category. On the contrary, and in line with theory, people in the mid-
low and mid-high democracy categories are both 1.49 times more likely to have higher 
tax morale than those who are not democratic at all at the 10% level, holding all other 
variables constant.  
Religion has been confirmed to influence tax morale in the post-dollarization period at the 
10% level of significance while being insignificant for dollarized Zimbabwe. Those who 
are not religious are 52% less likely to be in the higher tax morale category compared to 
140 
 
the religious. The result means that being religious increases the willingness of a person 
to pay taxes, ceteris paribus for post-dollarization Zimbabwe.  
All categories of national pride are statistically insignificant to explain tax morale in the 
post-dollarization period. Conversely, “quite proud and not very proud”, which are 
categories of national pride during the dollarization period, were positive and statistically 
significant at a 5 % level of significance. The quite proud and the not very proud were 
1.36 and 1.93 times more likely to be in the higher tax morale category than the very 
proud. The results go against the theoretical predictions which suggest that people with 
weak pride in their nations have low tax morale. These findings could be as a result of 
economic stability experienced during the dollarization period such that even people with 
weak pride of being Zimbabweans were willing to pay tax. Another possible explanation 
could be that those not proud of their country would then want to pay taxes in order to 
improve their country, while those who are already very proud are happy with the status 
quo and see no need to pay more taxes. 
The results further indicate that income level is a factor that influenced tax morale in the 
post-dollarization period at the 10% level but insignificant for the dollarization period.  
Regression results show that the upper-income class citizens were 25% less likely to be 
in the higher tax morale category than the middle-class citizens. This means that the 
upper-class citizen’s higher ability to pay taxes does not translate to higher tax morale. 
The results are in sync with the theory which predicts an ambiguous relationship between 
tax morale income levels.  This study argues that the results could be a reflection of the 
state of the economic situation in the post-dollarization period wherein every individual 
focussed just on securing basic needs at the expense of tax obligations.  
Perceptions of corruption have been found to influence tax morale in both periods. The 
not justifiable category was significant for dollarized Zimbabwe only, with people in that 
category being 8.9 times more likely to be in the higher tax morale category compared to 
those who felt it is somehow justifiable. On the other hand, those who felt that corruption 
was always justifiable were 40%, 70% less likely to be in the higher tax morale category 
than those who felt it somehow justifiable for post-dollarization Zimbabwe (5% 
significance) and dollarized Zimbabwe (1%), respectively. Therefore justifying corruption 
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is associated with low tax morale in both periods while being anti-corruption justifying 
corruption is associated with higher tax morale for the dollarized period.  
Happiness is also a factor that was found to influence tax morale during the dollarization 
period. The same variable is found insignificant in affecting tax morale in the post-
dollarization period. The very happy and not happy at all were 46% and 116% more likely 
to be in the higher tax morale category than those who are rather happy at the 1% and 
5% level of significance, respectively.  
Further, the regression results show that awareness is a factor that determines tax morale 
in both the dollarization and post-dollarization periods for the less than monthly category 
at a 10 % level of significance. The results indicate that people who listen to the radio and 
get information on what is happening in and outside the country “less than monthly” are 
89% more likely to be in the higher tax morale category, relative to weekly, in the post-
dollarization period and reduce the same chances by 33% for the dollarization period. 
Suggestions are that during the dollarization period, when the economy was stable, 
people focused on savings and investment, given that for the past period they had been 
de-saving. Accordingly, people used the radio information to know what is required of 
them and evade taxes. 
Likewise, education was statistically significant for both periods, all at the 5% level. For 
post dollarization, in Zimbabwe, those with primary and secondary level education were 
2.49 and 2.42 times more likely to have high tax morale than those with university-level 
education. In the case of dollarized Zimbabwe, those who learnt up to secondary level 
were 1.49 times more likely to be in the higher tax morale category than those with tertiary 
education. The results seem to imply that tax morale is higher among the less educated 
than the highly educated.  
Hunger has also been empirically confirmed to influence tax morale during both the 
dollarization and post-dollarization periods. For post dollarization Zimbabwe, being 
sometimes and never hungry increased the odds of having higher tax morale by 1.8 and 
1.6 times compared to those who are rarely hungry, respectively. For dollarized 
Zimbabwe, being often hungry reduced the odds of having high tax morale by 36% per 
cent compared to those in the rarely hungry category. 
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The regression results further indicate that trust in Parliament had a statistically significant 
effect on the level of tax morale in the post-dollarization period, but insignificant for the 
dollarization period. Those in the not very much category were 41% more likely to have 
high tax morale than those who trust in parliament quite a lot, at the 10% level of 
significance. These results contradict with theory as they imply that people are more likely 
to pay taxes if they do not trust Parliament.  
6.6.2 South Africa and Zimbabwe regression results 
Empirical analysis of the determinants of tax morale for South Africa and Zimbabwe 
(dollarized) presented in Figure 6.4 show that marital status does not explain tax morale 
in South Africa. However, in Zimbabwe, the separated have 138% higher odds of being 
in the higher category of tax morale than the divorced at the 10% level of significance. 
Also, the single is 2.02 times more likely to have higher tax morale than the divorced at 
the 5% level. Therefore, being single or separated is associated with having higher tax 
morale than the divorced in dollarized Zimbabwe, all other variables held constant.   
The results go against prior predictions which expect married people to have higher tax 
morale. These results could be a result of the fact that divorced and separated persons 
have fewer responsibilities than married people. The study suggests that married people 
are more concerned about the future of their children, and as such, they mostly focus on 
planned investment for them, sometimes through sending them to boarding schools and 
investing in businesses. They are pessimistic on whether the government when they are 
no longer alive, would provide social nets for their children. As such they are more willing 
to secure a tangible legacy for their children at the expense of tax payment.  
Democracy is statistically significant to explain tax morale in both South Africa and 
Zimbabwe. For South Africa, those in the mid-high and completely democratic categories 
had 36% and 42% lower odds of being in the higher tax morale category, than those in 
the not democratic at all category. This is contrary to the theory which predicts high tax 
morale for people who perceive the country to be democratically governed. On the 
contrary, and in line with theory, for Zimbabwe, those who believe that the governance of 
the country is reasonably democratic (mid-low and mid-high democracy) are both 1.49 
times more likely to have higher tax morale than those who believe it is not democratic 
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at, holding all other variables constant. This implies that the higher the democracy the 
lower the tax morale for South Africa, and the opposite is true for Zimbabwe.  
Religion, income level, gender and employment status are statistically insignificant to 
explain tax morale for both South Africa and Zimbabwe. 
All categories of pride are also statistically insignificant to explain tax morale in South 
Africa, whilst those who are quite proud and not very proud were 1.36 and 1.93 times 
more likely to be in the higher tax morale category than the very proud for Zimbabwe. 
This study argues that during the period under investigation, Zimbabwe’s economy was 
on a recovery path after a long decade of deplorable recession, such that even people 
who were not proud of being Zimbabweans because of the hard memories of the 
recession times, were willing to show appreciation and solidarity to the government 
through paying tax.  
The age variable was significant for South Africa only, with those above 60 years of age 
having a 43% less likelihood of being in the higher tax morale category than those in the 
26-59 age category. This is especially reasonable given that the over 60 years people are 
now in retirement and have less income (probably just pensions and savings) because 
they are now economically inactive. Their affinity to pay tax is likely to be low.  
Corruption is established to be a critical determinant of tax morale for both South Africa 
and Zimbabwe. Those who felt that corruption is not justifiable were 8.9 and 34 times 
more likely to be in the higher tax morale category compared to those who felt it is 
somehow justifiable, for Zimbabwe and South Africa respectively both at 1% significance 
level. On the other hand, those who felt that corruption was always justifiable were 70% 
and 93% less likely to be in the higher tax morale category than those who felt it somehow 
justifiable for Zimbabwe and South Africa, respectively at the 1% level. The results 
indicate that people who justify corruption have lower tax morale than those who are 
against corruption.  
The regression results also indicate that all categories of happiness do not explain tax 
morale in South Africa. However, for Zimbabwe, being “very happy” and “not happy at all” 
increased the odds of being in a higher tax morale category by 46% and 116% compared 
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to those who are rather happy at the 1% and 5% level of significance, respectively. The 
results are inconsistent with the theory, which suggests that happy people are expected 
to have higher tax morale than those who confirm that they are not happy at all.  
All categories of awareness, hunger and education are statistically insignificant to explain 
tax morale in South Africa. However, the same factors have been empirically confirmed 
to determine tax morale in Zimbabwe. For awareness, listening to the radio less than 
monthly reduces the likelihood of being in the high tax morale category by 33% compared 
to weekly. Concerning hunger, being often hungry reduced the odds of having high tax 
morale by 36% compared to those in the rarely hungry category. This implies that hunger 
reduces tax morale in Zimbabwe. In the case of education, those who learnt up to 
secondary level were 1.49 times more likely to be in the higher tax morale category than 
those with tertiary education. The results seem to imply that tax morale is higher among 
the less educated than the highly educated.  
The empirical results further show that trust is statistically insignificant for Zimbabwe but 
significant for South Africa at the 5% level. Those who do not trust parliament at all have 
a 35% less likelihood of being in the high tax morale category compared to those who 
trust Parliament quite a lot. Lack of trust in parliament reduces tax morale among South 
Africans.  
6.7 Conclusion 
The chapter estimated, presented and interpreted the results of the ordered logit model 
applied to investigate the determinants of tax morale using odds ratios. The study 
investigated determinants of tax morale (i) between Zimbabwean samples classified into 
dollarization and post-dollarization periods (ii) and between the Zimbabwean sample 
(under dollarization) and South African sample. It has been established that marital 
status, democracy, pride, corruption, happiness, awareness, education and hunger were 
determinants of tax morale during the dollarization period in Zimbabwe, whereas 
democracy, religion, income, corruption, awareness, education, hunger and trust are 
determinants of tax morale in the post-dollarization period. It can be noted from this 
analysis that the factors that determine tax morale during and post-dollarization have 
changed with changes in the economic situation in the country. For South Africa, the 
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analysis established that it is democracy, age, corruption and trust in Parliament that 
explain variability in tax morale. This entails that the determinants of tax morale in South 






















CONCLUSIONS, POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
 7.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the findings and conclusions of the study and points out areas for 
future research. The chapter is structured as follows: Section 7.2 highlights the study 
summary and Section 7.3 discusses the findings. In Section 7.4 the study’s contribution 
to the body of knowledge is discussed and Section 7.5 proposes policy recommendations. 
Section 7.6 provides recommendations for further study in the area.  
7.2 Summary of the study 
From the literature reviewed in the study, it was revealed that few or no comparative 
studies had been done on the determinants of tax morale between South Africa and 
Zimbabwe. The main objective of the study was to identify and analyse the factors that 
influence tax morale in South Africa and Zimbabwe.  In order to achieve this, the research 
sought to achieve five primary objectives. Firstly, the study critically assessed the 
dynamics of the tax systems in South Africa and Zimbabwe. Secondly, the research 
empirically determined the level of tax morale in both South Africa and Zimbabwe. Thirdly, 
the study critically analysed the relationship between tax morale and tax compliance. 
Fourthly, it compared determinants of tax morale in South Africa and Zimbabwe. Lastly, 
the study compared the level of tax morale in Zimbabwe in economic stability and in 
economic instability situations. 
To achieve the first objective, this study critically assessed the tax systems in South 
African and Zimbabwe. It outlined the evolution of tax collection and tax compliance 
experiences and trends in the studied countries. In particular, it explored the origin of 
taxation and discussed the development of tax systems in terms of structural reforms and 
regulatory reforms. It also discussed the tax systems’ performance during the recent 
decades (measured in terms of the tax-GDP ratio and tax buoyancy) and identified factors 
that affect tax compliance and the strategies used to mitigate against the jaws of tax 
evasion and avoidance. In addition, it presented the key challenges facing the 
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governments in terms of tax collection in the studied countries. More so, the study critically 
compared the similarities and the differences between the tax systems in these two 
countries. Lastly, to achieve the last objective, a comparison of levels of tax morale in 
Zimbabwe during economic stability and economic turmoil was done. 
In order to achieve the empirical objectives of the study, data was collected using a 
standardized questionnaire from the World Values Survey on public attitudes on 
democracy, governance, markets, taxation and civil society in a number of countries 
around the world. The surveys interviewed participants who were above 18 years 
regardless of gender and ran for the period 2010 to 2020. Both dependent and 
independent variables were derived from the questions in the questionnaires mentioned 
above. An ordered logit model was estimated to determine the effects of the identified 
independent variables on tax morale in the two countries under study. Also, an ordered 
logit model was used to compare tax morale for South Africa and Zimbabwe as well as 
comparing tax morale in Zimbabwe in different economic environments.  
This study also explored the theoretical and empirical literature that investigated the 
factors affecting tax morale in the studied countries. It found that the macroeconomic 
factors being investigated in the literature included social norms, trust in public 
institutions, demographic factors, corruption, quality of governance, pride in one’s nation, 
satisfaction with democracy and happiness. The study found that the relationships 
between these factors and tax morale were extremely debatable in the literature. 
Therefore, the study enhanced the literature by conducting an empirical investigation on 
the factors that affect tax morale in South Africa and Zimbabwe. 
Furthermore, through the literature review, the study critically examined the effect of tax 
morale on tax compliance. Sustainable tax compliance levels are critical goals of each 
and every nation around the globe.  A plethora of studies concurred that tax morale has 
a positive relationship with tax compliance, signalling the importance of studying tax 
morale. The literature review also highlighted that tax morale, as part of behavioural 
economics, is the latest phenomenon that can be used to explain why tax compliance 




7.3 Summary of thesis findings 
The study was divided into two sections, namely, a comparison of tax morale in Zimbabwe 
during the dollarization era and the post-dollarization period, and an assessment of tax 
morale determinants in South Africa and Zimbabwe.  
Independent variables that had similar effects on tax morale during both dollarization and 
post-dollarization include hunger, awareness, corruption and education level. Corruption 
and hunger showed a negative relationship with tax morale while the results indicated 
that the higher the level of education acquired, the higher the willingness to pay tax. Also, 
the study had findings that the more that people get information through the radio, the 
more they are willing to pay tax. Contrasting results were noted on democracy, income 
level, religion, happiness, trust in Parliament and marital status. Single participants 
exhibited higher tax morale than their married counterparts during the dollarization era, 
while the variable was insignificant in the post-dollarization period.  
Interesting results for satisfaction with democracy were displayed for the post-
dollarization era when the participants who were satisfied with democracy indicated low 
tax morale, which is deviant from the findings of the literature review in Chapter 4. 
Furthermore, the study revealed that a higher level of happiness among Zimbabweans 
during the dollarization period had a positive relationship with tax morale, while happiness 
was insignificant during the post-dollarization period. Trust in Parliament and religion was 
positively correlated with tax morale in the post-dollarization era while the two variables 
were insignificant in the dollarization period. A higher class of participants in terms of 
income level showed a negative relationship with tax morale in the post-dollarization 
period, while income level did not influence tax morale in the dollarization era. 
It has also been shown that marital status, democracy, pride, corruption, happiness, 
awareness, education and hunger are statistically significant determinants of tax morale 
in Zimbabwe. For South Africa, the analysis established that it is democracy, age, 
corruption and trust in Parliament that explain variability in tax morale. This entails that 
the determinants of tax morale in South Africa and Zimbabwe are not perfectly similar, 




7.4 Contributions of the study 
The sub-section covers the contributions of the study in terms of the methodology, theory 
and management of taxes in South Africa and Zimbabwe. This research makes far-
reaching contributions to behavioural economics in relation to the factors that influence 
tax morale in many dimensions. Firstly, to the researcher’s knowledge, this is the first 
study to focus on factors that influence tax morale that include the hunger variable. 
According to World Vision (2020), hunger is increasing at a shocking rate in Africa. The 
organisation estimated that in Africa, 20% of the population are experiencing hunger. The 
inclusion of hunger will assist policymakers, especially in Third World countries to choose 
a sustainable mix in dealing with the improvement of tax compliance. 
Secondly, the study contributes immensely to the body of literature as it is the first to 
analyse tax morale and its determinants in two different economic set-ups experienced 
by a developing country. Thirdly, an analysis and comparison of trends in tax systems for 
the two different African countries, in terms of economic growth, drew important 
conclusions on the impact of the socio-economic environment on tax morale. 
7.5 Policy recommendations 
One of the important objectives of the study is that it deduces recommendations that, if 
undertaken by policymakers, will improve the much-needed tax compliance levels. The 
major recommendation put forward by the study is that governments should invest in the 
understanding of tax morale and its determinants. Tax morale is worthwhile to the 
economy since it lessens the government's expense of financing the public sector. A high 
level of tax morale means that many people are paying tax, and thus there is an increase 
in the tax base which can lead to a reduction of tax rates. Low tax rates have the effect 
of improving the standard of living of the whole populace as disposable income is 
increased. More so, low tax rates have been proven to diminish financial bonds in the 
market, thus reducing enforcement and administrative expenses by the government. The 
spared revenue can be directed to other formative exercises profiting public development 
and advancement. 
The second recommendation is that the tax authorities should intensify tax education and 
public campaigns to enhance acknowledgement that the payment of tax is a public 
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obligation and commitment of all, as opposed to citizens’ perception of it as an oppressive 
exercise to consume their hard-earned income. To guarantee the accomplishment of 
raising tax proficiency to the best effect, the study recommends that the tax authorities 
should adopt the 'catch them young' concept on primary and secondary school pupils, 
thereby educating them on the importance of complying with tax laws. SARS and ZIMRA 
should also continue to broadcast tax tutorials through their respective websites, social 
media and radio with wide coverage. 
The third recommendation submitted by the study is that the management of corruption 
and hunger by Third World countries is vital in formulating policies that seek to boost tax 
compliance. Corruption has a negative impact on public service delivery, which is an 
important factor that influences citizens’ decision to pay tax. Satisfaction with the public 
service delivery is positively correlated with tax morale, and thus the perception that the 
tax paid is put to good use motivates citizens to pay tax.  
More so, the research suggests that administration arms, namely parliament, the 
executive and the judiciary should deal with improving trust in them by citizens. The more 
that residents believe that government officials meet their requirements on the most 
fundamental level, the more they are willing to pay tax. Moreover, the study additionally 
suggests that governments should work on building a relationship of trust and 
participation between taxpayers and tax authorities to evoke the much needed voluntary 
tax compliance. 
7.6 Recommendations for future study 
This study focuses on only two African countries, and future research on determinants of 
tax morale using this study’s approach can achieve improved results if more countries 
can be added. Additional countries would provide more data points and thus more robust 
suppositions. 
There are some issues in respect of which the research did not fully address all the tenets 
of the recently launched slippery slope framework. This will be done by determining how 
the perceived power of authorities and procedural justice has an effect on tax morale 
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under contrasting economic conditions in Zimbabwe. The perceived power of authorities 
and procedural justice can then be compared across countries.  
The study focused mainly on comparing tax morale in Zimbabwe under the dollarization 
and post-dollarization eras. Future studies can thus determine the different political 
changes within the Zimbabwean landscape. The periods which can be included in the 
study will be before the government of national unity, during the government of national 
unity (2009-2013), post-GNU, and post-Mugabe era. In this case, studies will be able to 
see the extent to which the different political establishments affected the tax morale in the 
context of Zimbabwe. 
In future, other studies can look at how the use of technology such as the e-filing system 
which is used by the Zimbabwean regulator ZIMRA has affected the tax morale of the 
citizens of Zimbabwe. The use of technology can thereby be used to determine the 
interaction of technology and economic conditions in the country and how these can 
jointly affect tax morale in a country like Zimbabwe with a high literacy rate. 
Other studies can minimize the methodological weaknesses associated with each method 
of data collection on the determinants of tax morale. There is therefore a need to fuse the 
quantitative research approach with an experimental approach such that there is an 
enrichment of the data on the determinants of tax morale. With the hybrid experimental 
and quantitative survey approach, there is an increase in the reaching of sound 
conclusions. 
Results of the study showed that there are some factors that show negative or no 
relationships with tax morale and its determinants. Therefore, future studies need to look 
at how policies can change the tax morale of the citizens. They need to distinguish 
between persuasive and enforcement policies in dealing with the country’s citizens.  
Lastly, the study recommends additional surveys that target the context of African 
countries better by also focusing more on the interaction between taxpayers and the tax 
administration, for example, the Taxpayer Opinion Survey done by Torgler et al. 2008 
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